Giovanni Dolci
IMAXAbout Giovanni Dolci
Giovanni M. Dolci is Chief Commercial Officer and Executive Vice President at IMAX, appointed in 2025 after rising through global sales leadership since joining IMAX in 2012; he holds a degree in Economics and Management from Bocconi University and an MSc in Management from Cass Business School . Age: 40; Tenure at IMAX: since October 2012 . Company performance during his leadership in sales/commercial roles includes 2024 TSR of 70.4%, three‑year average Adjusted EBITDA growth of 24.0%, and 2022 PSUs earned at 154.4% of target, indicating strong pay‑for‑performance alignment at IMAX . IMAX’s 2024 operational delivery included 146 system installations and 130 signings worldwide, underpinning the commercial strategy Dolci oversees .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| IMAX Corporation | Chief Commercial Officer & EVP | 2025–present | Leads commercial strategy across global sales, partnerships, and content commercialization . |
| IMAX Corporation | Chief Sales Officer | 2021–2025 | Drove global signings and installations; expanded commercial footprint . |
| IMAX Corporation | Head of Global Sales | 2020–2021 | Led worldwide sales execution amid slate recovery . |
| IMAX Corporation | Senior Vice President | 2018–2020 | Managed regional growth and key exhibitor relationships . |
| IMAX Corporation | VP, Theatre Development & Managing Director, Europe & Africa | 2017–2018 | Scaled EMEA network; deepened market penetration . |
| IMAX Corporation | Vice President, Theatre Development | 2012–(prior to 2017) | Built early pipeline and theatre expansion strategy . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arts Alliance Media | Director of Business Development & Commercial Operations | — | Led digital cinema solutions; commercial operations experience . |
| Film Financing (NZ/Italy/UK) | Financing professional | — | Structured film financing across multiple geographies . |
| IMAX Theatres International Limited | Board Director | — | Oversight of subsidiary operations tied to theatre network . |
Fixed Compensation
- Not disclosed for Dolci. IMAX’s latest proxy identifies Named Executive Officers (NEOs) and provides detailed compensation; Dolci is not listed among NEOs for 2024/2025, so his base salary, target bonus, and grant values are not disclosed .
Performance Compensation
IMAX’s executive incentive architecture (applies company‑wide and governs NEOs; senior executives typically follow the same LTIP structures):
- Annual cash bonus scorecard (2024): quantitative metrics + leadership/strategic achievements (50% qualitative for non‑CEO executives). Key metrics and outcomes below .
| Metric (FY 2024) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Quantitative Payout (% of target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue ($m) | 25% | $328.1 | $386.0 | $463.2 | $352.2 | 71% |
| Total Adjusted EBITDA ($m) | 19% | $124.5 | $146.5 | $175.8 | $138.9 | 83% |
| Free Cash Flow before Growth CAPEX ($m) | 13% | $59.5 | $70.0 | $84.0 | $54.0 | 0% |
| Installations (count) | 19% | 119 | 140 | 168 | 146 | 121% |
| Signings (count) | 19% | 111 | 130 | 156 | 130 | 100% |
| Streaming Technology Bookings ($m) | 6% | $12.8 | $15.0 | $18.0 | $3.2 | 0% |
| Quantitative factor (aggregate) | — | 50% payout at threshold | 100% | 200% | — | 74.7% |
- PSU design (2024 grants): three‑year performance; 60% based on average annual Adjusted EBITDA growth; 40% based on relative TSR vs IMAX’s compensation peer group; payout ranges and goals below .
| PSU Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Payout Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avg. Annual Adjusted EBITDA Growth | 5.0% | 12.5% | ≥20% | 50%–175% of target |
| Relative TSR Percentile vs Peer Group | 25th | 50th | ≥90th | 30%–150% of target |
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RSU vesting: generally time‑based, vesting 33%/33%/34% on anniversaries of grant date .
