Charles Brooks
About Charles Brooks
Charles T. Brooks is Executive Vice President, Operations and Systems at Kemper Corporation (KMPR). He joined Kemper in May 2016 as Senior Vice President & Chief Information Officer and assumed his current EVP role in March 2017; he is age 58 per Kemper’s 2025 proxy executive officer biographies . Prior roles include Global Operations & Technology Officer at ACE Limited (now Chubb) from August 2011 to December 2015; Senior Vice President/Head, Member and Plan Sponsor Services at Aetna from February 2009 to August 2011; Senior Vice President, Operations and CIO, Personal Lines at Travelers from December 2003 to February 2009; and Partner, Financial Services – Insurance Practice at Accenture from June 1998 to December 2003 . Company-level performance context during recent years: Kemper’s cumulative TSR values in the pay-versus-performance table were $95.23 (2024), $68.41 (2023), $67.38 (2022), $78.53 (2021), and $100.82 (2020), versus peer TSR of $195.70 (2024), $154.07 (2023), $140.14 (2022), $128.18 (2021), and $98.70 (2020); net income moved from $409.9m (2020) to $(123.7)m (2021), $(286.6)m (2022), $(272.1)m (2023), then $317.8m (2024) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kemper Corporation | Senior Vice President & Chief Information Officer | May 2016–Mar 2017 | Led enterprise CIO function |
| Kemper Corporation | Executive Vice President, Operations and Systems | Mar 2017–present | Oversees operations and systems across Kemper |
| ACE Limited (now Chubb) | Global Operations & Technology Officer | Aug 2011–Dec 2015 | Led global operations and technology |
| Aetna | SVP/Head, Member and Plan Sponsor Services | Feb 2009–Aug 2011 | Ran member/plan sponsor services |
| Travelers | SVP, Operations and CIO, Personal Lines | Dec 2003–Feb 2009 | Operations and IT leadership in Personal Lines |
| Accenture | Partner, Financial Services – Insurance Practice | Jun 1998–Dec 2003 | Consulting leadership in insurance |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external public-company directorships disclosed in the proxy biographies reviewed |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 500,000 |
| Bonus Paid ($) | 400,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 38,691 |
| Total ($) | 2,102,491 |
Notes
- The HR&CC awarded discretionary bonuses in 2022 despite not meeting plan funding goals, citing strategic execution amid macro headwinds; NEO bonus amounts include Brooks at $400,000 .
- 2022 base salaries for NEOs were unchanged from 2021; Brooks base salary was $500,000 .
Performance Compensation
| Instrument | Grant date | Metric(s) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Grant-date fair value ($) | Vesting / performance period | Payout status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | 2/1/2022 | — | — | 44,119 options | — | 647,314 | Vests in 3 equal annual tranches starting 2/1/2023; strike $52.70 | Not disclosed |
| PSUs (Relative TSR) | 2/1/2022 | Relative TSR | 3,440 | 6,879 | 13,758 | 352,342 | Three-year performance period; payout certified after period | Not disclosed |
| PSUs (Three-Year Adjusted ROE) | 2/1/2022 | Three-Year Adjusted ROE | 1,720 | 3,439 | 6,878 | 164,143 | Three-year performance period; payout certified after period | Not disclosed |
| Prior PSUs (2010s) | Various | 2/3 Relative TSR, 1/3 Adjusted ROE (for 2020 awards) | — | — | — | — | 2020–2022 cycle concluded; 2020 PSUs paid out at 0% (both TSR and ROE tranches) | 0% payout (for 2020–2022 cycle) |
Design details
- Option exercise price equals closing price on grant date; option fair values via Black‑Scholes; PSU fair values via Monte Carlo (Relative TSR) and grant-date close (ROE) .
