Andrew T.S. Lo
InvescoAbout Andrew T.S. Lo
Andrew T. S. Lo (age 63) is Senior Managing Director and Head of Asia Pacific at Invesco, a role he has held since 2001 after joining the firm in 1994; he holds a B.S. and an MBA from Babson College . Under his leadership, APAC delivered $26.1B in net long‑term inflows in 2024 with strong investment performance across the region . Company performance context for pay: 2024 net long‑term inflows were $65.2B, net revenues $4,400M, adjusted operating margin 31.1%, and adjusted diluted EPS $1.71 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Invesco Asia | Managing Director | 1994–2001 | Built and scaled regional platform ahead of appointment as Head of APAC |
| Invesco | Senior Managing Director & Head of Asia Pacific | 2001–present | Led APAC to sustained organic AUM growth and diversified inflows across China, Japan, India |
| Capital House Asia | Managing Director | 1990–1994 | Led investment management operations across Asia |
| Citicorp | Vice President, Investment Mgmt Group | 1988–1990 | Advanced institutional investment management capabilities |
| Chase Manhattan Bank | Credit Analyst | 1984–1988 | Foundation in credit analysis and risk |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong Investment Funds Association | Chair | 1996–1997 | Advanced industry standards and market development in HK |
| Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (Council) | Member | 1997–2001 | Influenced market policy and governance for capital markets |
| Securities and Futures Commission (HK) | Advisory Committee Member | 1997–2001 | Contributed to regulatory oversight and investor protection |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 457,978 | 458,070 | 462,000 | 462,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Cash Bonus / Non-Equity Incentive ($) | 1,337,213 | 1,400,000 | 1,400,000 | 2,100,000 | 1,518,750 | 1,827,000 | 2,100,000 |
Notes: 2018–2021 values reflect committee decisions; 2022–2024 reflect SEC Summary Compensation Table non‑equity incentive amounts .
Performance Compensation
| Metric | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Deferral ($) / Time‑based Equity ($) | 541,930 | 542,000 | 1,400,000 | 1,260,000 |
| Long‑term Equity ($) / Performance‑based Equity ($) | 2,400,000 | 2,400,000 | 2,100,000 | 1,890,000 |
| Total Annual Compensation ($) | 4,800,000 | 4,805,000 | 6,062,000 | 5,750,000 |
| Incentive Target ($) | 4.14M | 4.14M | 4.292M | 5.25M |
| Payout vs Target (%) | 104.8% | 104.8% | 130% | 100% |
2024 Company Scorecard (drives NEO pay outcomes)
| Metric (Weight within Financial 66.7%) | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | 2024 Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Long‑Term Flows ($B) | 33.5 | 65.2 | 130% |
| Net Revenues ($M) | 4,368 | 4,400 | 104% |
| Adjusted Operating Income ($M) | 1,350 | 1,371 | 106% |
| Adjusted Operating Margin (%) | 30.9% | 31.1% | 104% |
| Adjusted Diluted EPS ($) | 1.61 | 1.71 | 108% |
| Financial Outcome Score | — | — | 110% |
| Organizational Health (33.3% weight) | — | — | 102% |
| Overall Company Score | — | — | 107% |
2024 Equity Award Grants (Lo)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Shares | Fair Value ($) | Vesting Schedule | Close Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time‑based RSUs | 2/28/2024 | 71,693 | 1,096,186 | 4‑year ratable (25% annually) | 15.29 |
| Performance‑based RSUs (target) | 2/28/2024 | 107,540 | 1,519,814 | 36‑month cliff; vesting tied to 3‑yr avg AOM & relative TSR | 15.29 |
Performance equity vesting matrix ranges 0–150% based on three‑year average Adjusted Operating Margin and relative TSR; if absolute TSR is negative, vesting is capped at 100% .
