Greg McIntosh
About Greg McIntosh
Greg McIntosh (age 52) is Executive Vice President, Chief Commercial Officer and General Manager of Global Records & Information Management (RIM) at Iron Mountain. He has held the RIM GM role since October 2021, after serving as EVP & Chief Commercial Officer from December 2019; he joined Iron Mountain in May 2014 and previously led Innovation & Product Management, Consumer Storage, Strategic Accounts, and the Canadian RIM business. McIntosh holds a BMath and MAcc from the University of Waterloo and is a CPA (Ontario). Company performance during his senior tenure includes 2024 revenue of $6.15B (+12% reported) and Adjusted EBITDA of $2.24B (+14%), with Global RIM revenue up 7%, and a five‑year cumulative TSR of 329% through 12/31/2024, underscoring execution against Project Matterhorn growth priorities .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iron Mountain | EVP, GM Global RIM | Oct 2021 – present | Leads the core global RIM franchise; aligns commercial engine to drive cross‑sell and retention across a 95% Fortune 1000 customer base . |
| Iron Mountain | EVP & Chief Commercial Officer | Dec 2019 – Oct 2021 | Global responsibility for commercial functions and positioning emerging solutions to meet digital requirements . |
| Iron Mountain | SVP, Consumer Storage; SVP, Innovation & Product Management | Dec 2016 – Mar 2019 | Drove new product introduction, pricing strategy, customer insights; supported growth objectives . |
| Iron Mountain | SVP & GM, Canada (RIM) | May 2014 – Dec 2016 | Led Canadian RIM operations; foundation for subsequent global commercial leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davis + Henderson (now Finastra) | Financial Services Technology executive | Pre‑2014 | Senior leadership roles in fintech; deep B2B tech services background leveraged in IRM go‑to‑market . |
| Cyence International | Co‑Founder & President | Pre‑acquisition (dates not disclosed) | Scaled to 185 employees; successful exit to a large fintech provider; hands‑on growth and product strategy experience . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary rate | $575,000 | 2024 base salary for McIntosh (target level used for incentive calculations) . |
| Salary paid (reported) | $533,046 | 2024 Summary Compensation Table salary paid (USD) . |
Perquisites in 2024 included employer retirement plan matching (Canada DPSP), de minimis President’s Club guest costs, and a small related tax gross‑up; no SERP is provided .
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (Annual Bonus – 2024)
Program design: 70% financial (Adjusted EBITDA and Revenue; AFFO/share), 30% strategic objectives; corporate payout was adjusted to 124.9% after a negative discretion to align with broader workforce bonus outcomes. Individual multipliers for NEOs were applied based on personal performance .
| Metric | Weight | Target/Scale | 2024 Result | Payout (weighted) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA & Revenue (enterprise) | 40% | Max 200%; payout grid aligned to 97%/95% threshold, 100%/100% target, 107%/105% max | Adj. EBITDA $2,254M vs $2,200M; Revenue $6,180M vs $6,170M | 124.9% (pre‑discretion) . |
| AFFO per share (cc) | 30% | Max 150% | 2024 payout 141.3% (cc) | 141.3% (pre‑discretion) . |
| Strategic Objectives | 30% | Portfolio of customer, core strength, sustainability/DEI measures | Aggregate payout 128.2% | 128.2% (pre‑discretion) . |
| Corporate payout (pre‑discretion) | — | — | — | 130.8% . |
| Corporate payout (final) | — | — | — | 124.9% (after −5.9% discretion) . |
| Individual multiplier (McIntosh) | — | ±25% | 15% | 15% . |
| Executive | Target bonus (% salary) | Final payout (% of target) | Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greg McIntosh | 100% | 143.7% (124.9% corporate × 1.15 IM) | $826,000 . |
Long‑Term Incentives (2024 Grants)
All NEOs other than the CEO elected 100% Performance Units (PUs) via Equity Choice; earned PUs cliff‑vest three years from grant based on operational revenue performance (subject to ROIC hurdle) and relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index (25% weight). The design allows payout under either the Core Plan (average annual revenue over three years; max 200% for that component) or the Advanced Revenue Plan (ARP) if tougher year‑3 revenue and positive absolute TSR conditions are met (unweighted ARP range 300%–400% for operational component), with ROIC as a funding gate. Relative TSR pays 50%–200% unweighted, capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative .
| Grant detail (McIntosh) | Value/Units |
|---|---|
| Grant date | March 1, 2024 . |
| 2024 PU grant – target units | 40,108 . |
| 2024 PU grant – maximum units | 140,378 (reflects up to 350% under ARP) . |
| 2024 Stock awards (expected fair value) | $3,688,733 |
| 2024 Stock awards (maximum value) | $12,910,565 . |
| Vesting schedule | Three‑year cliff from grant; earned PUs settle in shares (i.e., March 1, 2027) . |
| 2024 CEO/NEO LTI mix | NEOs (ex‑CEO) 100% PUs; CEO 85% PUs/15% options . |
Performance history: 2022 PU grants (three‑year period ended 12/31/2024) paid at a total weighted 350% (Operational ARP 300% + rTSR 50%) on strong constant‑currency revenue growth (>13% CAGR; >$2B increase to $6.536B) and 147.5% absolute TSR (99th percentile vs MSCI US REIT) .
Stock Options (Outstanding)
McIntosh did not receive options in 2024; he holds legacy options as of 12/31/2024 with the following key positions :
- 6,744 options @ $31.46 expiring 3/09/2026 (exercisable) .
- 6,839 options @ $37.00 expiring 2/16/2027 (exercisable) .
- 4,009 options @ $33.72 expiring 2/15/2028 (exercisable) .
- 13,442 options @ $35.17 expiring 3/25/2029 (exercisable) .
Insider trading plan and activity: On 3/14/2024 McIntosh adopted a Rule 10b5‑1 plan to exercise up to 3,923 options and sell up to 13,923 shares between June 13–28, 2024; 2024 realized activities included 3,923 shares acquired on option exercise and 28,373 shares vested (value realized $2.50M on vesting) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item (as of 3/5/2025 unless noted) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Beneficially owned shares | 71,768 (<1% of outstanding) . |
| Vested options (or within 60 days) | 31,034 . |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024 snapshot) | 3,104 (vesting 3/1/2025) . |
| Unearned/unvested PUs (12/31/2024 snapshot) | 97,769; 109,950; 50,135 across 2022–2024 cycles . |
| Ownership guidelines | EVPs: 2× salary; all executives in compliance as of March 2025 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for executives; insider trading policy requires pre‑clearance and 10b5‑1 safeguards; all in compliance as of 4/18/2025 . |
Notes: The Company’s ownership guidelines require retention of 50% of net shares until thresholds are met, reinforcing long‑term alignment .
Employment Terms
Severance and Change‑in‑Control (CIC)
McIntosh participates in Severance Program No. 1. Qualifying termination (without cause or for good reason) provides: cash equal to one year base salary plus a bonus based on target multiplied by the average payout percentage over the prior three years; Company‑paid employer share of COBRA to 12 months; outplacement for 12 months; accelerated vesting of RSUs/options scheduled to vest within 12 months; and pro‑rata vesting of PUs (33.3%/<12 months; 66.6%/12–24 months; 100%/>=24 months), payable at original vest if earned . Equity awards accelerate on a double‑trigger in connection with a “vesting change in control” (termination within 14 days prior to or 12 months post CIC) .
Estimated payments (12/31/2024 hypothetical):
- Qualifying termination (no CIC): Cash $1,281,292; benefits $40,000; equity acceleration $21,266,229; total $22,587,520 .
- Qualifying termination with CIC: Cash $1,281,292; benefits $40,000; equity acceleration $34,983,724; total $36,305,016 .
Other provisions:
- Clawback policy (adopted Nov 30, 2023) requires recoupment of excess incentive‑based compensation after restatements and allows recovery in cases of fraud/intentional misconduct; applies to time‑vesting awards as well .
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policy; 10b5‑1 plan controls; pre‑clearance required .
- No excise tax gross‑ups on CIC benefits (shareholder‑friendly) .
- Deferred compensation: none of the NEOs participated in the Executive Deferred Compensation Plan in 2024 .
Non‑compete/non‑solicit: receipt of severance benefits is contingent upon executing separation and confidentiality/non‑competition agreements; detailed durations are not disclosed in the proxy .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Insider selling pressure: A 10b5‑1 plan was established in March 2024 to exercise and sell a limited number of shares (up to 13,923), indicating measured liquidity management rather than discretionary timing; significant 2022 PU vest (350% payout) in March 2025 could increase supply from vesting events across the NEO group .