- 2022 PSUs use a 50% threshold and 200% maximum of target units .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of 3/9/2023) | 24,432 common shares; <1% of shares outstanding (63,963,923) |
| PSUs outstanding (not deemed beneficial ownership unless vest within 60 days) | 19,135 PSUs for Brooks excluded from beneficial ownership |
| Stock ownership guidelines (executives) | Minimum 2× salary for NEOs; RSUs count; 50% retention of net shares until guideline met; 1‑year holding period on shares acquired from options/vesting (tax/exercise exceptions) |
| Hedging & pledging | Prohibited for all directors and equity award recipients (e.g., swaps, collars; pledging under margin/loans) |
| Clawback policy | Adopted and revised under SEC/NYSE rules for incentive compensation upon financial restatement; terms embedded in award agreements |
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of 12/31/2022)
| Strike ($) | Expiration | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31.01 | 5/5/2026 | 20,000 | — |
| 31.01 | 5/5/2026 | 23,219 | — |
| 43.30 | 2/7/2027 | 16,629 | — |
| 60.00 | 2/6/2028 | 19,200 | — |
| 76.25 | 2/5/2029 | 17,115 | — |
| 77.39 | 2/4/2030 | 5,621 | 2,811 (vested 2/4/2023) |
| 69.74 | 2/2/2031 | 3,465 | 6,931 (ratable vest on 2/4/2023 & 2/2/2024) |
| 52.70 | — | — | 44,119 (ratable vest on 2/1/2023, 2/1/2024, 2/1/2025) |
Under a hypothetical change-in-control at 12/31/2022, accelerated value for options was zero because unvested option strike prices exceeded the 12/30/2022 closing price of $49.20; PSUs/RSUs would accelerate per plan .
Employment Terms
- Severance agreements (double-trigger CIC protection): If terminated without cause or resign with “good reason” within 2 years after a change-in-control, NEOs (other than CEO) receive a lump sum equal to 2× annualized salary + annual incentive (greater of prior-year bonus or 110% of salary), plus pro‑rata incentive for year of termination, life insurance continuation for 2 years, lump‑sum COBRA differential for 24 months, and up to 52 weeks of outplacement; excise tax best‑net choice (full benefits subject to 280G vs cutback below safe harbor) .
- CIC termination value example (12/31/2022): For Brooks, cash severance $2,650,000; accelerated PSUs $1,202,399; welfare/outplacement $56,827; total $3,909,226; death/disability total $963,831 (accelerated PSUs $713,831 + $250,000 supplemental death benefit) .
- Equity acceleration on certain terminations: Unvested options vest upon death/disability/CIC; retirement-eligible terminations allow continued vesting per original terms; otherwise, unvested options forfeited .
- Indemnification: Executive officers are party to indemnification agreements providing fullest Delaware-law indemnification and advancement of expenses, supplementing bylaws and charter .
CIC/Termination Scenario Values (as of 12/31/2022)
| Scenario | Cash severance ($) | Accelerated options ($) | Accelerated RSUs ($) | Accelerated PSUs ($) | Welfare/outplacement ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change in Control termination | 2,650,000 | — | — | 1,202,399 | 56,827 | 3,909,226 |
| Death or Disability | — | — | — | 713,831 | 250,000 | 963,831 |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 2020 PSU cycle paid 0% on both TSR and ROE tranches, indicating strict performance thresholds and limited discretionary adjustments on long-term incentives; this ties realized pay to outcomes and reduces windfalls during underperformance .
- Selling pressure/vesting: Unvested options at 12/31/2022 carried strikes above the $49.20 close, yielding no accelerated value upon CIC; combined with a one-year post-vesting holding requirement and stock ownership guidelines (2× salary for NEOs), this framework tempers near-term selling pressure and supports alignment .
- Retention/contract economics: Double-trigger CIC severance of ~2× salary+bonus plus benefit continuations is competitive and supportive of retention, while 280G best‑net provisions avoid shareholder‑unfriendly tax gross‑ups; retirement-eligible continued vesting provisions incentivize tenure .
- Ownership: Brooks beneficially owned 24,432 shares (<1%), with additional PSUs outstanding that are not counted toward beneficial ownership; compliance is monitored, with retention requirements until guidelines are met, and hedging/pledging is prohibited—reducing misalignment risk .
- Execution risk context: Company TSR lagged peers in several recent years and long-term incentive payouts reflected performance pressure; conversely, net income rebounded in 2024, suggesting improved operating fundamentals that may enhance future PSU outcomes if sustained .