Shares Vested in 2024 (Lo)
| Grant Date | Type | Vest Date | Shares Vested (#) | FMV Price ($) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/28/2020 | Time | 2/28/2024 | 25,538 | 15.29 | 390,476 |
| 2/28/2021 | Time | 2/28/2024 | 13,122 | 15.29 | 200,635 |
| 2/28/2022 | Time | 2/28/2024 | 16,478 | 15.29 | 251,949 |
| 2/28/2023 | Time | 2/28/2024 | 14,333 | 15.29 | 219,152 |
| 2/28/2021 | Performance | 2/28/2024 | 51,962 | 15.29 | 794,499 |
| Total | — | — | 121,433 | — | 1,856,711 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (common shares) | 610,163 shares |
| Deferred Share Awards | 569,934 shares |
| Total Reported (beneficial + deferred) | 1,180,097 shares |
| Beneficial Ownership as % of Shares Outstanding | 0.136% (610,163 / 447,413,586) |
| Unvested Time‑based/Deferred Shares (12/31/2024) | 277,525 shares; $4,851,138 MV |
| Unvested Performance‑based Awards (12/31/2024) | 292,409 shares; $5,111,310 MV |
| Shares Pledged as Collateral | None; no pledging reported |
| Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines | 5x base salary for executives; 10x for CEO |
| Compliance Status | CEO and all NEOs exceeded ownership requirements as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Hedging and pledging prohibited (no exceptions granted) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Details |
|---|---|
| Employment Start at Invesco | 1994 |
| Current Role Tenure | Head of Asia Pacific since 2001 |
| Notice/Salary Continuation | Employment arrangements provide 6 or 12 months salary continuation upon involuntary termination other than for “cause” or unsatisfactory performance |
| Change‑of‑Control (CIC) Vesting | Double‑trigger for accelerated vesting (CIC followed by involuntary termination or voluntary termination for “good reason”), or if awards are not assumed/converted/replaced |
| Potential Payouts (as of 12/31/2024) | Equity awards: $9,962,448 upon involuntary termination, CIC termination, or death/disability; no notional fund awards |
| Clawback Policy | Recoupment of incentive compensation for material restatements (big “R” or little “r”) when pay would have been lower under corrected results |
| Grant Timing / Vesting Conventions | Annual equity grants approved mid‑Feb; grant date Feb 28; time‑based awards vest ratably over 4 years; performance awards 3‑year cliff |
Performance Compensation (Mechanics & Alignment)
- Equity awards are majority performance‑based (typically 60%) with vesting tied to three‑year average AOM and relative TSR; negative absolute TSR caps vesting at 100% .
- 2024 company scorecard (Financial 66.7%; Organizational 33.3%) produced an overall outcome of 107%, which set NEO incentive payouts; Lo’s payout matched his 100% target given APAC execution .
Compensation Governance, Peer Group, and Say‑on‑Pay
- Peer group used for compensation and performance awards includes leading asset managers (e.g., BlackRock, T. Rowe Price, State Street) and bank‑affiliated managers; relative TSR measured vs designated peers .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval received approximately 85% support, with program refinements informed by shareholder feedback (e.g., negative TSR cap, streamlined scorecard) .
Performance & Track Record
- APAC flows: $26.1B net long‑term inflows in 2024; strong JV momentum in China (20 fund launches; $2.7B first‑month inflows; ETF AUM +$4.5B) and top‑selling Japanese active equity fund ($5.1B inflows) .
- APAC AUM under management: $118.8B with 71%, 68%, and 49% of assets above peer median on 1/3/5‑year basis (Indian business 95%, 85%, 76%) .
Fixed Compensation (SEC Summary Table View)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Share Awards ($) | 3,499,991 | 4,393,319 | 2,616,000 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | 1,518,750 | 1,827,000 | 2,100,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 68,543 | 71,540 | 77,818 |
| Total ($) | 5,587,284 | 6,791,859 | 5,293,818 |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- No pledging of company stock by executive officers; hedging prohibited .
- Company‑wide net‑share tax withhold repurchases are procedural; no disclosure of discretionary insider selling by Lo .
- Clawback and double‑trigger CIC vesting mitigate windfall and misalignment risk .
Investment Implications
- High alignment: material equity exposure (beneficial + deferred) with no pledging and adherence to ownership guidelines supports shareholder alignment and reduces hedging risk .
- Performance‑rigor: three‑year AOM/relative TSR PSU design with negative TSR cap and scorecard‑driven incentives tie pay to durable performance, moderating payout risk through cycles .
- Retention and transition risk: sizeable unvested equity ($9.96M CIC/termination equity value) and 4‑yr RSU + 3‑yr PSU vesting cadence reinforce retention; double‑trigger CIC terms lower parachute risk but imply meaningful equity acceleration upon qualified separation .
- APAC execution: sustained regional inflows and performance under Lo underpin firm’s growth vectors in China/Japan/India, a positive signal for forward AUM/revenue momentum tied to his remit .