Angela Aman
About Angela Aman
Angela M. Aman is Chief Executive Officer and a director of Kilroy Realty Corporation (KRC). She is 45 years old, joined as CEO on January 22, 2024, and has served on KRC’s Board since 2024; she holds a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania . 2024 operating performance under her leadership included FFO (As Adjusted) per share of $4.59, ~1.78M SF of leases, and year-end liquidity of ~$1.3B; net debt/EBITDA was 6.4x, and in the SEC pay-versus-performance table, a $100 initial investment in 2020 was valued at $60.91 for KRC and $117.56 for the peer index by year-end 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brixmor Property Group | President, CFO & Treasurer | 2023–2024 | Led finance/treasury; senior operational oversight across a major REIT platform |
| Brixmor Property Group | CFO & Treasurer; EVP | 2016–2023 | Drove capital markets and financial strategy; enhanced investor credibility |
| Starwood Retail Partners | EVP & CFO | 2015–2016 | Strengthened private retail platform’s finance and controls |
| Retail Properties of America, Inc. | EVP, CFO & Treasurer | 2012–2015 | Public REIT finance leadership; capital allocation |
| RREEF (real estate securities team) | Investment Analyst/Portfolio Manager | 2005–2011 | Public REIT investing; portfolio management discipline |
| Deutsche Bank Securities (Real Estate IB) | Investment Banking | 2001–2005 | M&A/financing expertise in real estate capital markets |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Residential (NYSE: EQR) | Trustee; Audit Committee Chair | Current | Public company board service; audit leadership |
| Nareit; ICSC; ULI | Member | Current | Industry engagement across REITs, retail, and urban land use |
Fixed Compensation
| Component (2024 unless noted) | Amount/Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $800,000 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 175% (max 262.5%); minimum 50% of target for 2024 per agreement |
| Actual Annual Cash Incentive (2024) | $1,775,000 (126.8% of target) |
| Initial Sign-on RSU Grant | 101,627 RSUs; granted 1/22/2024; vested on 1/22/2025 |
| Annual Equity Award Value (2024) | $3,500,000 total; $875,000 time-based (25%), $2,625,000 performance-based (75%) |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Cash Incentive Framework and Results
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual 2024 | Payout vs Target | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFO Per Share | 35% | $4.175 | $4.59 | 150% (Maximum) | Key REIT earnings metric |
| Leasing SF – Operating Portfolio | 17.5% | 850K | 1,417K | 150% (Maximum) | Demand indicator |
| Leasing SF – Development Portfolio | 7.5% | 100K | 0 | 0% (Below threshold) | Pipeline execution |
| Net Debt/EBITDA | 10% | 6.7x | 6.4x | 150% (Maximum) | Balance sheet discipline |
| Corporate Responsibility | 10% | Qualitative (ESG initiatives) | Achieved at target | 100% | Key ESG/culture priorities |
| Individual Performance (CEO) | 20% | Assessed by Committee | 115% for Aman | 115% | Leadership contribution |
2024 Long-Term Incentive (RSUs) Structure for CEO
| Element | Weight | Target/Threshold | Actual/Status | Payout Range | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFO (As Adjusted) Per Share Modifier | 100% gate for performance RSUs | Target $4.175; Threshold $4.10 | 2024 Result: $4.59 → 175% of target banked shares for CEO | 0–175% (CEO) | Banked shares eligible; final vest in Q1 2027 contingent on modifiers and service |
| TSR Percentile vs Office REIT Peers | 50% of banked shares | 50th pct = 100% | To be determined over 2024–2026 | 25–175% (CEO) | Cliff at end of 3-year period |
| Average Net Debt/EBITDA | 50% of banked shares | 6.8x = 100% | To be determined over 2024–2026 | 25–175% (CEO) | Cliff at end of 3-year period |
| Time-based RSUs | 25% of annual LTI | N/A | Vests 1/3 annually on Jan 5 in 2025–2027 | N/A | Service-based |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares Owned Directly (3/1/2025 ref) | 64,119 shares (<1% outstanding) |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 26,054 time-based; 136,783 performance-based (banked on 2024 FFO) |
| Initial RSU Grant Status | 106,516 units (incl. dividend equivalents) vested on 1/22/2025 |
| Ownership Guidelines | 600% of base salary for CEO; met as of 12/31/2024 |
| Anti-hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging generally prohibited with narrow exceptions; no repricing of options, no single-trigger CIC, no excise tax gross-ups |
Potential supply overhang: 2027 vest of 2024 performance RSUs subject to TSR and leverage outcomes; annual time-based RSUs vest each January 5 (may contribute to routine Form 4 activity) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Appointment/Start | CEO effective January 22, 2024 |
| Agreement Term | Through March 31, 2028; auto-renews annually unless notice given |
