Adam Richins
IDACORPAbout Adam Richins
Adam J. Richins, age 46, is Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Idaho Power (principal subsidiary of IDACORP) since October 2019 and is one of IDACORP’s named executive officers (NEOs) . During 2024, IDACORP achieved its 17th consecutive year of earnings per share growth and increased its quarterly dividend; Idaho Power set record retail MWh sales and maintained 99.96% service reliability, underscoring operational execution under Richins’ tenure . Long-term incentive performance for the 2022–2024 cycle paid 200% on cumulative EPS ($15.75 CEPS) but paid 0% on relative TSR (24th percentile vs. 30th threshold), highlighting strong financial delivery with TSR underperformance vs. peers .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Idaho Power Company | Senior Vice President & Chief Operating Officer | Oct 2019–Present | Operational leadership through period of record customer growth and retail MWh sales |
External Roles
No external public-company directorships or external roles are disclosed for Richins in the company’s executive officer listings (10‑K) and proxy materials reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (SEC-reported):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 485,000 | 530,000 | 585,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 573,119 | 715,702 | 845,632 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($) | 508,348 | 568,616 | 583,502 |
| Change in Pension Value ($) | — (negative excluded per SEC method) | 779,987 | 230,584 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 12,200 | 13,200 | 13,800 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 1,578,667 | 2,607,505 | 2,258,518 |
| Total Without Change in Pension Value ($) | 1,578,667 | 1,827,518 | 2,027,934 |
2024 base salary and STI opportunity:
- 2024 base salary: $585,000 .
- Short-term incentive opportunity as % of base salary: Threshold 30%, Target 60%, Max 120% .
- 2024 STI paid (actual): $583,502 .
Performance Compensation
2024 Short-Term Incentive Metrics (Company-level)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Multiplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Customer Satisfaction (CRI) | 15% | 84.25% | 82.95% | 15% weighting scale; actual below target (linear scale) |
| Service Reliability (avg outage incidents ≥5 min) | 15% | ≤1.25 | 1.26 | 15% weighting scale; near target (linear scale) |
| Net Income (IDACORP, $mm) | 56% | $278.0 | $289.2 | Achieved above target; max schedule published |
| Preservation of ADITCs ($mm) | 14% | ≥$15.0 | $77 | Above maximum threshold |
- Overall 2024 STI payout around 166% of target, reflecting record net income, strong reliability, and significant ADITC preservation .
2024 Long-Term Incentive (granted Feb 16, 2024)
Design and performance measures:
- Mix: One-third time-vesting RSUs vesting January 2027; two-thirds performance-based RSUs (PSUs) over 2024–2026 (CEPS and relative TSR equally weighted) .
- CEPS goals (2024–2026): Threshold $13.50; Target $14.65; Max $15.80 .
- Relative TSR (vs EEI Utilities Index): Threshold 30th percentile; Target 55th percentile; Max 90th percentile .
Richins’ 2024 LTI grant detail:
| Component | Shares | Vest / Performance Period |
|---|---|---|
| Time-vesting RSUs | 3,299 | Cliff vest 1/1/2027 |
| PSUs – Threshold | 2,970 | Performance end 12/31/2026 |
| PSUs – Target | 6,598 | Performance end 12/31/2026 |
| PSUs – Maximum | 13,196 | Performance end 12/31/2026 |
Prior cycle PSU outcome (earned Feb 2025):
| PSU Grant (Feb 2022) | Shares Earned | Dividend Equivalents ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Richins | 3,774 | 39,438 |
Short-Term Incentive Mechanics and Targets (structure)
- 2024 STI goal structure: Net Income (56%), ADITC preservation (14%), Customer Satisfaction (15%), Service Reliability (15%) .
