John Strosahl
About John Strosahl
John Strosahl, 58, is Jamf’s Chief Executive Officer and a Class I director, roles he has held since September 2023; he previously served as COO (2020–Sep 2023), President (2022–Sep 2023), and Chief Revenue Officer (2015–2020) . He holds a bachelor’s degree from Illinois Wesleyan University and a master’s degree from the University of Illinois at Chicago . Under his leadership in 2024, Jamf delivered 12% revenue growth to $627.4M, ARR growth of 10% to $646.0M, and expanded non-GAAP operating income to $103.1M from $45.4M in 2023, while ending the year with 33.2M devices and 76.5K+ customers . Long-term TSR since the 2020 IPO remained below peers (value of initial $100 investment at $35.84 vs. peer group $260.74 as of 2024), underscoring a gap between operational improvements and stock performance .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jamf | Chief Operating Officer | 2020–Sep 2023 | Oversaw operations during scaling of ARR to $588.6M in 2023 and positioned for 2024 profitability expansion . |
| Jamf | President | 2022–Sep 2023 | Led go-to-market and operations bridging CRO-to-COO progression . |
| Jamf | Chief Revenue Officer | 2015–2020 | Drove enterprise customer and ARR growth post-Vista investment leading into IPO . |
| eBay Inc. | Vice President | Nov 2013–Oct 2015 | Senior leadership at a global e-commerce platform . |
| Digital River, Inc. | Executive roles | Prior to 2013 | Global e-commerce and business development leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| PROS Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: PRO) | Director | Current | Public company directorship (comp/committee roles not disclosed in Jamf proxy) . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $317,522 | $390,118 | $550,001 |
| Target bonus (% of salary) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | 100% |
| Actual annual cash incentive ($) | $263,493 | $373,004 | $539,000 (98% of target) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Plan (ACIP) – 2024 design and outcomes
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Weight | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARR | $638.0M | $663.0M | 60% | Actual $646.0M; contributes to ~98% overall payout |
| Non-GAAP Operating Income Margin | 14.4% | 15.4% | 40% | Actual ~16.4%; contributes to ~98% overall payout |
| CEO ACIP payout detail | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Target bonus % | 100% of salary |
| Target opportunity ($) | $550,000 |
| Actual payout ($) | $539,000 (98% of target) |
Equity awards and vesting
| Grant | Grant date | RSUs (#) | Vesting | Grant date FV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO Annual RSU | Mar 15, 2024 | 338,028 | 25% annually over 4 years (service-based) | $5,999,997 |
Outstanding CEO equity at 12/31/2024 (service-based RSUs; market value uses $14.05/share):
| Grant date | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Jun 1, 2021 | 35,796 | $502,934 |
| Mar 15, 2022 | 51,899 | $729,181 |
| Mar 15, 2023 | 122,058 | $1,714,915 |
| Oct 15, 2023 | 290,885 | $4,086,934 |
| Mar 15, 2024 | 338,028 | $4,749,293 |
2024 vesting/option activity:
- Shares acquired on RSU vesting in 2024: 199,392 shares (no options exercised) .
Program features and controls:
- No new stock options granted since 2019 (shift to RSUs) .
- Clawback policy compliant with Nasdaq/Exchange Act Section 10D adopted; covers incentive-based cash/equity for 3 fiscal years pre-restatement .
- Hedging and pledging prohibited without specific written approval; blackout periods and 10b5-1 compliance enforced .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (4/14/2025) | 525,808 shares; <1% of outstanding |
| Options exercisable (legacy) | 121,000 (11/21/2017 grant) + 123,750 (10/10/2019 grant) = 244,750 |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 838,666 total across grants; ~$11.78M market value at $14.05 (matches CoC acceleration value) |
| 2024 vested shares (supply) | 199,392 shares vested during 2024 |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited without legal approval; plans require cooling-off; trading windows enforced |
Note: Beneficial ownership table aggregates direct/indirect holdings and securities vesting/exercisable within 60 days, per SEC rules .
Employment Terms
| Provision | CEO (John Strosahl) |
|---|---|
| Qualifying termination (no change in control) | 12 months cash severance; COBRA contribution; acceleration of 50% of unvested time-based equity |
| Qualifying termination in change-in-control period | 18 months cash severance; prorated bonus at target; 100% acceleration of unvested time-based equity; COBRA contribution |
| Estimated payout (as of 12/31/2024) – no CoC | Total $6,473,650 (Cash severance $550,000; Equity accel $5,891,629; Health $32,021) |
| Estimated payout (as of 12/31/2024) – with CoC | Total $13,206,289 (Cash severance $1,375,000; Equity accel $11,783,257; Health $48,032) |
| Non-compete / non-solicit / arbitration | Company standard applies to executives; details summarized in proxy . |
Board Governance
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| Board seat | Class I director since 2023; term expires 2027 |
| Independence | Not independent (serving CEO) |
| Committees | None (CEO is not listed on Audit or Compensation & Nominating Committees) |
| Chair/CEO structure | Roles separated; Chair (Vista-affiliated) designated per governance and nomination agreement; Board cites benefits of separation |
| Board/committee attendance | All directors attended ≥75% of meetings in 2024 |
| Director compensation | CEO receives no additional pay for board service |
Dual-role implications: Separation of Chair and CEO limits concentration of power; CEO is a management director (non-independent), with Vista retaining significant designation rights for nominees and chair selection subject to ownership thresholds, elevating sponsor influence on governance .
