Neil Murray
JONES LANG LASALLEAbout Neil Murray
Neil Murray, 50, is Chief Executive Officer of Real Estate Management Services (previously Work Dynamics) and has served in this role since 2019; he joined JLL in 2017 as EMEA CEO, Corporate Solutions, after senior leadership at Sodexo (CEO Corporate Services; UK & Ireland Region Chair) . Under JLL’s 2024 performance backdrop, revenue reached $23.4B (+13% y/y), Adjusted EBITDA was $1.186B (+28% y/y), and net income was $546.8M (+149% y/y) . Cumulative TSR since year-end 2019 equated to $145.41 on a $100 initial investment, modestly below a selected peer group at $194.42 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jones Lang LaSalle (EMEA) | EMEA CEO, Corporate Solutions | 2017–2019 | Led enterprise client solutions across EMEA; foundation for global margin and efficiency initiatives later cited in AIP rationale . |
| Sodexo, Inc. | CEO Corporate Services; Region Chair UK & Ireland | 2009–2017 | Scaled corporate services operations; cross-border supply chain and client engagement experience applicable to REMS margin expansion and digital transformation . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | Not disclosed in 2025 proxy. |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $500,000 | $600,000 |
| All Other Compensation (USD) | $0 (not itemized in 2023 SCT notes for Neil) | $10,091 (life/health $586; tax prep $9,505) |
| Perquisites Policy | — | Company states no personal perquisites of any significance for NEOs |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024
| Component | Target/Weight | Actual/Payout | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIP Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $1,186.3M (115% of target) → 151% payout | Non-GAAP definition per Annex A; excludes equity investments in IM and STS . |
| AIP Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 25% | 14.72% (111% of target) → 136% payout | Margin equals AIP Adjusted EBITDA / adjusted revenue . |
| Strategic Factors | 25% | Above target → 125% payout | 2024 themes: operational efficiency, cross-selling, technology transformation . |
| Leadership Multiplier (Neil Murray) | 100% | 100% | Rationale: multi-year margin plan; AI/digital leadership; supply-chain leverage; data center acquisition; global client strategy . |
| AIP Target Bonus (Neil) | $1,800,000 | Final Cash AIP Award: $2,530,800 | Funding factor 140.6% × LM 100% . |
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024 Grants
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target Units | Max Units | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs – Adjusted EPS (75%) | 4/5/2024 | 2,793 | 5,586 | $589,965 |
| PSUs – FCF Conversion (25%) | 4/5/2024 | 2,794 | 5,588 | $590,177 |
| RSUs (time-based) | 4/5/2024 | 7,449 | — | $1,477,435 |
Performance metrics and mechanics:
- PSUs: Adjusted EPS set annually within the 3-year cycle; FCF Conversion assessed cumulatively over three years; Relative TSR acts as ±20% modifier with negative TSR disallowing positive modification; max payout 200% .
- 2024 Adjusted EPS achieved $14.01 → 165.8% annual payout component (used in 3-year average) .
Historical PSU vesting result (2012–2024 cycle certified Feb 27, 2025):
| PSU Cycle | Metric Weights | Outcome | Shares Vesting (Neil) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | GAAP Diluted EPS 75%; Relative TSR 25% | Total payout 19.2% (EPS below threshold; TSR 38th percentile → 76.8%) | 1,511 shares |
Shares vested in 2024 (RSUs/PSUs):
| Executive | Shares Vested | Value Realized |
|---|---|---|
| Neil Murray | 10,007 | $1,944,367 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 31, 2025) | 21,937 shares; <1% of class (47,513,451 shares o/s) → ~0.046% |
| Unvested RSUs (Dec 31, 2024) | 18,635 units; MV $4,717,264 (@$253.14) |
| Unvested PSUs (Dec 31, 2024) | 40,000 units (reflects maximum performance); MV $10,125,473 (@$253.14) |
| Options Outstanding | None |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited by insider trading policy; pre-clearance required; blackout restrictions; discourages hedging/monetization transactions |
| Ownership Guidelines (NEOs) | CEO: 6× salary; other NEOs: lesser of 1× annual LTIP grant or 4× salary; 75% retention of shares until compliant; then 50% hold for two years |
| Compliance Status | As of Mar 31, 2025, all NEOs meet or exceed guidelines |
Vesting schedule (unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024):
| Vest Date | Feb 15, 2025 | Mar 31, 2025 | Feb 15, 2026 | Feb 15, 2027 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Neil Murray – RSUs | 3,878 | 1,511 | 5,797 | 7,449 |
Treatment on termination for awards granted pre/post Dec 2024:
- RSUs/PSUs (pre-Dec 2024): death/disability → full vest; voluntary/involuntary (with or without cause) → forfeited; retirement → continue vesting subject to restrictive covenant .
