Jonathan S. Olsen
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer at INVH
Executive
About Jonathan S. Olsen
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Invitation Homes since June 2023; age 51. Olsen joined INVH in 2012 and progressed through capital markets, finance, and corporate strategy leadership roles before being appointed CFO . Company performance context for pay-for-performance: in 2024, INVH delivered 7.7% total revenue growth, Core FFO/share up 6.4%, and AFFO/share up 6.7% YoY . Under Olsen’s leadership in finance, INVH issued unsecured debt, improved credit ratings, strengthened investor confidence, and drove margin expansion and cost control .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Invitation Homes | EVP, CFO & Treasurer | Jun 2023–present | Led finance and capital markets; improved credit ratings; margin expansion; cost controls |
| Invitation Homes | EVP, Corporate Strategy & Finance | Feb 2020–May 2023 | Led strategy and finance; supported growth initiatives |
| Invitation Homes | SVP, Finance & Head of Capital Markets | Jun 2016–Feb 2020 | Executed capital markets; strengthened balance sheet |
| Invitation Homes | MD & Head of Capital Markets | Apr 2013–Jun 2016 | Built capital markets platform post-merger |
| Invitation Homes | MD & Co-Head of Asset Management | Jun 2012–Apr 2013 | Early portfolio management |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Banc of America Securities; Goldman Sachs; Jefferies | Real Estate Investment Banking | 2003–2012 | Transaction execution and financing in real estate |
| UBS Securities; SG Cowen; PepsiCo | M&A roles | 1996–2001 | Corporate M&A and strategic transactions |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $450,000 | $550,000 (+22%) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $13,200 | $13,800 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive – Design (2024)
| Metric | Weight (%) |
|---|---|
| AFFO per Share | 30 |
| Same Store Core Revenue Growth YoY | 20 |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 20 |
| Strategic Priorities | 20 |
| Individual Performance | 10 |
Annual Cash Incentive – Results (2024)
| Target ($) | Target Award (% of FYE Base) | Actual Cash Incentive as % of Target | Amount Earned ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| $687,500 | 125% | 96.5% | $640,241 |
Long-Term Equity – 2024 LTIP
| Grant | Type | Shares (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Performance Metrics / Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/1/2024 | Time-vesting RSUs | 10,857 | $375,000 | Vests in equal annual installments over 3 years |
| 3/1/2024 | Performance-vesting RSUs (target) | 30,612 | $1,125,054 | 75% of LTIP at-risk; 45% weight TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index (RMS) CAGR; 30% weight Same Store NOI CAGR; TSR capped at target if absolute TSR negative; earned after 3-year period ending 12/31/2026, then subject to time vesting until certification |
Long-Term Equity – 2023 LTIP (for context)
| Grant | Type | Shares (#) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3/1/2023 | Time-vesting RSUs | 9,882 | Vests in equal annual installments over 3 years (through 3/1/2026) |
| 3/1/2023 | Performance-vesting RSUs (target) | 29,122 | Metrics: TSR vs RMS CAGR and Same Store NOI CAGR; performance period 1/1/2023–12/31/2025; earned on certification, then subject to time vesting |
Realized Equity – 2024 Stock Vested
| Shares Acquired on Vesting (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|
| 21,218 | $721,650 |
Historical Program Performance (Company-level)
| Metric | Target | Achievement | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 LTIP: TSR vs RMS Index CAGR | +50 bps | +140 bps | 116% |
| 2021 LTIP: Same Store NOI Growth CAGR | 4.75% | 7.2% | 200% |
| Overall 2021 LTIP performance portion | — | — | 150% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 13,838 shares; <1% of shares outstanding |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Non-CEO executive officers required to own ≥3x base salary; must retain ≥50% of qualifying equity until compliance; ongoing retention after compliance |
| Anti-Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited; no margin purchase or borrowing against accounts holding INVH securities |
Outstanding Equity Awards at 2024 Fiscal Year End (Olsen)
| Grant Date | Unvested Time RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) | Unearned Performance RSUs (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/1/2022 | 3,021 | $96,581 | — | — |
| 3/1/2023 | 6,588 | $210,618 | 29,122 | $931,030 |
| 3/1/2024 | 10,857 | $347,098 | 30,612 | $978,666 |
| 4/1/2022 (OP Units, Outperformance Program) | — | — | 51,048 | $1,632,000 |
Notes:
- Time RSUs from 2024 vest over three years; from 2023 vest in equal annual installments; 2022 time RSUs vested on 3/1/2025 .
- 2023 performance RSUs earn based on metrics at 12/31/2025; 2024 performance RSUs at 12/31/2026; earned awards then remain subject to time vest until certification .
