Vincent J. O’Neill
Iridium CommunicationsAbout Vincent J. O’Neill
Iridium Communications’ Chief Financial Officer since January 1, 2025, age 59, Vincent J. O’Neill joined Iridium in 2014 and served as SVP, Finance, leading budgeting, long‑range financial planning, strategic transactions, and financing activities. He previously held finance leadership roles at BT Cellnet (now Telefónica), Mobilitie, and Sprint Nextel; he is a Chartered Management Accountant and holds an accounting and finance diploma from the Technological University of the Shannon (Ireland) . Iridium’s pay program is explicitly tied to operational EBITDA, strategic and network/quality goals, with a robust clawback regime adopted in Oct‑2023 .
Company performance context (annual):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $721,034,000* | $790,723,000* | $830,682,000* |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $380,163,000* | $401,628,000* | $406,611,000* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.*
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| BT Cellnet (now Telefónica) | Finance leadership | Not disclosed | Wireless carrier finance leadership |
| Mobilitie | Finance leadership | Not disclosed | Wireless infrastructure finance leadership |
| Sprint Nextel (now part of T‑Mobile) | Finance leadership | Not disclosed | Wireless operator finance leadership |
| Iridium Communications | VP FP&A; SVP Finance | 2014–2024 | Led budgeting, long‑range planning, strategic and financing transactions |
External Roles
None disclosed in the company’s filings for O’Neill .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $410,000 per year (initial) |
| Target Bonus % | 65% of base salary (Annual Bonus target) |
| Long-term Equity | $1,500,000 grant date fair value, granted on/around Mar 1, 2025, split between service‑based RSUs and performance‑based RSUs (subject to board/committee approval) |
| Perquisites | Limited: financial counseling/tax prep (execs other than CEO), executive physicals/concierge medical on a tax‑neutral basis |
| Pensions/Gross‑ups | No pension/SERP; no excise tax gross‑ups |
Performance Compensation
2025 Performance Bonus Plan (applies to CFO):
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operational EBITDA | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | TBD (assessed Q1 2026) | Corporate performance factor feeds bonus; max corporate factor 190%; max total payout 200% | First 60% of Target Bonus Award granted as RSUs 3/1/2025; earned/vest in March 2026 upon certification and continued service |
| Strategic Goals | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | TBD | As above | As above |
| Network & Quality Metrics | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | TBD | As above | As above |
| Individual Performance | — | — | — | 0%–150% personal factor additive; overall cap 200% | — |
Program design, payout caps, and vesting mechanics: RSUs equal to first 60% of target; excess >60% paid in cash; subject to clawback .
Long‑term equity program structure:
| Award Type | Measurement Period | Payout Scale | Vesting Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance‑based RSUs | Two‑year company performance period | Typically 0–200% of target depending on achievement | One‑half vest upon certification; remainder vests based on continued service through the third anniversary of grant |
| Service‑based RSUs | N/A | N/A | 34% vests on first anniversary (e.g., March 1 following grant), remainder in eight equal quarterly installments thereafter |
Reference precedent (2024 plan weights for NEOs): OEBITDA 65%, Strategic 20%, Network/Quality 15%; corporate performance achieved 113% in 2024 (context for structure only) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Status | Detail |
|---|---|
| Ownership Guidelines | CFOs/EVPs must hold stock equal to 2× base salary; unvested RSUs and unexercised options do not count |
| Retention to Compliance | Until guideline met, must retain 50% of “Net Profit Shares” from vest/exercise (net of taxes/exercise cost) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited (no hedging; no pledging/margin) |
| Clawback | Company‑wide clawback adopted Oct 2023; awards subject to recoupment under multiple policies |
Recent insider filings (indicative of equity activity):
- Form 3 filed Jan 3, 2025 (RSU scheduled to vest March 1, 2025) .
- Form 4 filed Mar 4, 2025; Jun 2, 2025 (ownership changes reported) .
- Form 4 filed Sep 2, 2025 showing 804 shares withheld for taxes at $24.89 per share (not open‑market selling) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Start Date, Role | CFO effective Jan 1, 2025 |
| Base Salary | $410,000 initial |
| Annual Bonus Target | 65% of base salary |
| 2025 Equity Award | ~$1,500,000 grant date fair value, split 50/50 service‑ vs performance‑based RSUs |
| Severance (non‑CIC) | Provides severance benefits upon termination without cause or resignation for “Good Reason”; specifics governed by agreement |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) | Includes CIC severance payment and healthcare continuation; “double‑trigger” equity acceleration—unvested time‑based awards accelerate on qualifying CIC‑related termination |
| Clawback | Incentive awards subject to company clawback policy |
| Other | Agreement requires compliance with Company policies and proprietary information obligations |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Bonus structure centered on Operational EBITDA, strategic and network metrics with capped payouts; first 60% delivered in RSUs ties annual incentives directly to stock value and performance certification (reduces discretionary drift) .
- Retention profile: $1.5M equity grant split between service and performance components, ownership guideline of 2× salary and retention of net shares until compliant—together create meaningful golden handcuffs and strong “skin-in-the-game” alignment; hedging/pledging prohibited (low alignment risk) .
- CIC terms: Double‑trigger equity acceleration and CIC cash/benefit protections provide continuity but limit windfall; not shareholder‑unfriendly (no excise tax gross‑ups) .
- Trading signals: 2025 filings include tax withholding settlements (e.g., 804 shares at $24.89), not open‑market selling—limited indicative selling pressure from O’Neill’s transactions to date .
- Execution context: Iridium delivered FY24 corporate performance at 113% of bonus plan targets with OEBITDA at 101% and continued strategic and network achievements; as CFO, O’Neill’s incentives are directly levered to sustaining OEBITDA and strategic/quality objectives (monitor RSU vesting and 2025 bonus certification in Q1‑2026) .