Sign in
Adam Miller

Adam Miller

Chief Executive Officer at Knight-Swift Transportation HoldingsKnight-Swift Transportation Holdings
CEO
Executive
Board

About Adam Miller

Adam Miller is Chief Executive Officer and a director of Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc. (KNX), age 44, with a B.S. in Accounting from Arizona State University and CPA licensure in Arizona . He joined Knight in 2002, served as Knight CFO (2012–2017), Knight‑Swift CFO (2017–Feb 2024), and President of Swift (Nov 2020–Feb 2024) before being appointed CEO and director in February 2024 . Under his leadership in 2024, KNX reported $7.4B total revenue, a 96.7% operating ratio (94.7% adjusted), net income of $116M, and consolidated revenue growth of 3.8% . Execution highlights include integrating the acquired non‑union regional LTL division of DHE in ~3 months, expanding the LTL network by 51 terminals (~30% door count increase), and ongoing profitability improvement at U.S. Xpress with a $144M annualized run-rate of realized improvement and EPS accretion targeted by 2026 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Knight TransportationCFO2012–2017Led finance; prepared Knight for merger; progressed to combined-company CFO .
Knight‑Swift TransportationCFO2017–Feb 2024Oversaw finance across combined entity; supported diversification and M&A .
Swift TransportationPresidentNov 2020–Feb 2024Operated largest TL platform; delivered cost/revenue actions enabling U.S. Xpress integration .
Knight Refrigerated (subsidiary)Controller2006–2011Built controllership capabilities; enhanced reporting discipline .
Knight TransportationSVP Accounting & Finance2011–2012Strengthened finance/controls; succession to CFO .
Knight TransportationAccounting & Finance roles2002–2006Foundational finance experience; cultural familiarity .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No other current public company board roles disclosed .

Fixed Compensation

Metric ($)FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Salary803,365 774,231 888,173
Stock Awards (grant-date fair value)2,563,484 2,550,311 3,063,856
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation1,388,475 827,640
All Other Compensation20,182 18,432 19,145
Total4,775,506 3,342,974 4,798,814

Additional base salary detail: Raised from $825,000 to $900,000 in March 2024 upon appointment as CEO; increased to $950,000 in November 2024 .

Performance Compensation

2024 Annual Cash Bonus (plan and outcome)

ComponentWeightingTarget definitionActual resultComponent payout
Adjusted Operating Income Growth40% YoY growth in adjusted operating income (ex fuel surcharge; committee may adjust for extraordinary items) Target not met 0% of target
Consolidated Revenue Growth (ex Trucking & LTL fuel surcharge)30% YoY growth excluding fuel surcharge (committee may adjust) 4.8% 40% of target (corresponding band)
Strategic Objectives (U.S. Xpress profitability; LTL terminal expansion)30% Committee discretion based on progress Achieved at 200% 200% of target
ESG Modifier±10% Based on MSCI, Sustainalytics, CDP, EcoVadis, S&P Global scores +10% +10% adjustment
Total payout79.2% of target; $827,640 paid Feb 21, 2025

Target bonus potential and vesting logistics:

  • 2024 target bonus potential: 110% of base salary (adjusted upon CEO appointment) .
  • 2025 target bonus potential: 120% of base salary under a similar metric structure with ESG modifier .

Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – November 30, 2024 grants

ElementTarget value ($)Units grantedVestingPerformance period and metrics
Performance RSUs (PRSUs)1,800,000 30,322 Vests Jan 31, 2028 if earned 3-year period: 1/1/2025–12/31/2027; one-third company metrics (Adjusted EPS CAGR and consolidated revenue CAGR); two‑thirds relative metrics (peer ranking in total revenue growth and return on net tangible assets); TSR modifier −25% to +25% vs Benchmarking Peer Group .
Time-based RSUs1,200,000 20,215 33% on Jan 31, 2026; 33% on Jan 31, 2027; 34% on Jan 31, 2028 Retention-focused; no dividends on unvested awards; three-year ratable vesting .

Illustrative PRSU payout grids and TSR modifier for 2025–2027 cycle are detailed in the proxy (CAGR bands and peer ranking ladders; TSR modifier −25% to +25%) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership and Guidelines

  • Shares beneficially owned: 169,440; less than 1% of shares outstanding (162,000,854) .
  • CEO stock ownership guideline: 5× base salary; all directors/officers are in compliance .
  • Anti‑pledging/hedging policy: Designated persons (including CEO) prohibited; only Kevin and Gary Knight have grandfathered pledges; Adam Miller is not disclosed as having any pledges .

Vested Shares and Value Realized (2024)

Metric2024
Shares vested34,090
Value on vesting ($)1,956,084

Outstanding Equity Awards (as of December 31, 2024; stock price $53.04)

Grant dateUnvested RSUs (#)Market value ($)Unearned PRSUs (#)Market/payout value ($)Vesting notes
12/06/20215,702 302,434 RSUs vested 1/31/2025 (100%) .
12/06/202114,149 (earned, not yet delivered) 750,463 2021 relative PRSUs vested 1/31/2025 at 112.5% payout; issued March 2025 .
11/30/202212,087 641,094 27,060 (target) 1,435,262 RSUs vest through 1/31/2026; PRSUs performance 1/1/2023–12/31/2025, vest 1/31/2026 .
12/15/202317,301 917,645 64,878 (max reflected, performance > target in 2024) 3,441,129 RSUs vest 33% annually 2025–2027; PRSUs performance 1/1/2024–12/31/2026, vest 1/31/2027 .
11/30/202420,215 1,072,204 1,251 (threshold; period not started) 66,353 RSUs vest 2026–2028; PRSUs performance 1/1/2025–12/31/2027, vest 1/31/2028 .