Employment Terms
| Term | Olsen Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | No individual employment agreement for NEOs |
| Severance Plan Eligibility | Participates in Executive Severance Plan (adopted 2017) |
| Qualifying Termination (without cause/constructive termination) | Cash: 1.5x (base salary + target annual cash incentive), paid in equal monthly installments over 18 months; Pro-rata annual incentive for year of termination based on actual performance; 12 months COBRA premium payments; non-compete/non-solicit 12 months; confidentiality/non-disparagement indefinite |
| Change-in-Control (double-trigger within 24 months) | Lump-sum cash: 2.25x (base salary + target annual cash incentive); Pro-rata annual incentive; COBRA premiums for 18 months |
| Clawback | Compensation & Management Development Committee reviews/approves clawback policy; monitors compliance |
Potential Benefits upon Termination or Change in Control (As of 12/31/2024)
| Component | Qualifying Termination | Change in Control | Qualifying Termination within 24 Months of CIC | Death/Disability |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Severance ($) | $1,856,250 | — | $2,784,375 | — |
| Bonus ($) | $640,241 | — | $640,241 | $640,241 |
| Time Vesting RSUs ($) | $245,913 | $582,621 | $582,621 | $582,621 |
| Performance Vesting RSUs ($) | $1,143,055 | $964,119 | $1,856,562 | $1,143,055 |
| Continuation of Benefits ($) | $14,968 | — | $22,452 | — |
| Other Benefits ($) | $31,731 | — | $31,731 | — |
| Total ($) | $3,932,158 | $1,546,740 | $5,917,982 | $2,365,917 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix alignment: approximately 81% of total target compensation for NEOs (including Olsen) is at-risk (LTIP and annual incentive), with 19% fixed base salary .
- Equity emphasis and performance rigor: 75% of LTIP is performance-based (relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index and Same Store NOI CAGR), with TSR capped at target if absolute TSR is negative; remaining 25% time-based aids retention .
- Options usage: Company does not use stock options in executive compensation, reducing repricing risk; equity is via RSUs .
- Annual incentive metrics tie directly to value creation drivers in a REIT: AFFO/share, Same Store Core Revenue Growth, Adjusted EBITDA Margin, strategic priorities, and individual performance .
- 2024 payout outcomes: Olsen’s annual cash incentive paid at 96.5% of target ($640,241) reflecting performance against the objective scorecard .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited for directors/officers/associates; reduces misalignment risk and forced selling pressure .
- Stock ownership guidelines require ≥3x base salary for non-CEO executives with 50% holding requirements until compliant; compliance status for Olsen not disclosed .
- No employment agreement; severance governed by plan with non-compete/non-solicit (12 months) and double-trigger CIC protections; no tax gross-ups disclosed in these sections .
- Clawback policy exists; details and enforcement history not disclosed .
Equity Ownership & Vesting-Related Selling Pressure
- Beneficial ownership: 13,838 shares (<1%); alignment primarily via unvested/uneared RSUs and OP Units .
- Near-term vesting events: 2022 time RSUs vested 3/1/2025; 2023 time RSUs vest annually through 3/1/2026; 2023 performance RSUs earn at 12/31/2025; 2024 time RSUs vest annually through 3/1/2027; 2024 performance RSUs earn at 12/31/2026 and then time vest to certification (typically February) .
- 2024 realized vesting: 21,218 shares vested ($721,650), indicating periodic supply from vesting; actual sales depend on personal trading choices within policy restrictions .
Performance & Track Record
- Company operating performance underpinning incentive payouts: 2024 total revenue +7.7%, Core FFO/share +6.4%, AFFO/share +6.7% YoY .
- Finance execution under Olsen: unsecured debt issuance; improved credit ratings; investor engagement; margin expansion and cost controls .
- Historical LTIP achievements highlight delivery against TSR and NOI growth benchmarks (e.g., 2021 LTIP overall performance payout 150%) .
Employment Terms – Additional Notes
- RSU covenants: post-employment non-solicitation and non-competition for 12 months; confidentiality and non-disparagement covenants indefinite .
- Board-level ownership and retention policies reiterated as part of governance framework .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High share of at-risk pay, performance-weighted LTIP (relative TSR and NOI growth), and anti-hedging/pledging rules indicate strong alignment with shareholder outcomes; Olsen’s realized and outstanding RSUs create continued exposure to multi-year performance metrics .
- Retention risk: Time-vest RSUs and double-trigger CIC severance (2.25x salary+bonus) provide retention and protection; absence of an individual employment agreement adds flexibility for the company while severance plan standardizes outcomes .
- Trading/supply signals: Regular annual RSU vesting and certification-related deliveries (notably 2025–2027) may contribute to periodic insider supply; anti-pledging reduces forced selling risk; monitor Form 4s around vest dates for actual selling behavior .
- Execution confidence: Finance execution (ratings, unsecured issuance) and 2024 operating metrics support incentive payouts; continued delivery against AFFO/share, NOI growth, and margin targets should support compensation realization without discretionary overrides, reducing pay-risk optics .