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Roger D. Shannon

Chief Financial Officer and Secretary at LAKELAND INDUSTRIESLAKELAND INDUSTRIES
Executive

About Roger D. Shannon

Roger D. Shannon is Chief Financial Officer (CFO) since February 1, 2023 and Secretary since February 1, 2024; age 60; B.S. in Accounting (Auburn University) and MBA (University of Georgia); CPA (inactive) and CFA charterholder . Lakeland’s executive incentive design ties annual cash bonuses to revenue growth (35%), Adjusted EBITDA margin (35%), free cash flow margin (15%), and individual goals (15%), with payouts from 50% to 200% of target, and LTIP performance RSUs to three-year aggregate revenue (20%), EBITDA margin (20%), and FCF margin (10%), with payouts from 50% to 150% of target . Company TSR rose from $86 to $112 on a $100 base over FY24–FY25 while FY25 net income was a loss of $18.075 million; these pay-versus-performance datapoints frame incentive alignment through cycles .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Charah SolutionsCFO and TreasurerJun 2019–Oct 2022Senior finance leadership for environmental services firm
ADTRAN (NASDAQ: ADTN)CFO; SVP Finance; Treasurer; Head of Corporate DevelopmentNov 2015–Jun 2019Led finance and corporate development at networking solutions provider
Steel TechnologiesCFO and TreasurerPrior years (not dated)Corporate finance leadership at metals processor
Brown-Forman; British American TobaccoSenior finance rolesPrior years (not dated)Multinational consumer sector finance roles
Vulcan Materials; Lexmark; KPMGAccounting/finance positionsPrior years (not dated)Foundational accounting and finance experience

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYears
Elauwit Connections, Inc.DirectorSince Nov 2024

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY2024FY2025
Base salary ($)291,923 358,154
Target bonus (%)Not disclosed50% of base salary

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Bonus – Design and Outcomes

ComponentWeightingTargetActualPayout mechanics
Revenue growth35% Not disclosedNot disclosed50% payout at minimum, 100% at target, 200% at max
Adjusted EBITDA margin35% Not disclosedNot disclosed50% payout at minimum, 100% at target, 200% at max
Free cash flow margin15% Not disclosedNot disclosed50% payout at minimum, 100% at target, 200% at max
Individual performance goals15% Not disclosedNot disclosed50% payout at minimum, 100% at target, 200% at max
Non-Equity Incentive ($)233,243 (FY24) Cash bonus paid per plan
Non-Equity Incentive ($)145,621 (FY25) Cash bonus paid per plan

Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – Performance RSUs

MetricWeightingPerformance periodPayout rangeVesting treatment
Aggregate three-year revenue20% FY2023–FY2026; FY2024–FY2027 awards outstanding 50%–150% of target Cliff vest at end of 3-year period
EBITDA margin20% FY2023–FY2026; FY2024–FY2027 awards outstanding 50%–150% of target Cliff vest at end of 3-year period
Free cash flow margin10% FY2023–FY2026; FY2024–FY2027 awards outstanding 50%–150% of target Cliff vest at end of 3-year period
FY2024 stock awards grant-date fair value ($)FY2024254,178 Standard plan terms
FY2025 stock awards grant-date fair value ($)FY2025640,746 Standard plan terms plus one-off RSUs

Equity Awards – One-off grants (FY2024–FY2025)

Grant dateAward typeSharesGrant-date fair value ($)Notes
Various FY2025RSUs (three one-off grants)Notional29,167; 230,625; 92,950 Disclosed one-off awards
FY2024RSUs (one-off grant)Notional29,167 Disclosed one-off award
Feb 1, 2023Stock options24,000 total (8,000 ex., 16,000 unex. at 1/31/25) 238,893 (FY2024 option grant-date FV) Strike $14.44; expires 02/01/2033; vests 50% on 02/01/2025 and 50% on 02/01/2026