Ownership alignment safeguards:

  • No dividends on unvested stock awards; double-trigger required for change-of-control vesting; clawback policy compliant with SEC/NYSE rules (3-year look-back) .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey termsEconomics/quantification
Change-of-control vestingDouble-trigger for PRSUs (CoC + qualifying termination), at performance through the calendar year of termination; PRSUs do not vest if period hasn’t started; RSUs accelerate upon death/disability .As of 12/31/2024: Miller PRSUs $2,829,100 under CoC+qual termination; death/disability RSUs $2,933,377 and PRSUs $2,829,100; total $5,762,477 .
Non-compete/non-solicit6 months post-separation; company may extend up to 12 months; pay monthly base salary during extension (offset by other earnings) .If extended 12 months, Miller would receive $950,000 (base salary) assuming no offsets .
ClawbackDodd‑Frank/NYSE‑compliant clawback for incentive-based comp upon material restatement; 3-year look-back; repay excess incentive comp .Policy applies to CEO and covered officers .
Anti‑pledging/hedgingProhibits pledging/hedging by designated persons; no hardship exemption; grandfathered pledges only for Kevin/Gary Knight .No pledges disclosed for Adam Miller .
Tax gross-upsNone (no tax gross-up payments) .

Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, Independence, Oversight)

  • Board service: Director since 2024; not independent (executive) .
  • Committee roles: None; all standing committees are fully independent (Audit, Compensation, Nominating & Corporate Governance, Finance) .
  • Board structure: Separate Executive Chairman (Kevin Knight) and CEO; robust Lead Independent Director (David Vander Ploeg) with defined authority for agendas, sessions, oversight, and liaison with stakeholders .
  • Attendance: Board held seven meetings in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of aggregate Board/committee meetings; all attended the 2024 annual meeting .
  • Executive sessions: Independent directors met five times without management present in 2024; four times with Executive Chairman present .
  • Director compensation: Non‑employee directors only; officer‑directors (including Adam Miller) do not receive director compensation .

Compensation Committee Design, Peer Groups, and Say‑on‑Pay

  • Design: Pay targeted to market median; at-risk emphasis; no re-pricing; no dividends on unvested awards; double-trigger CoC vesting; Anti‑Pledging; ESG modifier in cash bonus; consultant Pearl Meyer independent (no conflicts) .
  • Benchmarking Peer Group (examples): ArcBest, C.H. Robinson, GXO Logistics, Hub Group, J.B. Hunt, Landstar, Old Dominion, Ryder, RXO, Saia, Schneider, Werner, XPO, Expeditors .
  • Performance Peer Group (relative PRSU): Covenant Logistics, Heartland Express, Marten Transport, Schneider, Werner .
  • Say‑on‑Pay support: 98.3% approval at 2024 annual meeting; historically strong support (94.2% approval in 2023) .

Risk Indicators and Related Party Checks

  • Investigations/regulatory actions: None disclosed for the Company or its directors/officers in the past two years .
  • Section 16 filing compliance: Company reported certain inadvertent late filings for two individuals; no issues disclosed for Adam Miller .
  • Related party transactions: Audit Committee oversight; family‑related employment transactions disclosed and approved; no Adam Miller‑specific related party transactions disclosed .

Performance Compensation – Detailed PRSU Framework (for reference)

MetricWeighting within PRSUsTarget/pay gridTSR modifierVesting
Adjusted EPS CAGR~16.7% of total PRSUs (half of company metrics) 0%–200% based on CAGR bands −25% to +25% vs Benchmarking Peer Group Earned shares vest 1/31/2028 .
Consolidated revenue CAGR (ex TL/LTL fuel surcharge)~16.7% 0%–200% based on CAGR bands As above As above .
Return on net tangible assets (peer ranking)~33.3% 0%–200% based on rank vs peers As above As above .
Total revenue growth (peer ranking)~33.3% 0%–200% based on rank vs peers As above As above .

Historic vesting outcomes: 2021 Relative PRSUs paid at 112.5% (rank second on both metrics; TSR below 40th percentile reduced payout) issuing 14,149 shares to Adam Miller in March 2025; 2021 Target PRSUs did not vest given negative EPS CAGR .

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance alignment: High at‑risk mix (cash incentives tied to operating income and revenue growth; 60% PRSUs with multi‑metric design and TSR overlay) supports long‑term value creation and relative outperformance focus .
  • Near‑term supply/demand for shares: 2024 RSUs/PRSUs create scheduled vesting dates in 2026–2028; 2021 relative PRSU delivery in March 2025 increased share supply but vesting does not necessarily imply selling; insider trading is governed by KNX’s Securities Trading Policy .
  • Retention risk: Explicit non‑compete/non‑solicit terms with optional 12‑month extension at base pay (for CEO, $950k) and substantial unvested equity reduce near‑term departure risk .
  • Governance mitigants for dual role: CEO also serves on the Board but is non‑independent; separation of Chair and CEO, strong Lead Independent Director, and fully independent committees lessen independence concerns .
  • Change‑of‑control economics: Double‑trigger structure and clawback; no gross‑ups; quantified PRSU acceleration values provide transparency without excessive parachute features .