Charles D. Young
President at INVH
Executive
About Charles D. Young
Charles D. Young, age 56, is President of Invitation Homes (INVH). He was named President in February 2025, after serving as President & Chief Operating Officer (March 2023–February 2025) and EVP & COO (November 2017–March 2023) . Company performance under his operating leadership included 2024 total revenue growth of 7.7%, Core FFO/share growth of 6.4%, and AFFO/share growth of 6.7% year over year . Same Store occupancy averaged over 97% in 2024, with an average renewal rate near 80% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Invitation Homes | President | Feb 2025–present | Senior operating leader of the platform |
| Invitation Homes | President & Chief Operating Officer | Mar 2023–Feb 2025 | Oversight of operations and execution of operating priorities |
| Invitation Homes | EVP & Chief Operating Officer | Nov 2017–Mar 2023 | Scaled post-merger operating platform |
| Starwood Waypoint Homes (SWH) | Chief Operating Officer | Mar 2015–Nov 2017 | Led operations prior to merger with INVH |
| SWAY Management LLC (SWH’s external manager) | SVP – West Division | Jun 2013–Mar 2015 | Regional operating leadership |
| Waypoint Real Estate Group | Regional VP – Eastern Region | 2012–2013 | Regional operating leadership |
| Mesa Development | Executive Vice President | 2003–2012 | Mixed‑use residential development leadership |
| Goldman Sachs (REPIA/Investment Banking) | Professional | Pre‑2003 | Real estate principal investing and M&A |
| Kaleidoscope Group; K.G. Holdings | Co‑founder/Managing Director; Manager | — | Entrepreneurship and real estate holdings |
| NFL/World League | Professional athlete | — | Early career |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Floor & Decor | Director; Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee | — | Public company directorship |
| Stanford University | Trustee; committees on trusteeship, land & buildings, athletics | — | Non‑profit governance |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of salary) | Actual Cash Incentive ($) | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 700,000 | 150% | 1,013,250 | 96.5% |
| 2023 | 700,000 | — | 995,320 | — |
| 2022 | 700,000 | — | 635,154 | — |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Design (2024)
- Metric mix and weights: AFFO/share (30%), Same Store Core Revenue Growth YoY (20%), Adjusted EBITDA Margin (20%), Strategic Priorities (20%), Individual (10%) .
- 2024 outcome: Young earned 96.5% of target; $1,013,250 .
Long-Term Incentive Program (RSUs)
| Grant Year | Grant Date | Time-Vesting RSUs (#) | Performance RSUs – Target (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Key metrics and vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 3/1/2024 | 21,714 | 61,222 | 750,003 (time) ; 2,250,036 (perf) | 75% perf-based; metrics: 3-yr relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index (45%) and 3-yr Same Store NOI CAGR (30%); TSR capped at target if absolute TSR is negative; perf period 1/1/2024–12/31/2026; time RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; perf RSUs vest at Certification Date post‑period |
| 2023 | 3/1/2023 | 22,645 | 66,737 | — | Same metric framework; perf period 1/1/2023–12/31/2025; time RSUs vest ratably over 3 years |
| 2022 (actuals) | 3/1/2022 | 16,189 | 49,887 target; 15,535 earned | — | Actual achievement overall 31%; TSR relative CAGR earned 51%; Same Store NOI CAGR earned 0%; perf RSUs vested on 2/21/2025 (Certification Date) |
| 2021 (actuals) | 3/1/2021 | 15,348 | 46,175 target; 69,034 earned | — | Overall payout 150% (TSR relative CAGR 116%; Same Store NOI CAGR 200%); perf RSUs vested 2/22/2024 |
2024 Stock Vested (realized)
| Executive | Shares Vested (#) | Value on Vesting ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Charles D. Young | 113,718 | 3,858,279 |
2024 vesting comprised 2021 LTIP time RSUs (5,116), 2021 LTIP performance RSUs (69,034), 2022 LTIP time RSUs (5,396), 2023 LTIP time RSUs (7,548), and 2019 Outperformance OP Units (26,624), valued at respective vest dates (pre-tax) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 264,569 shares; <1% of outstanding (based on 612,883,131 shares) .
- Includes OP Units from 2019 Outperformance Program convertible into common stock: 106,493 units for Young .
