Alfred M. Rankin, Jr.
About Alfred M. Rankin, Jr.
Executive Chairman of Hyster-Yale, Inc. since May 2023 (director since 2012) and former Chairman & CEO through May 2023; age 83 . Under his leadership transition to Executive Chairman, the company posted improving profitability: Net Income rose from a loss in 2022 to $128.1M in 2023 and $144.2M in 2024, with Lift Truck consolidated operating profit increasing to $296.7M in 2024 . He is Non‑Executive Chairman at NACCO Industries (and NNRC) and Hamilton Beach Brands Holding, and is a member of the founding Rankin family (controlled voting structure) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hyster‑Yale, Inc. | Executive Chairman | May 2023–present | Oversight following separation of CEO/Chair roles in 2023; chairs Executive Committee, participates on Planning Advisory and Finance Committees . |
| Hyster‑Yale, Inc. | Chairman & Chief Executive Officer | Prior to 2020–May 2023 | Led turnaround to stronger profitability; guided long‑term strategy and capital allocation . |
| Hyster‑Yale, Inc. | President | Prior to 2020–Feb 2021 | Senior operating leadership . |
| Hyster‑Yale Materials Handling (HYMH) | Chairman | Prior to 2020–Dec 2024 | Governance of principal operating subsidiary . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| NACCO Industries, Inc. and NNRC | Non‑Executive Chairman | Prior to 2020–present | Former parent of Hyster‑Yale; ongoing board leadership . |
| Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Co. | Non‑Executive Chairman | Prior to 2020–present | Related public company; board leadership . |
| Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland | Director (past) | Not specified | Prior service referenced in biography . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 1,006,400 | 1,041,926 (100% of midpoint) |
| Cash in lieu of perquisites (target) ($) | 40,000 | 40,000 |
| Target bonus (% of salary midpoint) | 90% | 90% |
Performance Compensation
2024 Short‑Term Incentive Plan (Executive Chairman)
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout factor | Weighted payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lift Truck consolidated truck revenue | 20% | $4,366.3M | $4,113.8M | 88.4% | 17.7% |
| Lift Truck new units bookings % of target revenue | 15% | 100.0% | 72.8% | 40.0% | 6.0% |
| Lift Truck new units bookings adjusted standard margin % | 20% | 17.0% | 21.0% | 150.0% | 30.0% |
| Lift Truck average inventory % of adjusted standard cost | 25% | 23.5% | 27.7% | 40.0% | 10.0% |
| Lift Truck consolidated operating profit $ | 20% | $251.3M | $296.7M | 130.1% | 26.0% |
| Corporate Lift Truck subtotal → Group weighting 75% | — | — | — | — | 67.3% |
| Nuvera total bookings revenue $ | 70% of Nuvera | $13.6M | $0.8M | 42.2% | 29.5% (Nuvera subtotal 42.0%; group weighting 15% → 6.3%) |
| Nuvera adjusted standard margin % | 10% of Nuvera | 5.0% | (9.4)% | 40.0% | 4.0% |
| Nuvera operating profit $ | 20% of Nuvera | $(35.1)M | $(39.8)M | 42.4% | 8.5% |
| Bolzoni consolidated revenue $ | 20% of Bolzoni | $380.9M | $379.1M | 99.1% | 19.8% (Bolzoni subtotal 81.1%; group weighting 10% → 8.1%) |
| Bolzoni adjusted standard margin % | 35% of Bolzoni | 27.10% | 25.60% | 87.5% | 30.6% |
| Bolzoni operating profit $ | 20% of Bolzoni | $19.1M | $13.7M | 65.9% | 13.2% |
| Bolzoni average inventory % of adjusted standard cost | 25% of Bolzoni | 30.80% | 32.40% | 70.0% | 17.5% |
| Final payout % | — | — | — | — | 81.7% |
Cash payout (2024): $765,968 (81.685% of $937,710 target) .
2024 Equity Long‑Term Plan
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout factor | Vesting/holding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROTCE | 50% | 32.8% | 38.6% | 200.0% → 100.0% weighted | Fully vested on grant; 10‑year transfer restriction (NEOs) |
| Strategic Objectives list | 50% | 100% | 97.7% | 97.7% → 48.9% weighted | Same as above |
| Total payout % | 100% | — | — | 148.9% | — |
2024 LT award values (Executive Chairman):
- Cash‑denominated payout: $1,975,908 .
- Grant‑date fair value of stock component: $2,949,675 (55,900 shares initially issued before net settlement; 46,669 shares delivered after tax netting) .