Director Compensation (as applicable to Strosahl)
- No additional compensation is paid to the CEO for director service; non-employee director pay structure does not apply to him .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs. equity mix: 2024 CEO compensation comprised $550k salary, $539k cash bonus (98% payout), and $6.0M RSU grant, illustrating heavy equity alignment with time-based vesting (25% annual) .
- Shift away from options: No new option grants since 2019, reducing leverage/volatility versus RSUs and lowering reliance on out-of-the-money awards .
- Pay-for-performance: Annual bonus tied 60% to ARR and 40% to non-GAAP operating margin; 2024 results paid near target (98%) reflecting execution on growth and profitability .
- Clawback/controls: Restatement-linked clawback in place; hedging/pledging restrictions and 10b5-1 standards reduce governance risk .
- Consultant/peer group: Independent consultant (Radford); pay targets generally at 50th percentile of peer group; 2024 peer set disclosed .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | — | 627.4 (+12% YoY) |
| ARR ($M) | 588.6 | 646.0 (+10% YoY) |
| Non-GAAP operating income ($M) | 45.4 | 103.1 (up sharply) |
| Devices on platform (M) | — | 33.2 |
| Customers (K) | — | >76.5 |
| TSR ($100 since 7/22/2020) | 46.07 | 35.84 (peer: 260.74) |
Highlights/risks:
- Operational execution improved margins and ARR scale in 2024; however, TSR trails the sector materially since IPO, a potential overhang on incentive realizations even as RSUs vest .
- Leadership transitions (CFO change) were executed with continuity; CEO praised stability in 2024 communications .
Equity Ownership & Alignment – Additional Detail
- Beneficial ownership: 525,808 shares (<1%) as of 4/14/2025; executives and directors as a group own ~2.7% .
- Retention leverage: Unvested RSUs valued at ~$11.78M (12/31/2024), creating strong multi-year retention incentives; 100% single/double-trigger acceleration applies within defined CoC period; otherwise 50% acceleration on qualifying termination .
- Insider selling pressure: 199,392 shares vested for the CEO in 2024, suggesting periodic supply from tax withholdings/settlements; no options exercised in 2024 .
- Pledging/hedging: Prohibited absent written approval; no pledging disclosed for the CEO .
Employment Terms – Additional Detail
- Severance multiple: 12 months cash outside CoC; 18 months in CoC window; prorated bonus at target only in CoC; significant equity acceleration drives change-in-control economics .
- Health benefits: COBRA continuation contributions during severance periods (longer in CoC) .
Compensation Peer Group (2024)
Selected peers used for benchmarking include: Altair Engineering, AppFolio, Asana, BlackLine, Ceridian HCM, Domo, Dynatrace, Elastic, Everbridge, Five9, nCino, New Relic, PagerDuty, Paylocity, Q2, Rapid7, SentinelOne, Smartsheet, SPS Commerce, Sprout Social, Varonis Systems, Workiva .
Related Party & Governance Considerations
- Sponsor influence: Vista maintains significant director nomination and committee participation rights, including chair designation authority above ownership thresholds .
- Related parties: Routine transactions with Vista-affiliated entities (consulting and intercompany services) overseen by Audit Committee; amounts disclosed for 2024 .
- Option repricing authority exists in legacy 2017 plan, though no further awards are made under that plan post-IPO; current equity comes from 2020 plan .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 incentives tied to ARR and profitability paid near target; large time-based RSU overhang (~$11.8M unvested) aligns CEO to multi-year value creation but can contribute to ongoing share supply through scheduled vesting .
- Retention vs. CoC costs: Strong retention via sizable unvested RSUs; however, CoC terms (100% equity acceleration + 18 months cash) imply meaningful dilution/expense in an M&A scenario .
- Governance risk/mitigants: Sponsor board rights and non-independent CEO seat are offset by separated Chair/CEO roles, clawback, and hedging/pledging prohibitions; no CEO director fees reduce pay stacking .
- Execution vs. market: Improved 2024 fundamentals (ARR, margin) under Strosahl contrast with weak multi-year TSR since IPO; equity value realization depends on sustaining profitable growth and narrowing the TSR gap vs. peers .