| Base/Bonus Terms | Base salary $800,000; annual target bonus 175% of salary; max 262.5% |
| Equity | Guaranteed annual equity award value not less than $3.5M for 2024 and 2025; initial RSU $4.0M |
| Severance (No CIC) | 2× (base + target bonus) paid over 2 years; pro-rata target bonus; up to 18 months COBRA premium reimbursement |
| Severance (With CIC) | 3× (base + target bonus); pro-rata bonus; COBRA; acceleration of time-based RSUs; performance awards measured per award terms |
| Estimated Severance Values (12/31/2024) | $8.80M (no CIC) vs $18.36M (with CIC); accelerated vesting component $4.31M vs $11.67M respectively (valued at $40.50 per share) |
| Clawback | SEC/NYSE-compliant recovery policy for incentive comp on restatements |
| Tax Gross-ups | None for 280G/4999; benefits cut if tax-efficient |
| Non-Compete/NDAs | Non-Disclosure Agreements include restrictions on competitive activity, confidentiality, and non-disparagement; cooperation obligations |
| Relocation Perqs | Temporary housing, relocation costs, broker fees, tax gross-up for relocation; repayment if departure within one year (excluding qualifying terminations) |
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 2024; member of Corporate Social Responsibility & Sustainability (CSR&S) Committee .
- Independence and dual-role mitigants: Independent Chair (Dr. Brennan); supermajority independent board; executive sessions; robust governance practices; CEO limited to one other public board (she serves on EQR) .
- Director compensation: CEO does not receive additional board compensation .
Compensation Peer Group (2024)
The Compensation Committee used a 14-company REIT peer set for benchmarking pay decisions; KRC’s revenues, market cap, and total assets place it around the median of the group. The program emphasizes majority at-risk, performance-tied equity and cash incentives, with no fixed percentile targeting .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric/Highlight (2024) | Result |
|---|---|
| FFO (As Adjusted) per share | $4.59 |
| Leasing Volume | ~1,778,000 SF; highest since 2019 |
| GAAP Rent Change on Leases | +8.2% |
| Liquidity | ~$1.3B (≈$0.2B cash + $1.1B undrawn revolver) |
| Net Debt/EBITDA (company share) | 6.4x |
| Capital Markets | Issued $400M 12-year notes at 6.25%; recast $1.1B revolver; repaid $403.7M notes at par |
Shareholder engagement drove 2024 compensation program refinements (simplified metrics, reduced ESG weighting, added individual performance; 2025 introduces a liquidity ratio in the cash bonus framework) .
Compensation Governance Safeguards
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies; robust stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements; no single-trigger CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; independent compensation consultant; regular investor engagement .
- Clawback policy compliant with SEC/NYSE for incentive recovery on restatements .
Director Compensation (for context)
Non-employee directors receive cash retainers and ~$145,000 in RSUs annually; CSR&S oversight is formalized at board level. CEO does not receive additional compensation for board service .
Say-On-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
The board and Compensation Committee proactively engaged holders of ~75% of shares post-2024 vote; feedback led to right-sizing CEO pay versus prior CEO and structural changes to annual incentives and severance design .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Strong pay-for-performance: ~86% of CEO target TDC at risk; majority of LTI subject to three-year TSR and leverage outcomes; cash bonus linked to FFO, leasing, and balance sheet metrics .
- Reduced guaranteed elements vs prior CEO; severance levels materially lower than legacy contract; no single-trigger CIC .
- Explicit leverage and TSR metrics discourage excessive debt-funded growth and align to shareholder returns .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Positive: No single-trigger CIC; clawback in place; anti-hedging/pledging; independent chair; reduced severance vs predecessor; majority independent board .
- Watch items: Significant “banked” performance RSUs at 175% after strong 2024 FFO may create sizeable vest in 2027 pending TSR/leverage outcomes; routine January vesting cycles may create periodic supply pressure .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: CEO compensation is heavily performance-contingent, with explicit leverage and TSR controls; ownership guidelines met, and governance standards strong—supportive of long-term alignment .
- Catalysts/Trading Signals: 2027 cliff vest for 2024 performance RSUs contingent on three-year TSR/leverage; January annual time-based vestings are recurring supply events; 2025 cash bonus adds liquidity ratio, incentivizing further balance sheet strengthening .
- Retention Risk: Low near-term due to multi-year contract term and severance economics; absence of tax gross-ups and no single-trigger CIC reduce shareholder risk .