Tony L. Wong
InvescoAbout Tony L. Wong
Senior Managing Director and Co-Head of Investments at Invesco (IVZ) since 2023; previously Head of Fixed Income Investments (2019–2023) and joined Invesco in 1996. Education: B.A. (History) and B.B.A., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., University of St. Thomas (Houston). He is a member of Invesco’s Enterprise Risk Management Committee, Liquidity Risk Management Committee, and Co-head of the Global Investor Forum, with external roles on the Board of Trustees of Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta and the Executive Board for the SMU Cox School of Business . 2024 firm performance that drove NEO pay: company scorecard outcome 107% based on Financial Performance (110% across Net Long-Term Flows, Net Revenues, Adjusted Operating Income, Adjusted Operating Margin, and Adjusted Diluted EPS) and Organizational Health (102%) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Invesco Ltd. | Senior Managing Director and Co-Head of Investments | 2023–present | Oversees investment performance/quality across six global investment teams; connects Investments organizations |
| Invesco Ltd. | Head of Fixed Income Investments | 2019–2023 | Led investment process, performance management, strategic direction and enterprise oversight for global Fixed Income |
| Invesco Ltd. | Various senior fixed income roles | 1996–2019 | Progressive leadership roles within fixed income organization |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta | Board of Trustees | Not disclosed | Governance and community engagement |
| SMU Cox School of Business | Executive Board member | Not disclosed | Academic-industry interface and talent development |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | 2024 Incentive Target ($) | Cash Bonus ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 500,000 | 4,500,000 | 1,926,000 | NEO cash bonuses capped at 50% of total pay |
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric/Structure | Weighting/Target | Actual Outcome | Payout/Grant Details | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive (Total) | Company scorecard (Financial Performance + Organizational Health) + individual goals | 2024 incentive target $4.5M | Firm outcome 107% (Financial 110%, Org Health 102%) | Wong’s total incentive $4.815M (107% of target) | Cash paid Feb 2025; equity granted Feb 2025 per cycle |
| Time-based Equity | Deferred equity aligned to long-term contribution | Part of equity mix; for Wong $1,155,600 (2024) | Granted 61,373 shares (2/28/24); grant date FV $938,393 | Dividends paid currently (U.S. NEOs) | 25% annually on each grant anniversary over 4 years (ratable) |
| Performance-based Equity (PSUs) | Three-year average Adjusted Operating Margin (AOM) and relative TSR vs peer group | Equity for NEOs (excl. certain local regs): 60% performance-based | Wong target 92,060 shares; max 138,090 (2/28/24); FV $1,301,042 | Payout range 0–150% of target; dividends deferred until vest | 36-month performance period (2024–2026); vests 2/28/2027 (cliff) |
| Performance Rigor (context) | Relative TSR and AOM matrix | Negative absolute TSR caps vesting at 100% | 2022 PSUs vested at 17% of target (AOM 32.1%, TSR 22nd percentile) | Demonstrates strict vesting outcomes tied to multi-year performance | 3-year cliff |
2024 Company Scorecard (drivers of incentive outcomes)
| Measure | 2024 Target | 2024 Performance | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net long-term flows ($B) | 33.5 | 65.2 | 130% |
| Net revenues ($MM) | 4,368 | 4,400 | 104% |
| Adjusted operating income ($MM) | 1,350 | 1,371 | 106% |
| Adjusted operating margin (%) | 30.9% | 31.1% | 104% |
| Adjusted diluted EPS ($) | 1.61 | 1.71 | 108% |
| Financial Performance score (equal-weighted) | — | — | 110% |
| Organizational Health | Qualitative multi-metric | Year-end results | 102% |
| Total Company Outcome | — | — | 107% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Common shares beneficially owned | 149,849 |
| Deferred share awards | 153,433 |
| Total reported (beneficial + deferred) | 303,282 |
| Shares pledged as collateral | None (company prohibits pledging; no shares pledged reported) |
| Stock ownership policy | Executive Officer Stock Ownership Policy; no short selling/hedging/pledging |
| Options | Invesco does not grant options/SARs |
Outstanding Unvested Awards (as of 12/31/2024)
