Kelly Howe - Chief Financial Officer | JONES LANG LASALLE (JLL) Executive Profile & Compensation

About Kelly Howe

Kelly Howe, 53, was appointed Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of JLL effective July 1, 2025, after serving as CFO of JLL’s Leasing Advisory segment since January 2024; prior to JLL she was Boston Consulting Group’s first North America CFO, with over two decades in professional services finance. She holds an MBA from Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management and a BA in Business Administration from the University of Washington . JLL’s 2024 performance context for her role: revenue $23.4B (+13% YoY), adjusted EBITDA $1.2B (+28% YoY), and net income $546.8M (+149% YoY) . JLL’s incentive plans emphasize Adjusted EBITDA/Margin (AIP) and multi‑year Adjusted EPS, Free Cash Flow Conversion, and Relative TSR (LTIP), aligning pay with shareholder outcomes .

Past Roles

Organization	Role	Years	Strategic Impact
JLL	CFO, Leasing Advisory; then CFO, JLL	2024–present	Built enhanced analytics and identified key business drivers; promotion to group CFO effective July 1, 2025 reflects execution strength .
Boston Consulting Group (BCG)	North America CFO (first to hold role)	~23 years prior to 2024	Led financial initiatives that fueled growth, managed risk, optimized operations; leadership across strategy, commercial acceleration, and post‑merger integration .

Fixed Compensation

Component	2025 Terms	Notes
Base Salary	$600,000	Effective July 1, 2025 .
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Target	$1,000,000	Prorated to 50% ($500,000) for FY2025 .
One‑time RSU Grant	$675,000	To be granted September 2025 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) Design

Metric	Weighting	Targeting Framework	FY2024 Actual (enterprise)	Funding/Payout Basis
Adjusted EBITDA	50%	Threshold 50%; Target 100%; Max 200% of target payout	$1,186.3M (115% of target)	151% for this factor .
Adjusted EBITDA Margin	25%	Same structure as above	14.72% (111% of target)	136% for this factor .
Strategic Factors (Ops efficiency, cross‑sell, tech)	25%	Objective annual goals	Above target	125% for this factor .
Total Weighted Funding	—	—	—	140.6% aggregate funding in FY2024 .
Leadership Multiplier	80–120%	Individual modifier; total capped at 200%	—	Plan feature (applies to executives) .

Notes:

AIP excludes certain non‑cash investment impacts for Investment Management and Software & Technology Solutions, improving alignment to operational performance .
As CFO effective July 1, 2025, Howe’s FY2025 AIP payout will be based on the corporate metrics above and prorated; individual multiplier not disclosed .

Long‑Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) Design (GEB LTIP)

Vehicle	Weighting	Metric	Assessment Window	Payout Curve	Modifier
Performance Stock Units (PSUs)	60% of LTIP	Adjusted EPS	Annual goals within 3‑yr cycle; averaged to 75% of PSU weight	Threshold 50%, Target 100%, Max 200%	Relative TSR modifier ±20% if outlier vs S&P 500; no positive mod if absolute TSR negative .
Performance Stock Units (PSUs)	—	Free Cash Flow Conversion Ratio	3‑yr cumulative; 25% of PSU weight	Threshold 50%, Target 100%, Max 200%	Same TSR modifier .
Restricted Stock Units (RSUs)	40% of LTIP	Time‑based	3‑yr cliff vest	—	— .

Illustrative FY2024 Adjusted EPS outcome for PSU cycle: $14.01 actual vs $11.70 target → 165.8% annual EPS factor (for the 2024 tranche) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x salary; other GEB members must hold the lesser of 1x annual LTIP grant or 4x salary; retain 75% of net shares until in compliance; then hold 50% of net shares for two years after vest/exercise .
Insider trading policy prohibits pledging JLL stock, hedging, short sales, and margin accounts; 10b5‑1 plans permitted with pre‑clearance; blackout windows apply .
Clawback policy (updated Sept 7, 2023): mandatory recoupment of erroneously awarded incentive‑based compensation upon a material restatement, regardless of fault .

Employment Terms

Term	Provision	Detail
Appointment	CFO of JLL	Effective July 1, 2025 .
Reporting	To CEO/President	Member of Global Executive Board (GEB) .
LTIP Target	$1,500,000	First grant at new target level anticipated Q1 2026; mix of PSUs and RSUs .
Severance (baseline)	Severance Pay Plan	For U.S. employees; GEB minimum: 12 months base salary + target annual incentive if involuntary termination without cause; max 15 months base pay; pro‑rated AIP for departures after June 30 before bonus payment; no tax gross‑ups .
Change‑in‑Control (CIC)	Double‑trigger	If terminated without cause or for good reason within 24 months post‑CIC: lump sum 1.5x base pay + 1.5x target bonus (CEO 3.0x), pro‑rated target bonus, accelerated vesting of all equity; no tax gross‑ups .
RSU One‑time Grant	Retention	$675,000 in September 2025; vesting terms not disclosed; GEB RSUs cliff vest at 3 years .

Investment Implications

Strong pay‑for‑performance alignment: Howe’s AIP/ LTIP tied to Adjusted EBITDA/Margin and multi‑year Adjusted EPS, FCF Conversion, and Relative TSR; FY2024 corporate AIP funding at 140.6% shows operational momentum as she steps into CFO, which may support attractive variable payouts if execution persists .
Retention risk mitigants: one‑time RSU ($675k), CIC double‑trigger protections (1.5x salary+bonus), and robust severance baseline reduce near‑term turnover risk during leadership transition .
Shareholder alignment safeguards: strict anti‑pledging/hedging, stringent clawback, and meaningful ownership guidelines should limit misaligned risk‑taking and reduce forced‑sale pressure signals .
Execution focus areas: enterprise efficiency, cross‑sell, and tech transformation are embedded in AIP Strategic Factors—watch for disclosures and progress on these levers and for the 2026 LTIP grant sizing/mix to gauge confidence and capital allocation discipline .
Benchmarking context: Say‑on‑pay supported by ~90% approval in 2024 and peer group spanning real estate and business services (CBRE, Cushman & Wakefield, Aon, WTW, etc.), suggesting compensation competitiveness without excessive inflation risk .