- Compensation governance: Negative discretion was applied to 2024 corporate bonus outcomes; clawback policy in force; hedging/pledging prohibited; no CIC tax gross‑ups .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: Heavy tilt to at‑risk equity—100% PUs for 2024 LTI (NEOs other than CEO)—increases performance linkage, especially to multi‑year revenue, ROIC, and relative TSR .
- Shift toward performance units: Equity Choice resulted in 100% PUs among NEOs (ex‑CEO), elevating performance sensitivity versus RSUs .
- Metrics rigor and alignment: 2024 STI emphasizes enterprise Adjusted EBITDA/Revenue and AFFO/share, with strategic objectives tied to customer cross‑sell, RIM organic volumes, ALM and Digital growth, and ESG/DEI progress .
- Discretion applied: Compensation Committee reduced corporate STI payout from 130.8% to 124.9%, reinforcing governance alignment .
- 2025 LTI refinements: Single continuous revenue plan replaces Core/ARP; operational component capped at 133% if absolute TSR is negative, strengthening alignment with shareholder outcomes .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 results: Revenue $6.15B (+12% reported/+13% cc), Adjusted EBITDA $2.24B (+14%), AFFO $1.34B; Adjusted EBITDA margin up to 36.4%; RIM segment revenue +7% and EBITDA +10%; Data Center revenue +25% (116 MW signed); ALM revenue +119% with Regency integration .
- Shareholder returns: Five‑year cumulative TSR of 329% through 12/31/2024, far outpacing the MSCI US REIT Index (23%) .
Equity Award and Ownership Detail (12/31/2024 snapshots and 3/5/2025 ownership)
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| RSUs unvested | 3,104 (vest 3/1/2025) . |
| PUs unearned (by cycle) | 97,769; 109,950; 50,135 units outstanding across 2022–2024 awards; values at 12/31/2024 based on $105.11 close included in table . |
| Stock options | Exercisable blocks: 6,744 @ $31.46 (exp 3/9/2026); 6,839 @ $37.00 (exp 2/16/2027); 4,009 @ $33.72 (exp 2/15/2028); 13,442 @ $35.17 (exp 3/25/2029) . |
| Beneficial ownership (3/5/2025) | 71,768 shares; vested options 31,034; <1% ownership . |
| Policy alignment | EVPs must hold 2× salary; all execs in compliance as of March 2025; hedging/pledging prohibited; insider policy compliance affirmed as of April 18, 2025 . |
Employment & Contracts (Key Terms)
| Topic | Summary |
|---|---|
| Severance (qualifying termination) | 1× base salary + bonus (target × 3‑yr average payout), COBRA employer share up to 12 months, 12 months outplacement, 12‑month vesting acceleration for time‑based awards, pro‑rata PUs; separation and non‑competition agreements required . |
| Change‑in‑Control | Equity acceleration on double‑trigger (termination in connection with vesting change in control); estimated total value under CIC with qualifying termination: $36.3M (cash $1.28M; benefits $40k; equity $34.98M) . |
| Clawback | Restatement‑based and misconduct triggers; covers time‑vested awards . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited; pre‑clearance and Rule 10b5‑1 standards enforced . |
| Deferred comp | No EDCP participation in 2024 . |
Investment Implications
- Strong pay‑for‑performance alignment: Heavy reliance on multi‑year PUs tied to revenue, ROIC, and rTSR, with a governance overlay (negative discretion on STI; clawback; anti‑pledging) supports alignment and mitigates risk of windfall outcomes .
- Retention vs supply dynamics: Large unearned/unvested equity balances (notably 2023–2025 PUs) create retention hooks; however, sizable 2022 PU payout at 350% vested in March 2025 and 10b5‑1 plan‑driven sales may create episodic selling pressure around vest dates .
- Execution credibility: RIM growth (+7%), expanding data center pipeline (116 MW signings), ALM scale‑up (+119%), and outlier TSR (329% over five years) indicate strong operating discipline in McIntosh’s remit; continued revenue and ROIC delivery are key to 2024–2026 PU realizations and future compensation outcomes .
- Governance positives: No CIC tax gross‑ups, anti‑hedging/pledging policy, and robust stock ownership requirements (EVP 2× salary) reduce alignment risk; all executives are in compliance .