Quentin Markin
About Quentin Markin
Quentin Markin, age 52, is Executive Vice President, Business Development and Strategy Execution at Ivanhoe Electric (appointed January 1, 2023). A 24+ year mining lawyer (partner at Stikeman Elliott since 2008), he brings deep M&A, project development and financing expertise across Sydney, London, Vancouver and Toronto, and has been recognized by Chambers for 11 years as a mining law expert; he also joined Cordoba Minerals’ board in September 2023 . During his tenure, Ivanhoe Electric’s disclosed TSR (value of $100 invested) moved from $115.86 (2023) to $86.78 (2024); the company reported net losses in these years and used non-financial STIP focus areas (HSE, operations, corporate development) rather than financial reporting measures for 2024 pay-for-performance .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stikeman Elliott LLP | Partner (Mining) | 2008–2022 (partner); 24+ years total | M&A, project development and financings globally; notable deals include Franco-Nevada 2007 IPO (C$1.2B) and OceanaGold’s 2015 acquisition of Romarco Minerals (C$856M) . |
| Ivanhoe Electric (advisor before joining) | External counsel | — | Acted for Ivanhoe Electric since inception and for Ivanhoe Group companies prior to joining as EVP . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cordoba Minerals Corp. (TSX) | Director | 2023–present | Board role at affiliate focused on copper project development . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $400,000 | $400,000 |
| Target STIP (% of Base) | 100% of base salary | 100% of base salary |
| Actual STIP Bonus Paid (USD) | $377,600 | $354,000 |
Notes: STIP target is set by employment agreement at 100% of base salary; LTIP target is 200% of base salary (see Performance Compensation) .
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) – Structure and 2024 Focus
| Element | Details |
|---|---|
| Target | 100% of EVP base salary . |
| 2024 Focus Areas | Health, Safety & Environment; Operational Performance (drilling plans, study execution); Corporate Development . |
| Financial Measures in 2024 Pay vs Performance | Company did not use financial reporting measures for 2024 CAP; emphasis was on the above focus areas . |
| Year | Target (USD) | Actual Payout (USD) | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $400,000 (100% of base) | $377,600 | ~94.4% (calc) |
| 2024 | $400,000 (100% of base) | $354,000 | ~88.5% (calc) |
Note: Payout vs Target is computed from disclosed base salary, target %, and bonus paid.
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – Awards and Vesting
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares/Options | Exercise Price | Grant Date Fair Value | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | Jan 1, 2023 | 750,000 | — | $9,112,500 | 1/5 annually on Jan 1 of 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028 . |
| Stock Options | Mar 11, 2024 | 231,415 | $13.50 | $799,925 | 1/3 annually on Mar 11 of 2025, 2026, 2027 . |
PSU Program (approved 2024; in use for 2025 awards): 3-year cliff vesting; performance measured by relative TSR versus a Base Metals Index; payout 0x below 25th percentile, 1.0x at 50th, 2.0x at 75th (linear interpolation between thresholds) .
Scheduled Vesting and Potential Liquidity Windows
| Date | Instrument | Quantity | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 1, 2025 | RSUs | 150,000 | 2nd tranche of 2023 RSUs vests . |
| Mar 11, 2025 | Options | ~77,138 | 1/3 of 2024 options vests (first tranche) ; beneficial ownership shows 77,138 options vested within 60 days after Mar 11, 2025 . |
| Jan 1, 2026 | RSUs | 150,000 | 3rd tranche of 2023 RSUs vests . |
| Mar 11, 2026 | Options | Remaining in equal annual installments | Second tranche of 2024 options . |
| Jan 1, 2027 | RSUs | 150,000 | 4th tranche of 2023 RSUs vests . |
| Mar 11, 2027 | Options | Remaining in equal annual installments | Final tranche of 2024 options . |
| Jan 1, 2028 | RSUs | 150,000 | Final tranche of 2023 RSUs vests . |
Insider trading policy requires pre-clearance and imposes blackout periods; hedging, short sales, buying on margin and pledging company securities as collateral are prohibited, which mitigates pledging/forced-sale risk around vest dates .