- RSUs/PSUs (on/after Dec 2024): death/disability → full vest; involuntary without cause → prorated continued vesting subject to release; voluntary/for-cause → forfeited; retirement → continue vesting subject to restrictive covenant .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Term |
|---|---|
| Severance Pay Plan (GEB/NEOs) | Minimum 12 months base salary + target annual incentive if involuntary termination without cause; maximum 15 months based on level/tenure; pro-rated AIP if termination after June 30; no tax gross-ups . |
| Change-in-Control Agreements | Double-trigger: within 24 months post-CIC, termination without cause/for good reason → lump sum base × 1.5 and target bonus × 1.5 (CEO = 3.0×); pro-rata target bonus; full vesting of unvested RSUs; PSUs vest at target for in-period cycles; no tax gross-ups; plan-level CIC definition and limitations apply . |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank compliant clawback for erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation upon required restatements, regardless of fault . |
| Insider Trading/Blackouts | Pre-clearance; blackout periods; prohibition on margin accounts, pledging, derivatives; hedging strongly discouraged with pre-clearance required . |
| Retirement Definition (Awards) | Age/service-based thresholds; continued vesting subject to restrictive covenant agreement . |
Compensation Structure Notes
- Mix emphasizes performance-linked pay: For non-CEO NEOs, target mix ~35% AIP and ~53% LTIP; remainder base salary .
- 2024 Say-on-Pay approval ~90%, indicating shareholder support for program design and adjustments .
- 2024 program changes: moved Free Cash Flow to LTIP; excluded IM and STS equity investment impacts from AIP Adjusted EBITDA/Margin to better reflect operations; increased PSU max to 200% and added TSR modifier .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Strong ownership guidelines and pledging prohibition reduce misalignment risk; double-trigger CIC terms and prorated continued vesting (for 2024+ awards) mitigate abrupt retention risk but still provide meaningful protection that could reduce turnover pressure in a transaction .
- Near-term selling pressure: Scheduled RSU vesting (Feb 15, 2026: 5,797; Feb 15, 2027: 7,449) suggests periodic supply events; 2024 vesting value ($1.94M) evidences recurring share settlements and likely tax withholding flows .
- Pay-for-performance: AIP heavily tied to Adjusted EBITDA and margin with strategic objectives; Neil’s 100% leadership multiplier was earned via margin expansion and AI/digital execution—signals continued emphasis on operational efficiency and tech-enabled services in REMS segment .
- PSU outcomes: The 2022–2024 cycle paid at 19.2% due to EPS underperformance despite TSR in the 38th percentile, reflecting disciplined payout mechanics; 2024 EPS strength (Adjusted EPS $14.01) sets constructive tone for the current cycle but cyclicality and rate sensitivity remain material to multi-year outcomes .
Overall, Murray’s incentives are closely tied to enterprise EBITDA/margins and multi-year Adjusted EPS/FCF metrics, with robust ownership and clawback frameworks. Upcoming vesting cadence and double-trigger CIC terms support retention while maintaining alignment with long-term shareholder value creation .