Barry Hytinen
About Barry Hytinen
Barry Hytinen is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Iron Mountain, appointed in January 2020; he is 50 years old and holds bachelor’s degrees in finance and political science from Syracuse University and an MBA from Harvard University . Under his tenure, Iron Mountain delivered record FY2024 results: revenue $6.15B, Adjusted EBITDA $2.24B, AFFO $1.34B ($4.54 per share), alongside a 5-year cumulative TSR of 329% versus 23% for the MSCI US REIT Index, evidencing strong pay-for-performance alignment . Short-term incentives for executives are tied to Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA and AFFO per share, with strategic objectives, while long-term performance units (PUs) vest on three-year cliffs based on ROIC, Revenue, and relative TSR versus the MSCI US REIT Index .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hanesbrands Inc. (public) | EVP & CFO | Oct 2017–Dec 2019 | Led finance for a global basic apparel marketer |
| Tempur Sealy International (public) | EVP & CFO | Jul 2015–Oct 2017 | Led finance for a global mattress and bedding manufacturer |
| Tempur Sealy International | EVP, Finance & Corporate Development | Jul 2014–Jul 2015 | Corporate finance and development leadership |
| Tempur Sealy International | Various roles (joined 2005) | 2005–2014 | Progressive finance leadership |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $744,232 | $750,002 | $750,002 |
| Target STI (% of Salary) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | 125% (raised from 110% in 2024) |
| Actual STI Paid ($) | $1,015,000 (paid for 2022 performance) | $960,000 (paid for 2023 performance) | $1,405,000 (paid for 2024 performance) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $18,774 | $41,594 | $27,004 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $5,041,723 | $5,137,678 | $7,289,468 |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (2024) – Design and Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Target/Structure | Actual/Payout | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA & Revenue (Enterprise) | 40% | Payout threshold 50% at 97%/95%; target 100% at 100%/100%; max 200% at 107%/105% | Actual: $2,254M Adj. EBITDA vs $2,200M target; $6,180M Revenue vs $6,170M target → 124.9% payout | Committee applied negative discretionary adjustment to align broad workforce; final program payout basis maintained at 124.9% |
| AFFO per share (constant currency) | 30% | Max payout 150%; threshold set relative to dividend/investment needs | 141.3% payout | Constant currency basis |
| Strategic Objectives | 30% | Customer-centric cross-sell; Core Strength (MW booked, organic volume, ALM & Digital revenue); Sustainability & DEI | 128.2% payout (e.g., 116 MW booked; ALM revenue $389M result 80.6%; emissions reduction target hit) | Weighted aggregate across objectives |
| Corporate STI Payout (pre individual multiplier) | — | Calculated 130.8%; negative adjustment (5.9%) → final 124.9% | 124.9% | Applied to NEOs |
| Individual Multiplier (Barry) | — | ±25% range | +20% | Applied by Compensation Committee |
| Final STI payout (% of target for Barry) | — | — | 150.0%; $1,405,000 on $937,500 target | Paid Q1 2025 |
Long-Term Incentives (Structure and Grants)
| Component | Weight | Grant/Terms | Vesting | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Units (PUs) | 100% (Barry elected Equity Choice 100% PUs for 2024) | 2024 grant date: Mar 1, 2024; Target 55,534 PUs; Max 194,369 PUs; Expected grant-date FMV $5,107,462 | 3-year cliff; settles in shares on Mar 1, 2027 (subject to performance) | 75% Operational (ROIC hurdle; revenue Core Plan or ARP) and 25% relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT |
| Stock Options | N/A for CFO | Not granted to Barry (options only for CEO in 2024) | — | — |
| RSUs | Prior awards outstanding | RSUs vesting Mar 1, 2025: 5,033 units for Barry | As scheduled | Time-based; no options received in 2024 |
2022 PU Results (Vested March 2025)
| Component | Measure/Result | Weighted Payout |
|---|---|---|
| Operational Performance (ROIC + ARP Revenue) | ROIC ≥10.5%; FY2024 ARP revenue $6,536M (constant currency), exceeding ARP maximum | 300% |
