Brian Webb
HUNT J B TRANSPORT SERVICESAbout Brian Webb
Brian Webb, 56, is Executive Vice President of Final Mile Services (FMS) at J.B. Hunt. He joined the company in 2002 as a Business Development Executive and has been part of the executive leadership team overseeing last-mile operations . Segment performance under FMS in 2025 faced demand softness and mix shifts, with revenue and operating income declines cited in quarterly filings, reflecting execution focus on cost-to-serve improvements and profitability discipline .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. | Business Development Executive | 2002–present (company tenure) | Progressed into executive leadership; currently leads Final Mile Services |
| J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. | Executive Vice President, Final Mile Services | Not disclosed | Oversees FMS; initiatives to lower cost to serve amid end-market softness |
External Roles
No external public-company board roles or outside positions are disclosed for Webb in the latest proxy materials .
Fixed Compensation
Individual base salary, target bonus %, and bonus outcomes for Webb are not disclosed (Webb is not a Named Executive Officer; NEOs are listed separately in the CD&A) .
Performance Compensation
The company’s executive equity program utilizes time-based and performance-based restricted share units (RSUs). In recent years, all executive grants have been RSUs (no outstanding stock options), with performance awards tied to Operating Income, EBITDA, and ROIC. January 2025 executive leadership awards were structured with 40% time-based RSUs (vesting 40%, 40%, 20% on January 31, 2026–2028) and 60% performance-based RSUs (vesting March 31, 2028) based on three-year ROIC versus a peer group, adjusted by an Operating Income CAGR matrix (0–240% payout range) .
| Metric | Weighting | Target Definition | Payout Range | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROIC vs Peer Group (3-year, ending 12/31/2027 for 2025 awards) | ~60% of award (performance-based portion) | ROIC relative percentile versus defined peer set | 0–200% base; adjusted ±20% by Operating Income CAGR → 0–240% ultimate | 3/31/2028 (performance) |
| Operating Income CAGR Adjuster | Applied to performance tranche | Predefined matrix adjusts ROIC-based payout | ±20% adjuster to ROIC outcome | Applied at 3/31/2028 determination |
| Time-Based RSUs | ~40% of award | Service vesting | Fixed schedule | 40% on 1/31/2026; 40% on 1/31/2027; 20% on 1/31/2028 |
| Program Instruments | — | Company grants time- and performance-based RSUs; no options outstanding | — | Equity grants under long-standing MIP program |
Note: Performance metrics including Operating Income, EBITDA, and ROIC are cited for executive performance-based awards broadly; individual award weightings for Webb are not disclosed .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines for executive leadership require significant “skin in the game”: EVPs must hold stock equal to 3.5× base salary; shares from vesting must be retained until guidelines are met .
- Hedging and short sales are prohibited; Rule 10b5-1 trading plans must be pre-notified to the CFO’s office .
- Pledging: Allowed only under strict conditions (no margin; must exclude pledged shares when measuring guideline compliance; loan amounts must be disclosed). 2025 proxy disclosed pledges for specific executives but does not include Webb in the pledging list .
| Alignment Policy | Requirement | Status/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| EVP Stock Ownership Guideline | 3.5× base salary | Committee states covered officers met or are within time to meet goals |
| Retention Policy | Hold vested shares until guideline met | Applicable to all executives |
| Hedging & Derivatives | Prohibited | Applies to officers and covered employees |
| Pledging | Allowed under conditions; disclose loan amounts; no margin accounts | 2025 pledge disclosures list other executives; no pledge disclosed for Webb in proxy ownership table |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | None | Company generally has no employment contracts or predetermined personal severance agreements with executives |
| Severance / Change-in-Control | Double-trigger acceleration of outstanding RSUs (change in control + termination without cause/retirement/resignation for good reason) | Committee may accelerate vesting upon death or disability; change-in-control definition includes >30% ownership change or significant mergers/asset sales |
| Non-Compete | Two-year covenant post-employment for MIP awards | Applies to equity award terms |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank-compliant recovery policy; MIP allows reduction/cancellation/recoupment for violations | No restatements requiring recovery in 2024; company notes no illegal actions by officers since 1983 |
| Insider Trading | Policy in place; window restrictions; compliance emphasized | Formal insider trading policy maintained |
Performance & Execution Indicators (Final Mile Services – 2025)
| Metric | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Segment Revenue ($USD Millions) | $211; down 10% YoY | $206; down 5% YoY |
| Segment Operating Income ($USD Millions) | $8.0; down 60% YoY | $6.9; down 42% YoY |
| Commentary | Softness across end markets; revenue quality improvement efforts; higher casualty/group medical claims; increased bad debt expense | Demand softness; mix shift between asset and asset-lite; higher insurance claims; partially offset by lower personnel expenses and cost-to-serve initiatives |
Additional signals:
- Section 16(a) late Form 4 filing noted for Webb due to RSU vesting and tax-withholding share transactions (administrative issue), indicating periodic vesting-related activity and potential tax-related share withholding around vest dates .
- Executive equity program has shifted fully to RSUs (time/performance) and away from options, reducing optionality-driven selling pressure but concentrating liquidity needs around RSU vest dates .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift to RSUs and absence of options: Company uses only time- and performance-based RSUs for executives; no options outstanding, lowering risk-taking incentives but increasing certainty of equity vesting schedules .
- Performance rigor: Metrics include ROIC relative to peers and Operating Income/EBITDA, with 0–240% payout potential, signaling at-risk pay tied to multi-year value creation .
- Governance controls: Strong clawback, hedging prohibition, and stock ownership/retention policies support alignment and mitigate risk .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Disclosure Limitations)
Individual share counts, vested/unvested breakdowns, and option status for Webb are not disclosed in proxy ownership tables (which focus on directors and NEOs). However, RSU vesting activity is evidenced by the late Form 4 notice; pledging disclosures in 2025 did not list Webb among executives with pledged shares .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback (Company-Level)
2025 say-on-pay received strong approval (85.0M For vs. 4.8M Against; 0.19M Abstain), indicating shareholder support for the overall executive compensation framework governing leadership, including EVPs .
Investment Implications
- Alignment is generally solid: Stringent ownership multiples (3.5× salary for EVPs), retention until guideline compliance, hedging prohibition, and robust clawback reduce misalignment risk .
- Vesting-related trading pressure: With RSU-only design and noted vesting-related filings, expect periodic tax-withholding share transactions around scheduled vest dates (e.g., Jan 31 and Mar 31 cycles for 2025 awards) that can create short-term supply, though not indicative of discretionary selling .
- Execution risk in FMS: 2025 segment results show revenue and margin headwinds, with insurance claims and bad debt pressure; ongoing cost-to-serve initiatives are positive but require sustained delivery to improve operating income trajectory .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger RSU acceleration and two-year non-compete protect shareholders from single-trigger windfalls while providing retention mechanisms; absence of employment contracts reduces guaranteed severance exposure .
- Transparency gap: Webb is not an NEO; lack of individual salary/bonus/award detail limits precision in pay-for-performance assessment, placing more weight on segment performance and company-wide incentive design .
Data gaps: Form 4 transaction details and exact personal holdings for Webb were not available in the document search index; the proxy confirms a late Form 4 related to RSU vesting and tax withholding. If needed, retrieve Webb’s current beneficial ownership and recent transactions via SEC Form 4 feeds to refine insider selling pressure analysis .