Scott T. Scheimreif
Iridium CommunicationsAbout Scott T. Scheimreif
Scott T. Scheimreif is Executive Vice President, Government Programs at Iridium Communications (IRDM), a role he has held since 2012; he previously served as Vice President, Government Programs from 2008–2012. He is 56 and holds a B.S. in Business Administration from Salisbury University . Over the last three fiscal years, Iridium’s revenues increased from $721.0M (FY2022) to $830.7M (FY2024), while EBITDA also rose over the period; details below (values from S&P Global; EBITDA marked with asterisk where applicable).
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $721,034,000 | $790,723,000 | $830,682,000 |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $380,163,000* | $401,628,000* | $406,611,000* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global. (*) No document citation available.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iridium Communications Inc. | Executive Vice President, Government Programs | 2012–Present | Not disclosed in proxies |
| Iridium Communications Inc. | Vice President, Government Programs | 2008–2012 | Not disclosed in proxies |
External Roles
(no disclosures found in IRDM proxies)
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year cash vs annual bonus outcomes for Scheimreif:
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of Salary) | RSUs Vested from Bonus (shares) | Cash Bonus Paid ($) | Actual Bonus Earned ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $364,315 | 60% (pre-2023 increase) | 3,129 | $182,649 | $313,785 |
| 2023 | $375,244 | 65% | 2,306 | $75,052 | $217,079 |
| 2024 | $399,027 | 65% | 4,973 | $145,337 | $293,085 |
Notes:
- Target bonus opportunities set at 65% of salary for Scheimreif in 2023 and maintained in 2024 .
- IRDM structures 60% of target bonus as RSUs that vest after the Compensation Committee certifies plan achievement; any excess payout above 60% of target is paid in cash .
Performance Compensation
Annual incentive structure and outcomes (company-level metrics drive individual outcomes; individual performance factor was 100% in both 2023 and 2024):
| Year | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Credit to Corporate Factor | Vesting/Payment Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Operational EBITDA | 65% | $473.5M OEBITDA | $465.4M (adj.) | 59% | 60% of target bonus in RSUs (vested Mar-2024); remainder cash |
| 2023 | Strategic Goals (4 components) | 20% | Various targets | Achieved | 15% | As above |
| 2023 | Network & Quality Metrics (3 components) | 15% | Various targets | Achieved | 15% | As above |
| 2023 | Corporate Performance Factor | — | — | 89% | 89% | RSUs vested in full; cash paid for remainder |
| 2024 | Operational EBITDA | 65% | Company target | $470.6M (101% of target) | 73% (65% at target + 8% stretch) | 60% of target bonus in RSUs (vested Mar-2025); remainder cash |
| 2024 | Strategic Goals (new product, new service, NB-IoT) | — | Target | Achieved | 15% | As above |
| 2024 | Network & Quality Metrics | — | Target/stretch | Achieved all | 25% | As above |
| 2024 | Corporate Performance Factor | — | — | 113% | 113% | RSUs vested in full; cash paid for remainder |
Long-term equity incentives (performance RSUs and service RSUs):
- Performance RSUs: two-year performance period; upon certification one-half of earned shares vest, remainder subject to service-based vesting through third anniversary of grant .
- Service RSUs: 2024 grants vest 34% at first anniversary, then in eight equal quarterly installments; 2021–2023 grants vest 25% at first anniversary, then in 12 equal quarterly installments .
2024 Plan-Based Grants (Scheimreif):
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Shares (Target) | Fair Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance RSUs | 3/1/2024 | 25,244 | $750,000 | 0–200% payout range over 2-year period |
| Service RSUs | 3/1/2024 | 25,244 | $750,000 | 34% at 1-year, then 8 quarterly installments |
| Bonus RSUs (60% of target) | 3/1/2024 | 4,973 | $147,748 | Vested Mar-2025 (corporate factor 113%) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 135,673 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Outstanding Options (12/31/2024) | None listed for Scheimreif |
| Unvested Service RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 672 (2021), 5,010 (2022), 6,554 (2023), 24,148 (2024) |
| Unearned Performance RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 25,244 (2024 target) |
| Ownership Guidelines | Exec VPs must hold ≥2× base salary in stock; unvested RSUs/options do not count |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited by insider trading policy |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | In place since 2012; EVP Government Programs |
| Non-Compete / Non-Solicit | One year post-termination |
| Severance (no change in control) | 1× base salary, pro-rated bonus based on actual achievement, and up to 12 months COBRA premiums (or equivalent taxable cash) |
| Severance (within 12 months post-change in control) | Bonus not pro-rated; 100% of outstanding equity awards vest and become exercisable; cash severance paid in lump sum; COBRA as above (double-trigger equity acceleration upon qualifying termination) |
| Clawback Policies | Recovery policies effective Oct 2023 for cash and equity; prior 2019 policy remains in effect for earlier compensation; awards subject to Dodd-Frank/Nasdaq clawbacks and plan-level recoupment |
| Perquisites | Limited to financial counseling/tax prep (non-CEO) and executive physicals/concierge medicine (tax-neutral) |
| Tax Gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups |
| Pension/SERP | None provided |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Bonuses are driven primarily by OEBITDA with strategic/operational goals; in both 2023 and 2024, corporate performance factors were near/above target (89% and 113%), and 60% of target bonus is equity-based, strengthening alignment with shareholders .
- Equity-heavy compensation and scheduled vesting: Ongoing quarterly vesting of service RSUs (and performance RSUs after certification) creates predictable vest events that can drive periodic withholding-related share sales, though hedging/pledging are prohibited, limiting misalignment risks .
- Retention and change-in-control economics: Severance of 1× salary plus bonus and COBRA is moderate; double-trigger equity acceleration upon a qualifying termination within 12 months post-change-in-control reduces retention risk in a transaction scenario but limits windfall absent termination .
- Ownership and option structure: Current holdings are <1% of shares outstanding; options have rolled off with recent awards primarily RSUs, consistent with broader shift toward RSUs and performance-based equity (plan prohibits repricing without stockholder approval) .
- Governance signal: Strong say-on-pay support (94.3% in 2024) and updated clawback policies suggest shareholder-friendly oversight, reducing headline risk around compensation practices .