Tim Tatum
IDACORPAbout Tim Tatum
Timothy E. “Tim” Tatum is Vice President of Regulatory Affairs at Idaho Power (IDACORP’s principal subsidiary), a role he has held since March 1, 2016; he oversees economic regulatory activities in Idaho, Oregon, and with FERC. He joined Idaho Power in 1996 and progressed through regulatory roles including cost of service manager (2008) and general manager of regulatory affairs (2015). Tatum holds a BBA in Economics and an MBA from Boise State University, and completed the University of Idaho Utility Executive Course in 2012 .
Company performance during his tenure has been characterized by sustained EPS growth and rising revenues/EBITDA (see table below), with executive incentives tied to net income, ADITC preservation, reliability, customer satisfaction, CEPS, and relative TSR .
IDACORP Revenues and EBITDA by Fiscal Year
Values retrieved from S&P Global
| Metric | FY 2016 | FY 2017 | FY 2018 | FY 2019 | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $1,259,353,000* | $1,344,893,000* | $1,366,582,000* | $1,342,940,000* | $1,347,340,000* | $1,455,410,000 | $1,641,040,000 | $1,762,894,000 | $1,822,965,000 |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $419,070,000* | $470,284,000* | $450,261,000* | $461,150,000* | $473,597,000* | $493,846,000* | $491,537,000* | $506,872,000* | $547,853,000* |
* Values retrieved from S&P Global
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Idaho Power | Customer Service | 1996–2002 | Frontline customer operations foundation |
| Idaho Power | Economic Analyst (Energy Efficiency) | ~2002–2004 | Supported implementation of efficiency programs |
| Idaho Power | Regulatory Analyst | 2004–2008 | Company witness on revenue requirements, rate design, and efficiency programs |
| Idaho Power | Cost of Service Manager | 2008–2015 | Led revenue requirement determinations and cost-of-service studies for ratemaking |
| Idaho Power | General Manager, Regulatory Affairs | 2015–2016 | Broadened remit to rate design, IRP, PURPA procurement |
| Idaho Power | VP, Regulatory Affairs | 2016–present | Oversees regulatory strategy in ID/OR and FERC matters |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boise State Univ. College of Business & Economics | Advisory Council Member | Not disclosed | University-industry engagement; workforce and policy insight |
| Idaho Public Utilities Commission | Expert Testimony (Direct) | 2023–2024 | Regulatory execution and credibility with commissions |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $333,000 | Approved Feb 2024, +10.1% YoY; reflects performance and market alignment |
| Target Bonus % (STIP) | 40% of base | Threshold 20%; Max 80% of base |
| Actual STIP Paid | $221,432 (for 2024) | Driven by company-level payout (~166% of target) |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (STIP) – 2024 Design and Outcome
| Metric | Weighting | Target | 2024 Actual | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income (IDACORP) | 56% | $278.0M | $289.2M | Above target |
| ADITC Preservation | 14% | ≥$15.0M | $77M | Maximum achieved |
| Service Reliability (avg outage incidents) | 15% | ≤1.25 | 1.26 | Near target |
| Customer Satisfaction (CRI) | 15% | 84.25% | 82.95% | Below target |
| Company Payout Multiple | — | 100% | ~166% of target | Tatum award $221,432 |
Performance metrics emphasize earnings quality, prudent ADITC use, reliability, and customer satisfaction; STIP payment contingent on employee plan paying out and dividend sufficiency .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 Grants and Plan Structure
| Element | Weighting | Grant Detail (Tatum 2024) | Vesting / Performance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Vesting RSUs | 1/3 of LTI | 814 units (21.7% of base) | Cliff vest Jan 2027; dividend equivalents paid |
| Performance RSUs (CEPS) | 1/3 of LTI at target | Threshold 732; Target 1,628; Max 3,256 | CEPS thresholds: $13.50 / $14.65 / $15.80 |
| Performance RSUs (TSR vs EEI Utilities Index) | 1/3 of LTI at target | Same unit counts as CEPS | TSR thresholds: 30th / 55th / 90th percentile |
Recent payout history: 2022–2024 performance RSUs paid at 100% of target (200% CEPS; 0% TSR at 24th percentile); Tatum earned 1,070 shares with $11,182 in dividend equivalents .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 3,290 shares as of Mar 17, 2025 |
| Ownership as % of Shares Outstanding | ~0.0061% (3,290 / 54,020,021) |
| Unvested RSUs (Time) | 1,971 units, $215,391 market value at $109.28 |
| Unvested RSUs (Performance) | 3,430 units, $374,830 market value at $109.28 |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | VPs: 1x salary; 5-year compliance window; all executives in compliance; performance RSUs excluded from guideline count |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors/officers |
No stock options are granted under current policy; equity vehicles are RSUs (time and performance) .