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Realized PSU outcomes (context): 2022‑2024 PSU cycle vested at 154.4% of target (Adjusted EBITDA component at 175%; TSR component at 123.5%), evidencing strong multi‑year execution .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy Element | Terms | Status/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Share ownership guidelines | CEO: 500% of salary; Other NEOs: 100% of salary . In 2025, IMAX extended 50/50 RSU/PSU mix and broadened guidelines to a wider executive cohort to deepen alignment . | As of April 1, 2025, all NEOs in compliance; CEO holds ~1,453% of salary . |
| Clawback policy | Complies with SEC/NYSE rules; applies to current/former executive officers; covers incentive comp tied to financial metrics (including TSR); recoupment upon restatements . | No clawback actions reported for 2024 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited under Insider Trading Policy; includes options, swaps, collars, margin pledging . | Company‑wide prohibition . |
Note: Dolci’s individual beneficial ownership, vested/unvested breakdown, and pledge status are not disclosed; IMAX reports aggregate and NEO/director specifics, but Dolci is not a named executive officer in 2024/2025 proxies .
Employment Terms
- IMAX utilizes written employment agreements for executive officers covering salary, bonus, equity awards, and restrictive covenants (non‑competition and non‑solicitation); severance/change‑in‑control terms feature double‑trigger benefits and “Service Factor” provisions that allow continued vesting on certain terminations (PSUs remain subject to original performance) .
- No single‑trigger CIC for long‑term incentives; CEO retains legacy CIC provisions from historical agreements, not indicative of broader executive terms .
Dolci’s specific employment agreement, severance multiple, and CIC mechanics are not disclosed in public filings; analysis here reflects IMAX’s general framework.
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 TSR: 70.4% (share price up 70.4% in 2024), reinforcing alignment in equity‑based compensation .
- Three‑year performance: average annual Adjusted EBITDA growth of 24.0%; TSR ~80th percentile vs Russell 2000, enabling 2022 PSU payout of 154.4% .
- Network expansion: 146 installations and 130 signings in 2024, renewing key partner relationships (e.g., Wanda) and sustaining growth into 2025—core to Dolci’s commercial remit .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking, pay inflation risk)
| Peer Companies (2024/2025 framework) |
|---|
| Ambarella; Cinemark; Cineplex; Corsair Gaming; Dolby Laboratories; fuboTV; Harmonic; Knowles; Lions Gate; Marcus; WildBrain; Xperi Inc. |
Relative TSR PSUs benchmark IMAX performance to this group (target at 50th percentile; max at ≥90th percentile), constraining windfalls and requiring market‑leading returns for maximum payouts .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support: 72.5% (meaningfully higher vs 2023), with investors supportive of structure and transparency .
- 2024/2025 engagement: holders of ~67% contacted; ~45% met; feedback drove continued emphasis on PSUs, TSR weighting, disclosure, and expanded ownership guidelines to broader executive leaders in 2025 .
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment: Dolci’s incentives are embedded in IMAX’s framework that ties payouts to hard KPIs (Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA, FCF before growth capex, Installations, Signings) and multi‑year PSU hurdles (EBITDA growth and peer‑relative TSR), directly overlapping with his commercial responsibilities—positive for pay‑for‑performance .
- Retention risk: While Dolci’s specific severance/CIC terms are not disclosed, IMAX’s broader executive design uses double‑trigger CIC and continued vesting via Service Factor, reducing cliff‑risk and incentivizing tenure through multi‑year vesting—moderate retention support, but lack of disclosed individual severance multiples is a diligence gap .
- Trading signals: Insider selling pressure cannot be assessed for Dolci from proxy tables (not a NEO); monitor Form 4 filings for RSU vesting sales and option exercises; IMAX’s hedging/pledging prohibition and ownership guidelines mitigate misalignment risks .
- Execution focus: Watch quarterly signings/installations cadence and content slate strength—these are heavily weighted in annual incentives and linked to Dolci’s remit; undershoots can compress annual bonus outcomes, while outsized delivery can support upside .