Barry Phillips
LAKELAND INDUSTRIESAbout Barry Phillips
Barry G. Phillips, age 65, is Chief Revenue Officer – Fire at Lakeland Industries (Lakeland Fire + Safety), appointed June 17, 2024, with 37+ years in global sales leadership across fire service, first responder and industrial safety sectors . His pay-for-performance is tied to company-level metrics (revenue growth, Adjusted EBITDA margin, free cash flow margin) for annual bonuses , and long-term PSUs specifically targeting total revenue, Fire Services revenue, and Adjusted EBITDA over multi‑year horizons—directly aligning his incentives with Fire segment growth . Company performance context during his tenure includes Q1 FY2026 revenue up 29% YoY to $46.7M, with Fire Services revenue up 100% YoY, though margins were pressured by mix, purchase accounting and tariffs . Lakeland’s 3-year pay-versus-performance table shows FY2025 TSR value of $112 (from a $100 base in FY2022) and FY2025 net loss of $18.1M, underscoring the importance of multi-year value creation to incentive outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. | Chief Revenue Officer | Sep 2020 – Jun 2024 | Led global B2B sales/marketing/service/operations; drove revenue growth in safety-focused industries . |
| Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. | Vice President, Global Sales; Vice President, Sales & Marketing | 2015 – 2020 | Senior commercial leadership across product and channel; scaled sales organization . |
| Various safety product manufacturers & distributors | Senior roles | Not disclosed | Led global B2B sales, marketing, service and operations teams; transformed sales orgs and growth execution . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fire services organizations and industry standards associations | Leadership/member (unspecified) | Not disclosed | Industry standards involvement and sector leadership supporting market development . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Bonus Plan (Company-wide design; applies to executive officers)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Payout Range | Vest/Payout Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue growth | 35% | Company-set (not disclosed per executive) | 50% (threshold) to 200% (max) of target | Annual cash bonus after fiscal year, based on performance and continued employment . |
| Adjusted EBITDA margin | 35% | Company-set | 50% to 200% of target | Annual payout per plan . |
| Free cash flow margin | 15% | Company-set | 50% to 200% of target | Annual payout per plan . |
| Individual goals | 15% | Role-specific | 50% to 200% of target | Annual payout per plan . |
Long-Term PSUs Granted May 1, 2025 (Executive-specific; includes Phillips)
| Executive | Target PSUs | Performance Metrics | Targets | Measurement Window | Threshold/Max | Vesting/Forfeiture |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Barry Phillips (CRO – Fire) | 25,774 | Total revenue; Fire Services revenue; Adjusted EBITDA | $258.7M total revenue; $161.8M Fire revenue; $47.1M Adj. EBITDA | First test 1/31/2029; final test 1/31/2031 | Threshold at 80% of each metric; up to 120% of target earned | Vesting subject to certification of performance and continued employment; forfeiture if thresholds unmet by 1/31/2031 . |
Notes:
- The PSU design tightly aligns Phillips’ incentive to Fire segment scaling (dedicated Fire revenue target) and enterprise growth/profitability .
- Company-wide LTIP also uses 3-year performance RSUs tied to aggregate revenue, EBITDA margin, and FCF margin, reinforcing long-term alignment .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Company prohibits hedging/monetization transactions and holding Company securities in margin accounts or pledging as collateral—reducing misalignment and forced selling risk .
- Stock ownership guidelines: Other executive officers must hold shares equal to at least 2x base salary; dispositions from awards are prohibited until guidelines are met and thereafter limited (dispositions capped at 50% of issued awards), further dampening selling pressure .
- Clawback: Incentive-based compensation is subject to recoupment upon a financial restatement under the Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback policy (3‑year lookback); LTIP awards incorporate clawback terms .
- Individual ownership disclosure: Phillips is not individually listed in the March 31, 2025 security ownership table (which shows NEOs/directors), so shares/percent ownership for him are not disclosed in the proxy .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
| Employment status | Company moved away from executive employment agreements beginning FY2025; executives generally at‑will . |
| Severance (no CIC) | If terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason outside a CIC period: base salary through termination, pro‑rated annual cash bonus based on actual-year performance, plus 1 month of base salary per year of service (min 4 months, max 12 months) . |
| Change-in-Control (double-trigger) | If terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason within 90 days before or 18 months after a CIC: base salary through termination, pro‑rated target bonus, plus 1.5x (for executives other than CEO) of (base salary + target bonus), and COBRA premium reimbursement (net of active employee rate) up to 18 months . |
| Coverage | Phillips is a named participant in the Amended & Restated Executive Severance and Change in Control Plan (adopted Oct 31, 2024) . |
| Restrictive covenants | Plan includes non-solicitation and non-disparagement covenants for covered executives . |
Fixed Compensation
- The company discloses compensation details only for NEOs (CEO, CFO, COO) in the Summary Compensation Table; Phillips (CRO – Fire) is not an NEO in FY2025 proxy disclosures, and his base salary/target bonus/actual bonus are not disclosed .
Performance & Track Record
- Business performance during Phillips’ tenure: Q1 FY2026 revenue reached $46.7M (+29% YoY), with Fire Services up 100% YoY; margins compressed due to geographic mix, purchase accounting and tariff-related dynamics, resulting in adjusted EBITDA ex‑FX of $0.6M .
- Outlook and execution levers: Management maintained FY2026 revenue guidance of $210M–$220M (trending to the low end for adjusted EBITDA ex‑FX of $24M–$29M) and identified ~$4M in OpEx savings, while integrating four acquisitions and targeting head‑to‑toe Fire offerings (boots, helmets, gloves, turnout gear) .
- Pay-versus-performance context: FY2025 TSR measurement value at $112 and FY2025 net loss of $18.1M underscores heightened focus on long-term profitable growth embedded in PSU metrics .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased at‑risk, long‑duration equity: Phillips’ 2025 PSU grant is multi‑year (first test FY2029; final FY2031), tied to absolute revenue (incl. Fire), and Adjusted EBITDA targets with up to 120% payout—raising performance leverage and extending retention .
- Ownership and disposal constraints: 2x salary ownership guideline; no hedging/pledging; sale restrictions until guideline met and then limited—lowering short-term selling pressure and signaling alignment .
- Governance safeguards: Clawback policy applies to executives; anti‑repricing provisions in the 2017 Plan; say‑on‑pay supported annually (e.g., 2024 SOC vote passed) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment with value drivers: The Fire revenue target in Phillips’ PSU package directly ties his upside to scaling the Fire portfolio—an area showing strong growth (+100% YoY in Q1 FY2026)—and to enterprise revenue and Adjusted EBITDA expansion .
- Retention and selling pressure: Multi‑year PSUs (FY2029–FY2031 tests), ownership guidelines with sale constraints, and anti-pledging/hedging significantly reduce near-term selling pressure and increase retention .
- Downside protection vs. risk: Double-trigger CIC severance at 1.5x base+target bonus, pro‑rated target bonus, and COBRA support retain key talent through integration and market cycles; however, company-level margin pressure and net losses increase execution risk to achieving PSU targets and annual payouts .
- Governance/comp oversight: Annual say-on-pay support and a Dodd-Frank compliant clawback mitigate pay-for-performance slippage risk and align incentives with long-term shareholder value .
Note: Where individual data (e.g., base salary, bonus outcomes, personal shareholdings) is not disclosed for Phillips, analysis relies on company-wide plan designs and executive policies. All facts are sourced to cited SEC filings and company materials.