Pay Mix: 2022–2024 (Executive Chairman)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock awards ($) | Non‑equity incentive ($) | All other comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 1,192,218 | 1,825,997 | 1,116,804 | 223,630 | 5,384,048 |
| 2023 | 1,122,702 | 5,854,135 | 2,490,836 | 464,828 | 9,979,305 |
| 2024 | 1,081,926 | 2,949,675 | 2,139,768 | 456,260 | 6,673,780 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Class | Beneficial ownership (shares) | % of class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class A Common | 273,125 (270,101 sole; 3,024 shared) | 1.92% | Includes shares held by family members and trusts; certain interests disclaimed as noted in footnotes . |
| Class B Common | 2,943,424 (65,058 sole; 2,878,366 shared) | 85.19% | Held via Rankin family partnerships/trusts subject to a stockholders’ agreement; combined directors/executives control ~72.65% of voting power (A+B) . |
| 2024 shares received under LT plan | 46,669 shares delivered; $2,462,583 value at grant‑date price | — | Net of shares surrendered for taxes (55,900 initially issued) . |
Alignment policies and potential pressure:
- Hedging prohibited for officers/directors; pledging allowed only with prior approval .
- Ten‑year transfer restriction on NEO equity awards materially reduces near‑term selling pressure .
- No formal executive ownership guidelines; decade‑long holding functions as de facto guideline .
- Family group pledging observed (not attributed to A.M. Rankin personally): e.g., Britton T. Taplin pledged 384,451 Class A; certain GST trusts of J.C. Butler and David B.H. Williams pledged Class A and Class B shares .
Employment Terms
- No individual employment or change‑in‑control (CIC) agreements; limited CIC protections under incentive and nonqualified deferred comp plans (pro‑rata target award in CIC year; no tax gross‑ups) .
- Severance per broad U.S. plan: severance pay and continuation of certain health benefits tied to service length; no defined benefit pension .
- Clawbacks: NYSE‑compliant mandatory policy for restatements (3‑year lookback; no‑fault) and supplemental discretionary clawback for financial restatements .
- Insider trading policy; limited trading windows .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric (USD millions) | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income (Loss) | (71.6) | 128.1 | 144.2 |
| Lift Truck Consolidated Operating Profit (Loss) | 24.6 | 237.1 | 296.7 |
- Compensation program received strong shareholder support: 97% approval (2023) and 99% (2024) say‑on‑pay .
Board Governance
- Director since 2012; currently Executive Chairman; not independent .
- Committees: Executive Committee (Chair); Planning Advisory; Finance .
- Board separated CEO/Chair roles in 2023; no Lead Independent Director .
- Controlled‑company status by NYSE definition due to Rankin family holdings, but the Board elects not to rely on governance exemptions; Audit, NCG, and Compensation Committees fully independent .
- Director attendance: all directors attended ≥75% of Board and committee meetings in 2024; all attended 2024 annual meeting .
Director Compensation (as Director)
- Receives no separate director compensation; paid solely as a Named Executive Officer (NEO). Director fee table expressly excludes A.M. Rankin for fees .
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Committee members: John P. Jumper (Chair), Gary L. Collar, Carolyn Corvi, Edward T. Eliopoulos, H. Vincent Poor; all independent .
- Uses Korn Ferry as independent consultant; targets NEO compensation at 50th percentile of broad industrial survey; cash/equity mix designed for pay‑for‑performance .
- Long‑term awards fully vested at grant but subject to 10‑year transfer restrictions, aligning with long‑term value creation .
Compensation Structure Observations
- Shift in equity: Stock awards (grant‑date fair value) decreased from $5.85M (2023) to $2.95M (2024), while cash incentive declined from $2.49M (2023) to $2.14M (2024), reflecting lower LT formula/share‑price dynamics and ST payout factor (81.7% in 2024 vs ~98.8% in 2023) .
- Program maintains high at‑risk orientation: 2024 target comp mix for Executive Chairman remained majority variable (20% ST, 57% LT of midpoint; plus 1% perqs), consistent with 2023 structure .
- No discretionary bonuses in 2024; awards formulaically driven with limited committee discretion .
Related Party and Interlocks
- Family relationships: J.C. Butler, Jr. and David B.H. Williams (sons‑in‑law) and Claiborne R. Rankin (brother) serve as directors; standard related‑party review policy in place .
- No compensation committee interlocks reported .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Say‑on‑Pay approval |
|---|---|
| 2023 | 97% |
| 2024 | 99% |
Management disclosed ongoing engagement and kept 2025 program largely consistent with 2024 structure .
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment from 10‑year transfer restrictions on NEO equity and prohibition on hedging; however, permitted pledging (with approval) and significant family control create governance optics and potential overhang if any large pledges are forced‑sold (note: pledges disclosed for other family members/trusts, not for A.M. Rankin personally) .
- Executive Chairman role with family control concentrates influence; absence of a Lead Independent Director may be a governance concern for some investors, though committee independence and say‑on‑pay support mitigate near‑term risk .
- Pay outcomes track operating performance: 2024 ST payout at ~82% and LT at ~149% mirrored robust ROTCE and operating profit—a constructive signal for pay‑for‑performance discipline .
- CIC economics are modest (pro‑rata target, no gross‑ups) and no individual employment agreements—reduces parachute risk and supports capital discipline in event paths .