Jim Stephens
President, Cardiac Rhythm Management & Neuromodulation at ITGR
Executive
About Jim Stephens
Jim Stephens is President, Cardiac Rhythm Management & Neuromodulation (CRM&N) at Integer Holdings, age 51, and joined Integer in May 2023 after roles as CEO of HDT Global (2020–2021) and ~18 years at Parker Hannifin in division GM roles; earlier career roles included domnick hunter (UK) and Ceridian . During 2024, Integer delivered 10% sales growth to $1.717B, adjusted operating income growth at twice the rate of sales, and maintained debt leverage within its 2.5–3.5x adjusted EBITDA target, underpinning incentive payouts tied to STI AOI and multi-year PSUs linked to organic sales growth and relative TSR . Stephens’ CRM&N product category performance earned 125.81% of target and contributed to his 127.32% STI payout, highlighting operational execution in his domain .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parker Hannifin | General Manager, Aircraft Wheel & Brake Division | 2015–2017 | Division leadership across manufacturing and operations |
| Parker Hannifin | General Manager, Stratoflex Products Division | 2017–2020 | Led product division; technology and manufacturing oversight |
| HDT Global | President & CEO | 2020–2021 | Led company through sale in July 2021 |
| Integer Holdings | President, CRM&N | Joined May 2023 (tenure began 2023) | Product category leadership for CRM&N |
External Roles
No public external directorships disclosed for Stephens in Integer’s filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Salary Earned ($) | $461,827 |
| Bonus Target (% of salary) | 70% |
| Target STI ($) | $323,279 |
| % of Target Earned | 127.32% |
| STI Earned ($) | $411,607 |
| Annualized Base Salary ($) | $465,000 (increased March 2024 from $450,000 in 2023) |
Perquisites and benefits: 401(k) match $10,350; term life $2,035; LTD insurance $4,885; no restoration plan contribution or perquisites disclosed for Stephens in 2024 .
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (STI) – 2024 Design and Outcome
| Component | Weighting | Target/Definition | Achievement | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company STI AOI | Multiplier | Adjusted operating income; 100% target at $275.1M; 113% maximum at $310.9M | Actual $287.1M (104.4% of target) | Payout factor 133.35% |
| ELT Team Goal | 20% (Product Category Presidents) | Strategic objectives across product lines, customers, cost, culture | Rated 100% | Multiplied by STI AOI factor |
| Product Category Performance (CRM&N) | 80% (Product Category Presidents) | Category operating profit (31.25%), Quality CLA rate (18.75%), Inventory DOH (12.5%), On-time delivery-to-promise (12.5%), Category challenge metric (25%) | CRM&N category % of target earned: 125.81% | Multiplied by STI AOI factor |
Stephens’ total STI payout was 127.32% of target reflecting CRM&N performance and company STI AOI .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 Grants and Structure
| Instrument | Grant Date | Target Shares (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Based RSUs | 01/19/2024 | 2,275 | $236,577 | Vest one-third annually over 3 years (first anniversary then annually), equal installments; scheduled dates Jan 19, 2025; Jan 20, 2026; Jan 20, 2027 |
| rTSR PSUs | 01/19/2024 | 2,007 (threshold 1,003; max 4,014) | $236,746 | 3-year performance vs peer group; 55th percentile=100% vest; 75th percentile=200%; 25th percentile=50%; cliff vest after certification in Q1 2027 |
| Organic Sales Growth PSUs | 01/19/2024 | 2,275 (threshold 1,137; max 4,550) | $236,577 | 3-year organic sales growth each year averaged; 50%–200% payout range; capped at target if 3-year CAGR ≤ target; cliff vest after certification in Q1 2027 |
| Total 2024 LTI Value | — | — | $710,000 | One-third RSUs; one-third rTSR PSUs; one-third Financial PSUs |
PSU program mechanics and payout ranges summarized above reflect Integer’s standard design for NEOs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of 03/24/2025) | 1,394 shares; includes 491 RSUs issuable within 60 days; <1% of shares outstanding |
| Ownership Guidelines | 2.5x base salary requirement; Stephens is within the requisite period to attain guideline (not yet required to be fully met) |
| Anti-Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging of Company stock prohibited for executives |
| Options | No outstanding options disclosed for Stephens |
Vested vs Unvested/Unearned (as of 12/31/2024)
| Category | Shares (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Based RSUs (unvested) | 2,275 | $301,483 | Annual tranches in 2025/2026/2027 |
| Time-Based RSUs (unvested) | 2,454 | $325,204 | Vests 491 on 05/25/2025; 1,963 on 05/15/2026 |
| PSUs (2023 program, unearned) | 2,944 | $390,139 | Shown at max tracking; actual vest based on performance; certify and vest Q1 2026 |
| PSUs (2024 program, unearned) | 8,564 | $1,134,901 | Shown at max tracking; certify and vest Q1 2027 |
| RSUs vested in 2024 | 490 | $57,683 (value realized) | Vested shares and value in 2024 |
Note: Market/payout values above use $132.52 (12/31/2024 closing price) per Integer methodology .