- Unvested/Unearned awards at 12/31/2024 (selected):
- Time-vesting RSUs unvested: 20,932 (3/1/2022), 15,097 (3/1/2023), 21,714 (3/1/2024); total market value $1,846,044 at 12/31/2024 .
- Performance RSUs unearned (target basis): 66,737 (2023 LTIP), 61,222 (2024 LTIP); market/payout values $2,133,582 and $1,957,267 at 12/31/2024 (subject to performance) .
- 2022 Outperformance Program: unearned 200,188 OP Units; aggregate cap pool value reference $6,400,000; program design and payout mechanics per plan .
- Ownership policy: Non‑CEO executive officers must hold equity equal to 3x base salary .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited by policy (anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging) .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements: None. The company does not enter into individual employment or change‑in‑control agreements with NEOs .
- Severance plan (Senior VP+): On qualifying termination, cash equal to base salary + target bonus multiplied by 1.5x for Young, paid over 18 months; COBRA premiums for 12 months; pro‑rata annual bonus based on actual performance .
- Change‑in‑control (double trigger within 24 months): Lump‑sum 2.25x (base + target bonus) for Young; COBRA for 18 months; pro‑rata annual bonus .
- Restrictive covenants: Post‑termination non‑compete and non‑solicitation for 12 months (RSU agreements) .
- Clawback: Mandatory recovery policy for incentive compensation after material financial restatements .
- Potential payout illustrations (as of 12/31/2024):
- Qualifying termination: $7,846,871 total (including $2,625,000 severance; $1,013,250 bonus; equity treatment; benefits) .
- Change‑in‑control only: $4,126,752 (equity acceleration components) .
- Qualifying termination within 24 months of CIC: $11,436,715 (including $3,937,500 CIC severance; $1,013,250 bonus; equity; benefits) .
- Death/Disability: $5,860,190 (equity and benefits) .
Compensation & Realized Pay (multi‑year)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 700,000 | 3,000,039 | 1,013,250 | 14,800 | 4,728,089 |
| 2023 | 700,000 | 2,750,036 | 995,320 | 14,200 | 4,459,556 |
| 2022 | 700,000 | 4,429,515 | 635,154 | 12,200 | 5,776,869 |
Governance, Say‑on‑Pay, and Program Design
- Pay mix emphasizes “at‑risk” pay: ~81% of target comp for non‑CEO NEOs is at risk; majority of LTI is performance‑based .
- LTI metrics: 3‑year relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index (target requires +50 bps vs index; payout 0–200%, capped at target if negative absolute TSR) and 3‑year Same Store NOI CAGR (threshold 2.5%, target 4.0%, max 5.5%) .
- 2023 Say‑on‑Pay approval: 67.56%; company expanded investor engagement and disclosed changes/clarifications (including Outperformance Program) .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Positive: No individual employment/CIC agreements; clawback policy; anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging; robust ownership guidelines .
- Mixed: Outperformance Programs (2019, 2022) add additional equity monetization streams; 2019 program paid at maximum; 2022 program includes a “lock‑in” feature that guarantees a minimum payout if interim thresholds achieved (company committed not to use such features in future programs) .
- Vesting/selling pressure: Significant vesting in 2024 (113,718 shares; $3.86M) and additional LTIP/Outperformance vestings in 2025 (2022 LTIP perf RSUs certified in Feb 2025) can create event‑driven trading windows, though policy prohibits hedging/pledging .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: 75% of LTI is performance‑based on relative TSR and Same Store NOI CAGR; 2021 cycle paid 150% while 2022 paid 31%, demonstrating sensitivity to operating/market outcomes .
- Retention and overhang: Meaningful unvested RSUs and OP Units (including 2023–2024 LTIPs and 2022 Outperformance) support retention but add dilution/overhang and scheduled vesting supply; monitor certification/vesting dates through 2026–2027 for potential flow effects .
- Governance risk moderated: No individual employment contracts; reasonable severance multiples (1.5x; CIC 2.25x) with double‑trigger; clawback and anti‑pledging reduce misalignment risk .
- Execution track record: Operating KPIs (AFFO/share, occupancy) and 2024 growth metrics are solid; however, relative TSR shortfalls in 2022 LTIP underscore exposure to sector/market beta—key for interpreting future PRSU outcomes .