Employment Terms
- Role start date: March 1, 2016 (Vice President, Regulatory Affairs) .
- Employment agreements: Company does not provide executive employment agreements .
- Change-in-Control (CIC): Double-trigger; cash severance equals 2.5x base salary plus target STIP; welfare benefits continuation for 24 months; LTI treatment—time RSUs fully vest, performance RSUs pay at target upon CIC without termination; with termination, same vesting plus severance; no single-trigger (except legacy provisions apply to certain other NEOs) .
- Illustrative CIC values for Tatum (as of 12/31/2024, share price $109.28): Cash severance components $832,500 (base) and $333,000 (STIP target), time RSUs $215,391, performance RSUs $454,182, Security Plan II incremental $60,687, welfare $39,138, outplacement $12,000 .
- Clawback: SEC/NYSE Rule 10D-1 compliant; recovery of incentive comp upon material restatement; prior misconduct-based clawback remains applicable for pre-10/2/2023 awards .
- Non-compete / Non-solicit / Garden leave: Not disclosed in proxy; company prohibits hedging/pledging .
Performance & Track Record
- Company performance highlights underpin incentive payouts: 17th consecutive year of EPS growth; strong reliability (99.96% uninterrupted service); rising customer counts and peak loads; constructive rate case outcomes in Idaho and Oregon .
- STIP metrics explicitly tied to Net Income, ADITC preservation, reliability, and customer satisfaction; LTI metrics tied to CEPS and relative TSR (55th percentile target vs EEI Utilities Index) .
- Say-on-Pay: 94.5% approval in 2024, indicating shareholder support for pay design .
Compensation Peer Group & Governance
- Compensation peer group includes regulated utilities (e.g., ALLETE, Alliant, Avista, OGE, Portland General, ONE Gas, TXNM/Pinnacle West, etc.) with market medians guiding pay levels (target range 85–115% of median) .
- Independent compensation consultant (Pay Governance) engaged; committee-only authority over executive pay .
- Company policies: No stock options; limited perquisites; stock ownership and retention requirements; caps on incentives; rigorous risk review found compensation practices not likely to have material adverse effect .
Director/Board Governance (not a director)
Tatum is an officer (NEO in 2024) and not a director; board governance, director compensation, and committee roles addressed for board members elsewhere in the proxy .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited for executives (alignment positive) .
- No employment agreements (limits guaranteed pay; retention relies on incentives and pensions) .
- Robust clawback and ownership requirements (risk mitigation) .
- Related-party transaction disclosures do not identify Tatum as a related party in 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment appears strong: STIP/LTI metrics closely tied to regulated utility earnings quality, ADITC stewardship, reliability, and TSR; 2024 STIP paid ~166% of target driven by above-target net income and maximum ADITC preservation .
- Retention risk looks manageable: No employment agreements, but meaningful LTI and supplemental pension (Security Plan II PV $686,689; Retirement Plan PV $896,575) support retention; CIC double-trigger with 2.5x base+bonus reduces change-in-control uncertainty for leaders .
- Insider selling pressure is limited: Equity is primarily RSUs with scheduled vesting; no stock options grants; hedging/pledging banned; 2024 vesting activity (2,273 shares) reflects program design rather than discretionary selling .
- Alignment: Beneficial ownership (3,290 shares) and compliance with ownership guidelines, combined with prohibited hedging/pledging, support “skin-in-the-game” though ownership stake is small as a % of outstanding (typical for non-CEO utility officers) .