Mark A. Solls
About Mark A. Solls
Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of Invitation Homes since August 2015; age 68 as of the 2025 proxy, with prior general counsel roles across healthcare, hospitality, and manufacturing, and legal consulting experience . Company performance context includes cumulative TSR translating a fixed $100 investment to $122.25 in 2024, GAAP net income of $455,365k, and AFFO of $986,237k, with CAP linked to AFFO, net income, and three‑year TSR under Item 402(v) disclosures . Compensation design emphasizes pay‑for‑performance with annual cash metrics (AFFO/share, Same Store Core Revenue Growth, Adjusted EBITDA Margin) and multi-year equity tied primarily to relative TSR and Same Store NOI growth .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| DentalOne Partners, Inc. | Senior Vice President and General Counsel | Aug 2012–Jul 2015 | Led legal function at dental services organization |
| Susan G. Komen for the Cure | Legal Consultant | Apr 2011–Jul 2012 | Provided legal consulting to large non-profit foundation |
| Concentra Inc. | Executive Vice President and General Counsel | Aug 2006–Jan 2011 | Directed legal affairs for healthcare management company |
| Wyndham International, Inc. | Executive Vice President and General Counsel | Sep 2002–May 2006 | Oversaw legal matters for leading hotel company |
| DalTile International Inc. | Vice President and General Counsel | 1998–2002 | Led legal function for manufacturer/distributor of ceramic tile |
External Roles
No current external board or public company roles disclosed for Mr. Solls .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $500,000 | $512,116 | $523,077 |
| Target Bonus (%) | — | — | 125% |
| Actual Annual Cash Incentive ($) | $364,462 | $504,946 | $666,437 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,852,203 | $950,031 | $1,000,036 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $12,200 | $13,200 | $13,800 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $2,728,865 | $1,980,293 | $2,203,350 |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Cash Incentive
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AFFO per Share | 30% | — | — | — | Cash, paid per program terms |
| Same Store Core Revenue Growth (YoY) | 20% | — | — | — | Cash, paid per program terms |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 20% | — | — | — | Cash, paid per program terms |
| Strategic Priorities | 20% | — | — | — | Cash, paid per program terms |
| Individual Performance | 10% | Qualitative 90–110% for “solid”; 130–200% for “exceptional” | — | — | Cash, paid per program terms |
| Total (Mark A. Solls) | — | — | 105.5% of target | $666,437 | Cash, no vesting |
2022 LTIP Performance RSUs (3-year period ended 12/31/2024)
| Metric | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSR Relative to RMS Index CAGR | +50 bps | -590 bps | 51% | Vested on Certification Date (Feb 21, 2025) |
| Same Store NOI Growth CAGR | 8.00% | 6.1% | 0% | Vested on Certification Date (Feb 21, 2025) |
| Overall Performance Portion | — | — | 31% | Vested on Certification Date (Feb 21, 2025) |
NEO award sizing under 2022 LTIP (target vs actual earned and time-based RSUs):
| Executive | Performance RSUs (Target) (#) | Actual Earned (#) | Time-Vesting RSUs (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mark A. Solls | 18,516 | 5,766 | 6,009 |
2019 Outperformance Program (performance period Apr 1, 2022–Mar 31, 2025)
- Metrics: Absolute TSR and relative TSR vs FTSE Nareit Residential Index; maximum requires cumulative TSR of 42% and 50% outperformance vs index .
- Achievement: Absolute TSR 78.8% (100% payout); Index TSR 50.9% yielding 154.8% ratio (100% payout); Overall payout 100% (maximum) . | Item | Mark A. Solls | |---|---| | Award Pool % | 6.6% | | Maximum Aggregate Award Opportunity | $2,400,000 | | Actual Achievement ($) | $2,400,000 | | 2024 Vesting ($) | $600,000 | | Actual Achievement (Shares) | 58,882 | | 2024 Vesting (Shares) | 14,721 |
2024/2025 LTIP Program Structure (design)
- 75% performance-based over three years; 25% time-based over three years; relative TSR must outperform the selected index for target payout and includes an absolute TSR cap at target if negative .
