Raymond D. Parkinson
KAISER ALUMINUMAbout Raymond D. Parkinson
Senior Vice President – Advanced Engineering and Innovation at Kaiser Aluminum since April 2024; previously Senior Vice President – Advanced Engineering (Jan 2020–Apr 2024) and Vice President – Advanced Engineering (2001–2020). Joined Kaiser in 1986 as Technical Director for Extruded Products; 30+ years across sales, operations, quality, engineering, and R&D. Education: Ph.D. in Metallurgy plus BEng/MEng from Imperial College London; MBA from St. Mary’s College; Fellow of the Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining . Company performance context: 2024 net sales $3.02B, conversion revenue $1.46B, adjusted EBITDA $241M, adjusted EBITDA margin 16.5%; 2023 net sales $3.09B, conversion revenue $1.47B, adjusted EBITDA $210M . TSR for 2022–2024 was -9.95% (37th percentile), driving a 0.44x LTI payout; 2021–2023 LTI paid 0.00x, reflecting difficult operating conditions .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kaiser Aluminum | Senior VP – Advanced Engineering & Innovation | Apr 2024–present | Leads advanced engineering and innovation to support margin expansion and product development |
| Kaiser Aluminum | Senior VP – Advanced Engineering | Jan 2020–Apr 2024 | Drove technical programs through pandemic recovery and Warrick transition |
| Kaiser Aluminum | VP – Advanced Engineering | 2001–2020 | Built technical capabilities supporting aerospace/general engineering growth |
| Kaiser Aluminum | Technical Director – Extruded Products | 1986 | Led extrusion product technical functions; foundation for later leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining | Fellow | N/A | Professional recognition in materials engineering; supports technical leadership |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary (named executive officer in 2023; not an NEO in 2024).
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 382,475 | 396,325 | 430,000 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (Annual Bonus) ($) | 102,613 | — | 171,400 |
| Stock Awards Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | 489,500 | 407,425 | 1,198,250 |
2023 STI (short-term incentive) structure and results:
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Performance | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 60% | $125M | $180M | $540M | $210M | 0.70x |
| Safety – TCIR | 5% | 2.50 | 1.25 | N/A | 1.99 | 0.02x |
| Safety – LCIR | 5% | 0.50 | 0.35 | N/A | 0.28 | 0.05x |
| Quality (no-fault claim rate) | 10% | 0.30% | 0.20% | N/A | 0.60% | 0.00x |
| Delivery (on-time rate) | 10% | 85% | 90% | N/A | 89% | 0.09x |
| Productivity (earned $/labor hr) | 10% | $108 | $113 | N/A | $106 | 0.00x |
| Final Multiplier | — | — | — | — | — | 0.86x |
2023 Parkinson STI target schedule:
| Component | Threshold ($) | Target ($) | Max ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 STI opportunity | 60,000 | 200,000 | 440,000 |
Performance Compensation
2023 grants and vesting design (LTI: RSUs + PSUs with 3-year performance period):
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Number | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (annual) | Mar 5, 2023 | 1,931 | 145,520 | Time-based; vest Mar 5, 2026 (3-year cliff) |
| PSUs (target, annual) | Mar 5, 2023 | 2,897 | 299,130 | 60% Relative TSR vs S&P SmallCap 600/MidCap 400 Materials; 40% Adjusted EBITDA margin; performance period 2023–2025; vest after certification by Mar 15, 2026 |
| RSUs (special award) | Mar 5, 2023 | 10,000 | 753,600 | Time-based; subject to forfeiture upon qualified retirement per award terms |
Company LTI metric calibration and payout history:
- 2021–2023 LTI paid 0.00x across all metrics (Relative TSR, Controllable Cost, Adjusted EBITDA Margin) due to operational challenges (force majeure at Warrick, inflation, Trentwood outage, labor market) .
- 2022–2024 LTI paid 0.44x: Relative TSR multiplier 0.74x; Adjusted EBITDA Margin metric earned 0.00x; Average adjusted EBITDA margin 13.3% vs 19% threshold .