- STI payment conditionality: No executive STI pays if employees receive no STI or if IDACORP lacks net income sufficient to pay common dividends (not triggered in 2024) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 14,611 shares of IDACORP common stock (as of Mar 17, 2025); <1% of class |
| Unvested Time RSUs | 7,528 units; $822,660 market value at $109.28 (12/31/2024) |
| Unearned PSUs (Outstanding) | 12,624 units; $1,379,551 payout value shown at $109.28 under status for 2022–2024, 2023–2025, 2024–2026 cycles per table |
| Options | No IDACORP options outstanding; company does not award options |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Senior vice presidents: 3x base salary; performance RSUs excluded from counting; executives (including Richins) in compliance as of proxy date |
| Anti‑Hedging / Pledging | Executives prohibited from hedging and pledging company stock |
| Upcoming Vesting Milestones | Time RSUs vest: 1/1/2025 (1,887 shares, 2022 grant), 1/1/2026 (2,342 shares, 2023 grant), 1/1/2027 (3,299 shares, 2024 grant) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreements | Company does not provide employment agreements to executives |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) Structure | Double-trigger required (CIC + qualifying termination); CIC definition includes ≥20% acquisition, certain mergers/sales, liquidation, or board majority change |
| CIC Cash Severance (Richins) | Lump-sum 2.5x base salary + target STI (i.e., 2.5×$585,000 and 2.5×$351,000) |
| CIC Welfare Benefits | Continuation for 24 months; Outplacement up to $12,000 for 12 months |
| Equity Treatment at CIC | Full vesting of time-vesting RSUs and PSUs at target upon CIC without termination; with qualifying termination similar vesting applies per table (assumes $109.28/share incl. dividend equivalents) |
| Clawback | SEC/NYSE-compliant policy for recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation; prior policy covers fraud/misconduct-related restatements |
| Anti‑Hedging/Pledging | Executives prohibited (see alignment above) |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | Not specifically disclosed in filings reviewed (constructive discharge covers reductions, relocation >50 miles, benefit cuts) |
Compensation Structure Observations
- At‑risk mix: Over 50% of NEO target comp at risk; Richins’ 2024 LTI target increased from 140% to 150% of base salary, raising long-term equity exposure .
- Performance metrics: Short‑term plan balanced across financial (Net Income, ADITC preservation) and operational (Customer Satisfaction, Reliability) measures; long‑term plan uses CEPS and relative TSR vs EEI Utilities Index (target 55th percentile) .
- Shareholder support: 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval was 94.5% .
- Peer benchmarking: Compensation peer group includes regulated utilities such as Pinnacle West, Portland General, Avista, OGE, ONE Gas, and TXNM (formerly PNM Resources) .
Performance & Track Record Signals
- 17th consecutive year of EPS growth and record retail MWh sales support operational and financial execution in Richins’ COO remit .
- Reliability maintained at 99.96% in 2024, aligning with operational metrics in incentive plans .
- 2022–2024 PSU outcomes: strong CEPS drove 200% payout; TSR shortfall (24th percentile) yielded 0% TSR payout, indicating market-relative underperformance despite internal financial strength .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Elevated long‑term equity weighting (2024 LTI target 150% of salary) plus strict ownership, retention, and anti‑hedging/pledging policies create strong shareholder alignment and reduce near‑term selling pressure; executives are in compliance with ownership guidelines .
- Retention & CIC: Double‑trigger CIC protection (2.5x salary+target bonus; 24‑month benefits) and continued vesting terms reduce flight risk during strategic uncertainty; clawback adds discipline on pay outcomes .
- Trading signals: Upcoming vesting events (Jan 2025–2027) and recent PSU settlements (Feb 2025) increase potential share supply, but retention requirements (net share retention until guideline met) mitigate forced selling; TSR-based PSU sensitivity remains a lever to monitor vs EEI peers .
- Execution risk: Incentive design ties payout to Net Income, ADITC preservation, reliability, and customer satisfaction—continuing regulatory lag, load volatility, or TSR underperformance vs. EEI utilities could compress payouts and signal pressure on fundamentals .