| Grant Date | Type | Unvested Shares (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2/28/21 | Time-based | 2,788 | 48,734 |
| 2/28/22 | Time-based | 7,121 | 124,475 |
| 2/7/23 | Transition time-based (one installment) | 101,988 | 1,782,750 |
| 2/28/23 | Time-based | 12,718 | 222,311 |
| 2/28/24 | Time-based | 61,373 | 1,072,800 |
| 2/28/24 | Performance-based (target) | 92,060 | 1,609,209 |
| Total | — | 185,988 (time-based) | 3,251,070 (time-based) |
| Total | — | 92,060 (performance-based target) | 1,609,209 (performance-based target) |
Shares Vested in 2024 (realized values)
| Grant Date | Type | Vest Date | Shares Vested (#) | FMV Price ($) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/28/20 | Time | 2/28/24 | 6,077 | 15.29 | 92,917 |
| 2/28/21 | Time | 2/28/24 | 2,787 | 15.29 | 42,613 |
| 2/28/22 | Time | 2/28/24 | 3,560 | 15.29 | 54,432 |
| 2/28/23 | Time | 2/28/24 | 4,239 | 15.29 | 64,814 |
| Total | — | — | 16,663 | — | 254,776 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment notice period | Six or twelve months; salary/benefits continue; vesting timelines run in normal course until termination date |
| Severance (involuntary, not for cause) | Equity awards estimated $4,860,279; notional fund awards $2,527,953 (as of 12/31/2024) |
| Change-in-control treatment | Double-trigger vesting; same estimated equity/notional values if (i) awards not assumed or (ii) termination within 24 months post-CIC; no excise tax gross-up |
| Death/Disability | Same estimated equity/notional values as above |
| Clawback policy | Executive incentive compensation subject to recoupment policy |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for insiders |
| Tax gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups; no tax reimbursements for perquisites |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix: For NEOs, approximately 91%–92% of compensation is variable; at least 50% of equity awards are performance-based (60% for U.S.-based NEOs excluding certain local regulatory cases) .
- Shift in cash vs equity: Wong’s cash bonus increased to $1.926M in 2024 versus $1.564M in 2023; 2024 “share awards” reported $2.239M vs $2.299M in 2023 (as presented under SEC Summary Compensation Table timing) .
- No options: Invesco does not grant stock options/SARs, reducing repricing risk; all equity awards are RSUs/PSUs with long vesting .
- Performance rigor: PSUs vesting tied to three-year AOM and relative TSR vs peer group; negative absolute TSR caps vesting at 100%; 2022 PSUs vested at 17% highlighting strict targets .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 key achievements: Built high-performing investment function; strengthened investment risk organization; sustained competitive fixed income performance (AUM top-half: 84% 1-year, 83% 3-year, 91% 5-year as of 12/31/2024); advanced Private Markets growth initiatives; led Alpha platform implementation .
- Firm pay-for-performance alignment: Company outcome 107% from scorecard; no discretion applied by committee to adjust outcomes; caps on CEO and NEO cash bonuses .
Compensation Peer Group (for relative TSR and market reference)
- Asset manager and overlapping businesses peer set used since 2021; TSR vesting measured vs designated peers (e.g., BlackRock, Franklin Resources, T. Rowe Price, State Street, BNY Mellon, Janus Henderson, Lazard, AllianceBernstein, Northern Trust; plus GS/Morgan Stanley asset management units) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High deferred equity and strict PSU metrics (AOM + relative TSR, 0–150% payout) create strong alignment and retention via multi-year vesting; prohibition of hedging/pledging reduces governance risk .
- Retention risk: Significant unvested awards (time-based 185,988 shares; PSUs 92,060 target) and notional fund deferrals suggest ongoing vesting runway; CIC treatment requires double trigger, further stabilizing retention incentives .
- Selling pressure: 2024 showed only time-based vesting for Wong; PSUs pay outcomes are variable and can be low (e.g., 17% for 2022 PSUs at firm level), potentially limiting near-term monetization and reducing immediate selling pressure .
- Pay-performance sensitivity: Company scorecard outcomes directly influence cash and equity awards; improvements in flows, margins and EPS lift incentive outcomes, while weak TSR can materially reduce PSU vesting, signaling disciplined pay-for-performance .