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Steve T. Laflin

Director at INTERNATIONAL ISOTOPES
Board

About Steve T. Laflin

Steve T. Laflin, age 68, is a long-tenured director of International Isotopes Inc. (INIS), serving on the Board since June 2001; he previously served as President and Chief Executive Officer from August 2001 to September 2023. He holds a B.S. in Physics from Idaho State University and has held senior engineering and management roles in the nuclear industry since 1992, bringing deep operational and industry expertise to the Board . He is currently classified as a non-independent director under Nasdaq rules due to his executive role within the last three years .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureCommittees/Impact
International Isotopes Inc.President & CEOAug 2001 – Sep 2023Long-tenured executive; institutional knowledge; nuclear operations management
International Isotopes Inc.DirectorJun 2001 – PresentBoard member; not currently serving on Audit or Compensation committees
International Isotopes Idaho Inc. (subsidiary)President & GM1996 – 2001Led subsidiary operations; nuclear industry management experience

External Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureCommittees/Impact
RadQual, LLCMemberUntil Jul 2021 (sold to INIS)Industry exposure; historical affiliation with entity later sold to INIS

Board Governance

  • Independence: The Board determined Laflin is not “independent” under Nasdaq rules due to his prior executive officer role within the last three years .
  • Committee assignments: Audit and Compensation Committees are composed of Christopher Grosso (Chair) and Dr. Robert Atcher; Laflin is not a member of these standing committees .
  • Attendance: In 2024, the Board met four times and each director attended at least 75% of aggregate Board and committee meetings for which they served; all directors attended the 2024 Annual Meeting .
  • Nominating: No standing nominating committee; full Board (including independent directors) oversees nominations .
  • Leadership: Separate Chair (Grosso) and CEO (Bagerdjian) roles; structure intended to balance strategic oversight and operational management .

Fixed Compensation

Component (Director, 2024)Amount (USD)
Annual retainer (cash)$0
Committee membership fees$0
Committee chair fees$0
Meeting fees$0
Stock awards$0
Option awards$0
All other compensation$0
  • Compensation policy: INIS generally does not pay retainer or other cash fees to non-employee directors; equity may be granted periodically. Atcher has an hourly arrangement ($250/hour). Laflin had a consulting agreement effective through end of 2024, paid at an hourly rate for Board-requested services; specific rate not disclosed .

Performance Compensation

ItemDisclosure
Performance-based director payNot disclosed for directors (no performance metrics or PSU framework reported)
Compensation consultantsNone used; Compensation Committee does not use consultants
Approval mechanicsNon-employee directors approve CEO compensation; entire Board (including CEO) approves CFO compensation; unanimous approval required for director compensation actions

Other Directorships & Interlocks

CompanyRolePublic/PrivateNotes
None disclosedProxy biography lists industry roles (RadQual LLC; INIS) but no other public company boards for Laflin

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Nuclear industry operations and engineering leadership since 1992; former CEO with extensive institutional knowledge .
  • Physics degree (B.S., Idaho State University); senior management experience in regulated nuclear operations, safety, and licensing environments .

Equity Ownership

ItemDetail
Shares beneficially owned18,786,700
Ownership % of outstanding3.5% (base: 526,385,637 shares)
Options exercisable within 60 days6,000,000 included in beneficial ownership
RSUs/Unvested equityNot disclosed for Laflin in director section (aggregate outstanding options shown)
Anti-hedging/pledging policyCompany discourages hedging and pledging; no formal prohibition disclosed

Insider Filings and Trades

ItemDetail
Section 16(a) delinquent filings (2024)None reported for Laflin; delinquencies noted for Bagerdjian and Grosso only

Governance Assessment

  • Effectiveness and independence: Laflin’s deep operating expertise is valuable; however, his non-independent status and recent consulting relationship (through end of 2024) reduce perceived independence, which is mitigated by his non-membership on the Audit and Compensation Committees .

  • Committee structure: Concentration of oversight in two-person Audit and Compensation Committees (Grosso as Chair on both) places heightened responsibility on those independent directors and limits broader committee participation, with nominations handled by the full Board without a dedicated chartered committee .

  • Attendance and engagement: 2024 attendance met minimum thresholds; all directors attended the 2024 Annual Meeting, indicating baseline engagement .

  • Ownership alignment: Laflin’s 3.5% stake and 6,000,000 currently exercisable options suggest material equity alignment, alongside significant ownership by Kennerman Associates (42.2%) and Grosso personally (12.2%)—a structure supportive of alignment but indicative of concentrated control dynamics .

  • Conflicts and related-party exposure: Historical roles (CEO; RadQual membership prior to sale to INIS) and a 2024 consulting arrangement represent potential conflict vectors; the company’s related-party financing via promissory notes with insiders (CEO/Chairman among lenders) underscores ongoing related party exposure subject to full-Board review under policy .

  • Policies and signals: Anti-hedging/pledging policy is discouraging rather than prohibitive; the Compensation Committee does not use external consultants, relies on unanimous approvals for director compensation, and recorded strong say-on-pay support in 2022 (≈98%), signaling shareholder tolerance of the compensation approach despite structural constraints .

  • RED FLAGS:

    • Non-independence due to recent executive role; recent consulting relationship through 2024 .
    • No standing nominating committee and concentrated committee leadership .
    • Ongoing related-party financing history involving insiders (promissory notes), elevating conflict-of-interest risk profiles .
    • Anti-pledging is discouraging rather than a strict prohibition; potential alignment risk if pledging were to occur (not disclosed) .