Laura Adams
JONES LANG LASALLEAbout Laura Adams
Laura Adams, 56, is JLL’s Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO), serving since July 2022. She joined JLL in 2005 and previously served as Global HR Lead for the Markets Advisory, Capital Markets and Work Dynamics segments, after senior HR roles at Washington Mutual Bank and Diamond Technology Partners. Her core credentials emphasize aligning people programs to business strategy and leading large-scale change. Company performance during her tenure: 2024 revenue of $23.4B (+13% YoY), adjusted EBITDA of $1.2B (+28% YoY), and net income to common of $546.8M (+149% YoY); the 2022–2024 PSU cycle achieved an aggregate payout of 19.2% with relative TSR at the 38th percentile, reflecting prior-cycle headwinds for compensation tied to shareholder returns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| JLL | Chief Human Resources Officer | July 2022–present | Aligning people programs to business strategy; driving large-scale complex change |
| JLL | Global HR Lead for Markets Advisory, Capital Markets and Work Dynamics | Not disclosed | Global HR leadership across core segments |
| Washington Mutual Bank | Senior HR roles | Not disclosed | Senior HR experience in financial services |
| Diamond Technology Partners | Senior HR roles | Not disclosed | Senior HR experience in consulting/technology |
External Roles
- No external public-company board roles disclosed for Laura Adams in JLL’s 2025 DEF 14A .
Fixed Compensation
- The DEF 14A provides detailed compensation amounts for Named Executive Officers (NEOs), but Laura Adams (CHRO) is not a listed NEO; her specific base salary, target bonus, and actual bonus are not disclosed .
- JLL’s executive pay architecture for GEB members consists of base salary, Annual Incentive Plan (AIP), and Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) (PSUs/RSUs), with strong pay-for-performance alignment and governance (clawback; anti-hedging; no tax gross-ups) .
Performance Compensation
AIP program design and 2024 outcomes (applies enterprise-wide to GEB members, including CHRO):
| Performance Measure | Weighting (%) | 2024 Actual | Payout (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIP Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $1,186.3M; 115% of target | 151% |
| AIP Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 25% | 14.72%; 111% of target | 136% |
| Strategic Factors (operational efficiency, cross-selling, tech transformation) | 25% | Above target performance | 125% |
| Total Weighted Funding | — | — | 140.6% |
Leadership Multiplier (individual adjustment 80–120% within 200% cap) is applied post-funding; specific CHRO multiplier is not disclosed .
LTIP PSU metrics (2024–2026 design; annual EPS targets with 3-year averaging; TSR modifier; RSUs 3-year cliff vest):
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Annual Payout (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | $8.19 | $11.70 | $15.21 | $14.01 | 165.8% |
2022–2024 PSU cycle results (vested Mar 31, 2025; demonstrates payout mechanics for GEB LTIP):
| Metric | Weight | Goal Achieved | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. GAAP Diluted EPS | 75% | $29.24 (below threshold) | 0% |
| Relative TSR | 25% | 38th percentile | 76.8% |
| Aggregate Weighted Payout | — | — | 19.2% |
RSUs under GEB LTIP cliff vest after three years, reinforcing retention and alignment (applies to GEB members) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines (GEB) | CEO: 6x base salary; Others (incl. CHRO): the lesser of 1x annual LTIP grant or 4x base salary |
| Retention requirements | Retain 75% of shares acquired on vesting/exercise until minimum ownership achieved; thereafter hold 50% of shares acquired for two years following vesting/exercise |
| Trading controls | Pre-clearance required; blackout periods enforced; Rule 10b5-1 plans permitted with approval |
| Hedging/derivatives | Prohibited for directors, GEB, and designated employees |
| Pledging/margin | Prohibited for directors, GEB, and designated employees |
| Beneficial ownership (individual) | Not individually disclosed for Laura Adams in DEF 14A 2025; NEOs and directors are listed; execs as a group (22 persons) held 433,483 shares vs. 47,513,451 shares outstanding as of Mar 31, 2025 (each <1% individually) |
Employment Terms
| Program | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance Pay Plan (GEB) | Minimum 12 months of base salary plus target annual incentive if involuntarily terminated without cause; plan maximum 15 months; pro-rated AIP eligibility if terminated after June 30; no tax gross-ups |
| Change-in-Control Agreement (GEB) | Double trigger: if terminated without cause or for good reason within 24 months post-CIC, lump-sum 1.5x base salary + 1.5x target bonus for GEB members (3.0x for CEO), plus pro-rata target bonus and accelerated vesting of stock awards; no tax gross-ups |
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Program emphasizes performance-based pay (AIP and LTIP) with robust governance (clawback, anti-hedging/pledging) and risk mitigation; shareholders supported say‑on‑pay with ~90% approval in 2024 .
- Peer group spans real estate and business services (e.g., CBRE, Cushman & Wakefield, Aon, WTW, CGI, Cognizant, Equifax, Prologis), aligning market benchmarks for competitiveness .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Say‑on‑Pay Approval (%) |
|---|---|
| 2024 | ~90% |
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment, lower sell pressure: GEB ownership requirements and mandatory retention (75% until compliant; 50% for two years thereafter), plus anti-hedging/pledging and blackout periods, reduce near-term insider selling pressure and enhance pay-for-performance alignment for CHROs and GEB members .
- Incentive quality and cyclicality: AIP funded at 140.6% for 2024 (operational efficiency and margin recovery), while 2022–2024 PSUs paid 19.2% amid lower GAAP EPS/TSR outcomes—highlighting cyclicality and the LTIP’s long-term discipline; 2024 Adjusted EPS performance (165.8% payout) signals improving earnings momentum into the 2024–2026 cycle .
- Retention and change-in-control economics: Double-trigger CIC (1.5x base + 1.5x target for GEB; equity acceleration) and minimum severance terms support executive retention through macro/industry cycles, limiting transition risk for human capital leadership while avoiding shareholder-unfriendly tax gross-ups .