Detailed LTI metric framework (2023–2025):
| Metric | Weight | Targeting Framework |
|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR vs S&P SmallCap 600/MidCap 400 Materials | 60% | 25th=0.5x; 50th=1.0x; 75th=1.5x; ≥90th=2.0x; cap at 1.0x if TSR negative |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 40% | Company-selected margin targets; pro-rata between threshold and max |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Outstanding unvested equity (as of Dec 31, 2023):
| Type | Units Unvested (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs (granted 3/5/2021; vest 3/5/2024) | 1,570 | 111,768 |
| RSUs (granted 3/5/2022; vest 3/5/2025) | 1,625 | 115,684 |
| RSUs (granted 3/5/2023; vest 3/5/2026) | 1,931 | 137,468 |
| RSUs (special award 3/5/2023) | 10,000 | 711,900 |
| PSUs (target; granted 3/5/2021) | 1,920 | 136,685 |
| PSUs (target; granted 3/5/2022) | 2,437 | 173,490 |
| PSUs (target; granted 3/5/2023) | 2,897 | 206,237 |
Ownership policies:
- Executive stock ownership guideline: 3x base salary for executive officers; retain ≥75% of net shares until threshold met .
- Securities trading policy prohibits hedging and pledging; no margin purchases or share lending programs .
Employment Terms
Severance and CIC economics (as of Dec 29, 2023; covered under Salaried Severance Plan):
| Scenario | Payments Earned but Unpaid ($) | Other Benefits ($) | Equity Awards ($) | Restoration Plan Distribution ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination for Cause | 42,308 | — | — | — | 42,308 |
| Termination without Cause / Good Reason (no CIC) | 42,308 | 251,008 | 1,473,779 | 555,722 | 2,322,816 |
| Termination without Cause / Good Reason (following CIC) | 42,308 | 251,008 | 1,371,822 | 555,722 | 2,220,859 |
| Qualified Retirement (age 65+) | 213,708 | — | 413,850 | 555,722 | 1,183,279 |
| Disability | 213,708 | 292,488 | 1,473,779 | 555,722 | 2,535,696 |
| Death | 213,708 | 50,000 | 1,473,779 | 555,722 | 2,293,208 |
Plan terms summary:
- Salaried Severance Plan: lump-sum based on weekly base salary × continuation period (service-based) and continuation of welfare benefits up to COBRA eligibility; similar approach applies in CIC-related terminations .
- Equity awards upon CIC termination: RSUs vest; PSUs vest based on performance through CIC date .
- Clawbacks: company maintains Dodd-Frank/Nasdaq-compliant clawback policy (Oct 2023) for incentive-based compensation; additional plan-level clawbacks for “detrimental activity” .
Performance Compensation Details (Parkinson-focused)
| Item | 2023 Value |
|---|---|
| STI actual payout ($) | 171,400 |
| STI target ($) | 200,000 |
| STI max ($) | 440,000 |
| LTI RSUs (#, $) | 1,931; $145,520 |
| LTI PSUs target (#, $) | 2,897; $299,130 |
| Special RSU award (#, $) | 10,000; $753,600 |
| LTI metric weighting | 60% TSR; 40% Adj. EBITDA margin |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased equity emphasis in 2023 via special 10,000 RSU award; raises retention weight and guaranteed time-based equity versus pure performance shares .
- STI design shifted from 2021–2022 simple EBITDA focus to balanced safety/quality/delivery/productivity, with EBITDA ≥60% weighting; company multiplier 0.86x in 2023 and 0.95x in 2024, indicating tighter pay-for-performance alignment .
- LTI rigor held: 2021–2023 LTI paid 0.00x; 2022–2024 LTI paid 0.44x (TSR earned; margin did not), reinforcing no discretionary adjustments despite external shocks .
Say-on-Pay & Governance Signals
- Say-on-pay approval ~98% in 2023 and ~98.5% in 2024, signaling investor support for compensation design .
- Prohibitions on hedging/pledging, robust clawbacks, ownership guidelines (3x salary for executives), and independent compensation oversight (Meridian) align incentives and mitigate risk .
Investment Implications
- Retention risk appears moderated by substantial unvested RSUs and PSUs (notably the 10,000 RSU special grant), with vesting running through 2026; termination and CIC provisions provide predictable severance and vesting outcomes, reducing disruption risk .
- Pay-for-performance integrity is strong: zero LTI payout for 2021–2023 and partial payout for 2022–2024 reflect discipline amid operational headwinds; Parkinson’s incentives are tied to TSR and margin improvement—both aligned with shareholder value .
- No pledging/hedging and ownership guidelines support alignment; however, the increased use of time-based RSUs (special grant) shifts some mix toward retention over performance, which may dilute performance sensitivity short term but enhances talent stability in critical engineering leadership .
- With company targeting margin expansion and capacity investments (Trentwood Phase VII, Warrick upgrades), Parkinson’s technical leadership is levered to execution; TSR/margin-based PSUs directly incentivize delivery on these initiatives .