| Relative TSR | 147.5% TSR, 99.4th percentile vs MSCI US REIT Index | 50% |
| Combined Weighted Payout | ARP operational + rTSR | 350% of target |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 198,518 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 5,033 units; market value $529,019 at $105.11 close |
| Unearned PUs (12/31/2024) | 158,543; 208,015; 69,417 units; market values $16,664,455; $21,864,457; $7,296,421 at $105.11 close |
| Options | N/A (no options reported for CFO) |
| Ownership Guidelines | CFO must hold 3x base salary; all executives measured compliant as of March 2025 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited by policy; executives in compliance as of Apr 18, 2025 |
| Clawback | Adopted Nov 30, 2023; recoups excess incentive comp after restatement or misconduct |
| Insider Supply Indicators | 2024 stock vested: 69,262 shares, value realized $6,118,279; suggests vest-driven supply cadence (no options exercised) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | CFO (Severance Program No. 1) |
|---|---|
| Qualifying Termination (without cause/for good reason) | Cash: one year’s base salary plus bonus equal to annual target times average payout over prior three years; employer COBRA share up to 12 months; 12 months outplacement; accelerated vesting of RSUs/options scheduled within 12 months; PUs pro-rated (33.3% <12 months, 66.6% 12–24 months, 100% ≥24 months), payable at original vest date based on actual performance |
| Equity Acceleration on Change in Control | Double trigger: immediate vesting if terminated or resign for good reason within 14 days prior or 12 months post “vesting change in control” |
| Estimated Benefits (as of 12/31/2024) – Qualifying Termination | Cash severance $1,966,563; Benefits $68,269; Acceleration of unvested awards $36,243,790; Total $38,278,622 |
| Estimated Benefits (as of 12/31/2024) – Qualifying Termination in Connection with Change in Control | Cash severance $1,966,563; Benefits $68,269; Acceleration of unvested awards $56,800,738; Total $58,835,569 |
| Golden Parachute Excise Tax Gross-Up | None; policy explicitly prohibits excise tax gross-ups |
| Deferred Compensation | EDCP offered; none of NEOs participated in 2024 |
Compensation Structure Notes and Peer/Policy Context
- Independent compensation consultant (Pay Governance) advises the Compensation Committee; benchmarking considers 25th/50th/75th percentiles and a mixed REIT/non-REIT peer group (e.g., Equinix, Digital Realty, Crown Castle, Prologis, Broadridge, Cintas) .
- Strong Say-on-Pay support (~96% approval in 2024) underscores investor alignment .
- Changes for 2025 PU design: consolidated revenue plan replacing Core/ARP; three-year fixed revenue goals; cap operational payout at 133% if absolute TSR is negative; ROIC hurdle and 75% operational/25% rTSR weights retained .
Director/Related Party Governance and Risk Indicators
- Related party transactions: none new requiring Audit Committee review in 2024 .
- Insider trading controls: anti-hedging/anti-pledging; 10b5-1 plan restrictions and cooling-off periods; all executives in compliance as of Apr 18, 2025 .
- Dividend policy: increased to $0.785 per share effective Q1 2025 following strong AFFO performance .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of Barry’s pay is at risk via PUs tied to multi-year ROIC, revenue, and rTSR, plus STI tied to Revenue/Adjusted EBITDA/AFFO per share; strong 2022 PU payout (350%) reflects exceptional operational/TSR performance but requires sustained growth to repeat .
- Supply signals: Upcoming vesting events—RSUs on Mar 1, 2025 and three-year PU cliffs (e.g., Mar 1, 2027 for 2024 grants)—can create episodic selling pressure, though hedging/pledging is prohibited and executives are guideline-compliant .
- Retention/Change-in-control: Double-trigger equity acceleration with substantial CIC values ($58.8M for CFO as of 12/31/24) supports retention through contingencies while avoiding single-trigger windfalls; no excise tax gross-ups is shareholder-friendly .
- Pay/governance backdrop: Strong say-on-pay support and independent consultant oversight, with explicit clawback policy and anti-hedging/pledging, reduces governance risk and aligns incentives with multi-year TSR and revenue growth .