Upcoming Vesting Schedule (selected)
- RSUs from 2024 grant: annual tranches on Jan 19, 2025; Jan 20, 2026; Jan 20, 2027 (equal installments) .
- Prior RSU grant: 491 on May 25, 2025; 1,963 on May 15, 2026 .
- PSUs (2023): performance period through 12/31/2025 (organic sales) and 01/20/2026 (rTSR); vest in Q1 2026 upon certification .
- PSUs (2024): performance period through 12/31/2026 (organic sales) and to Q1 2027 (rTSR); vest in Q1 2027 upon certification .
Employment Terms
| Scenario (as of 12/31/2024) | Salary & Bonus ($) | Severance ($) | Acceleration of Stock-Based Awards ($) | Continuance of Benefits ($) | Outplacement ($) | 1x Prior-Year STI ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination Without Cause (non-CIC) | — | 465,000 | 126,424 | 16,700 | — | — | 608,124 |
| CIC + termination without cause/good reason | 1,581,000 | — | 1,389,207 | 69,100 | 25,000 | N/A | 3,064,307 |
Change-in-control framework for NEOs (excluding CEO-specific agreement):
- Double-trigger required (change in control plus qualifying termination) .
- Severance includes 2x base salary and 2x greater of three-year average cash bonus or current-year target, 2x Company 401(k)/similar plan contributions, 24 months of medical premium support at 110%, and $25,000 outplacement; immediate vesting of time-based and performance equity awards unless qualifying replacement awards are provided; best after-tax cutback provision; 24-month post-employment non-compete covenant .
- Clawback/recoupment policy covering cash and equity incentive awards (restatement-triggered recovery); policy updated to align with SEC/NYSE standards .
- No tax gross-ups for change-in-control benefits; hedging/pledging prohibited .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Stephens’ incentives are heavily tied to operational execution in CRM&N (80% of STI weight) and multi-year PSUs linked to organic sales growth and relative TSR, reinforcing stockholder value creation; his 2024 STI payout at 127.32% reflects above-target performance in category and company AOI .
- Retention risk: Standard double-trigger CIC protections, severance, and significant unearned PSUs scheduled through 2027 provide retention hooks; no tax gross-ups indicates shareholder-friendly design .
- Insider selling pressure: Near-term RSU vesting dates in 2025 and 2026 (including specific May tranches) may create incremental sellable supply; PSUs vest in Q1 2026 and Q1 2027 contingent on performance, potentially adding supply upon certification; anti-hedging/pledging reduces misalignment risk .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership is modest (1,394 shares; <1% of float) with a 2.5x salary guideline still within the compliance window, suggesting alignment will build as RSUs/PSUs vest and guidelines are reached over time .
- Program rigor: Integer’s compensation program uses challenging targets, reintroduced steeper STI curve post-pandemic, and strong say-on-pay support (~98% approval), indicating robust governance around executive pay .