- Committee discontinued supplementary outperformance awards following March 31, 2025 performance period based on stockholder feedback .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | Ownership % |
|---|---|---|
| Mark A. Solls | 237,853 | <1% (per table) |
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x salary; other executive officers (including CLEO) 3x salary; to be met within five years; 50% retention until met; maintain thereafter .
- Anti-hedging and anti‑pledging: Prohibited from hedging, buying on margin, borrowing against accounts, or pledging company securities .
Outstanding and Unvested Equity (as of 12/31/2024)
Time-Vesting RSUs (Not Vested):
| Grant Date | Unvested RSUs (#) |
|---|---|
| 3/1/2022 | 7,769 |
| 3/1/2023 | 5,216 |
| 3/1/2024 | 7,238 |
Performance/Equity Incentive Awards (Unearned/Unvested):
| Grant/Program | Unearned/Unvested (#) |
|---|---|
| 3/1/2023 LTIP Performance RSUs | 23,055 |
| 3/1/2024 LTIP Performance RSUs | 20,408 |
| 4/1/2022 Outperformance OP Units | 95,089 |
Vesting Schedules (key terms):
- 2022 LTIP time RSUs vested March 1, 2025; 2022 LTIP performance RSUs vested upon certification and issued in Feb 2025; 2023 and 2024 time RSUs vest in equal annual installments on the first three anniversaries of grant (March 1, 2023/2024) .
- 2023 LTIP performance RSUs measured to Dec 31, 2025 and remain subject to time vesting thereafter; 2024 LTIP is a three-year design with similar performance construct .
Options
- Committee does not utilize stock options in executive compensation; no option awards disclosed for NEOs .
Employment Terms
Executive Severance Plan (Senior VP+ level; applies to NEOs)
| Scenario | Cash Incentive (Pro‑Rata) | Cash Severance Multiple (Base + Target Bonus) | Payment Form | COBRA Premiums | Restrictive Covenants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying termination (without cause or constructive termination) | Based on actual performance | 1.0× for Mr. Solls | Equal monthly installments over 12 months | 12 months | 12‑month non‑compete and non‑solicit; indefinite confidentiality/trade secrets and non‑disparagement |
| Qualifying termination within two years post change in control | Based on actual performance | 1.5× for Mr. Solls | Lump sum | 12 months | Same as above |
| Death or disability | Pro‑rata annual cash incentive based on greater of target or prior year actual | — | — | — | — |
Clawbacks and Recoupment
- Company-wide Incentive Compensation Clawback Policy compliant with Dodd‑Frank/SEC/NYSE; executives acknowledge reimbursement/clawback/forfeiture terms; LTIP RSUs subject to clawback in case of material restatement .
- Detrimental activity provision: If restrictive covenant violation or detrimental activity within four years of grant, executive must repay after‑tax proceeds from sale/disposition of equity awards and shares .
Other Governance Terms
- No individual employment or change‑in‑control agreements; no excise tax gross‑ups; hedging and pledging prohibited .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment remains robust: majority of equity is performance-based with rigorous relative TSR and NOI goals; annual cash incentives tied to AFFO, Core Revenue growth, and EBITDA margin, capping awards at 200% and reinforcing capital discipline .
- Near-term vesting/selling pressure: 2022 LTIP time RSUs and performance RSUs vested in Feb–Mar 2025; ongoing annual vest dates for 2023 and 2024 time RSUs (March 1 each year) may create periodic liquidity events; 2023 performance RSUs certify after 12/31/2025 .
- Alignment and risk controls: 3x salary ownership guideline, mandatory retention until compliance, and anti‑hedging/pledging reduce adverse trading signals and enhance alignment; clawback and detrimental-activity recoupment provisions strengthen governance .
- Severance economics: 1.0× base+target bonus (12‑month installments) or 1.5× (lump sum) post‑CIC for Mr. Solls is moderate versus typical REIT practices; non‑compete/non‑solicit at 12 months supports retention while limiting post‑termination risk .
- Program evolution: Stockholder feedback led to discontinuation of supplementary outperformance awards after the 2022 program’s performance period; watch for LTIP sizing changes to offset removal, but design remains majority performance-based .
- Shareholder sentiment: 2023 say‑on‑pay approval fell to 67.56% (from ~90% historically), indicating heightened scrutiny; continued transparent goal‑setting and performance rigor will be key to sustaining support .