Attempt to retrieve Form 4 trading records: We attempted to fetch insider transactions (Form 4) for “Quentin Markin” from 2023-01-01 to 2025-11-19, but the insider-trades data source returned an authorization error. As a result, we cannot include transaction-level selling patterns here. If desired, we can re-run with updated access to incorporate tax withholdings (F), open-market sales (S), or grants (A/M) by date and price.
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 11, 2025) | 447,088 shares (<1%): 300,000 direct; 69,950 indirect via Robert Hoddle Investment Holdings Ltd; 77,138 shares issuable from vested options within 60 days . |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 600,000 unvested RSUs (market value $4.53M at $7.55/share) . |
| Options Outstanding (12/31/2024) | 231,415 unexercisable options at $13.50, expiring 3/11/2031 . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | “Other Executive Officers” must hold 2× base salary in stock or full-value awards within 36 months of Jan 1, 2024; newly appointed Covered Persons must comply within 36 months of appointment . |
| Hedging / Pledging | Hedging, short sales, margin purchases and pledging are prohibited by policy . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Provision |
|---|---|
| Role & Start | EVP, Business Development and Strategy Execution; effective Jan 1, 2023 . |
| Base / Targets | Base salary $400,000; STIP target 100% of base; LTIP target 200% of base . |
| Without Cause (non‑CoC) | Cash severance equal to 1.5× base salary + 1.5× target annual bonus; pro‑rated vesting of options/RSUs . |
| Change in Control (double‑trigger) | If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 12 months post-CoC: lump sum 18 months of base salary plus 1 month per full year of service after year 3 (max 24 months), plus 150% of STIP target; 100% of options/RSUs vest . |
| Death/Disability | 100% of options/RSUs vest . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality; non‑solicitation of employees for 12 months post‑separation . |
Pay Versus Performance (Company context)
| Year | Value of $100 Investment (IE TSR) | Peer Group TSR | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $139.66 | $117.43 | First trading year baseline referenced . |
| 2023 | $115.86 | $118.61 | |
| 2024 | $86.78 | $112.12 | Company did not use financial reporting measures to link 2024 CAP; STIP focused on HSE/operations/corp dev . |
Performance Compensation – Detailed Metrics Table
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STIP: HSE, Operational Performance, Corporate Development (2024) | Not disclosed | 100% of base ($400k) | Qualitative assessment per CNC discretion | $354,000 (≈88.5% of target) | Cash paid in Q1 following year . |
| LTIP: 2023 RSUs | N/A | 750,000 RSUs | Time-based | N/A | 1/5 annual 2024–2028 . |
| LTIP: 2024 Options | N/A | 231,415 options @ $13.50 | Time-based | $799,925 grant date fair value | 1/3 annual 2025–2027 . |
| PSUs (2025 design) | rTSR vs Base Metals Index | 1.0x at 50th percentile | 0–2.0x scale | Outcome TBD | 3-year cliff . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Large, multi-year RSU (2023) and time-based options (2024) create meaningful unvested equity through 2028, tying Markin’s wealth to long-term equity value; new PSUs linked to rTSR introduce explicit relative performance alignment from 2025 onward .
- Near-term supply/overhang watch: Scheduled RSU and option tranches (Jan 1 and Mar 11 each year 2025–2027) are predictable potential liquidity windows; however, hedging/pledging is prohibited and all trades require pre-clearance and are subject to blackout windows, reducing opportunistic selling risk .
- Cash vs equity mix: 2023 compensation was equity-heavy (large RSU grant); 2024 shifted toward options plus a sizable but sub-target cash STIP, indicating higher at-risk/equity orientation with vesting-dependent realization; introduction of PSUs increases performance-contingent pay going forward .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger severance (up to 24 months base plus 150% STIP) and full equity vesting could be material in a transaction, but require termination or good reason post-CoC; these terms reduce retention risk through deal processes while balancing shareholder protection .
- Experience and execution: Deep mining M&A and financing background, combined with 2024 STIP focus on HSE, drilling execution, and corporate development, suggests his incentives are oriented to advancing technical studies and strategic optionality (JV/offtake/cap-raising) critical to value realization in IE’s project pipeline .
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