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership23,101 shares as of Mar 31, 2025; includes 2,602 RSUs vested Apr 4, 2025 and 16,000 options exercisable within 60 days; <1% of class
Stock ownership guidelinesOther officers must own ≥2× base salary; dispositions barred until compliance; thereafter limited to 50% of issued awards
Hedging/pledgingProhibited for officers; no margin or pledging permitted
ClawbackDodd-Frank compliant policy adopted Nov 2023 with 3-year lookback; recoup erroneously awarded incentive comp upon restatement
Retirement benefitsNo pension/SERP; only 401(k) match
Related party transactionsNone disclosed in FY2024–FY2025

Outstanding Equity and Vesting Schedules (as of Jan 31, 2025)

AwardQuantityKey datesTerms
Options (exercisable)8,000 02/01/2025 tranche vested Strike $14.44; expire 02/01/2033
Options (unexercisable)16,000 Remaining 8,000 vest 02/01/2026 Two equal tranches
RSUs (time-based)5,000 Vest 10/31/2025Single cliff vest
RSUs (time-based)2,555 Vest 01/31/2026Single cliff vest
RSUs (time-based)2,002 Vest 12/04/2026Single cliff vest
RSUs (time-based)1,581 Vest 04/04/2027Single cliff vest
RSUs (time-based)12,500 Vest 04/04/2027Single cliff vest
RSUs (time-based, tranche series)7,805 Equal portions on 04/04/2025, 01/31/2026, 01/31/2027 (2,602 vested on 04/04/2025) 3 equal tranches
PSUs (performance)7,727 Performance period FY2023–FY2026Payout 50%–150% of target
PSUs (performance)7,805 Performance period FY2024–FY2027Payout 50%–150% of target

Employment Terms

ElementTerms
Employment statusCFO since Feb 1, 2023; Secretary since Feb 1, 2024; employment agreement (base $300,000) expired Jan 31, 2025; at-will thereafter
Annual bonus eligibilityParticipates in annual cash plan with FY2025 target 50% of base salary
Equity plansEligible under 2017 Equity Incentive Plan; time-based and performance-based RSUs; legacy options outstanding
Severance (non-Change-in-Control)Base salary through termination; pro-rated annual bonus based on actual performance; severance equal to one month of base salary per year of service (min 4 months, max 12 months)
Severance (Change-in-Control; double trigger)If termination without Cause or resignation for Good Reason within 90 days prior to or 18 months after a Change in Control: base salary through termination; pro-rated target bonus; 1.5× (for non-CEO officers) of base salary + target bonus; COBRA premium reimbursement up to 18 months
CovenantsNon-solicitation and non-disparagement under Severance and CIC Plan

Performance & Track Record

  • Pay versus performance: TSR value of a $100 investment measured at $69 (FY2023), $86 (FY2024), and $112 (FY2025); company net income was $1.873m (FY2023), $5.425m (FY2024), and $(18.075)m (FY2025) .
  • Incentive architecture emphasizes multi-year outcomes across revenue, EBITDA margin, and free cash flow margin for PSUs, and revenue growth, Adjusted EBITDA margin, and FCF margin for annual bonuses, supporting alignment with long-term value creation .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Equity-heavy mix: FY2025 stock awards grant-date fair value $640,746 and FY2024 $254,178, with ongoing performance RSUs and time-based RSUs; FY2024 included option awards valued at $238,893, indicating balance of equity forms over time .
  • Explicit performance weights and payout curves: Annual cash plan 35% revenue growth, 35% Adjusted EBITDA margin, 15% FCF margin, 15% individual goals; PSU plan linked to three-year aggregate revenue, EBITDA margin, and FCF margin with defined payout ranges (50%–150%) .
  • Governance safeguards: Clawback policy (Nov 2023), anti-hedging/anti-pledging, stock ownership minimums (2× salary for officers), and disposal restrictions until guideline compliance, limiting misalignment and excessive risk-taking .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited per Global Insider Trading Policy; no pledging allowed—a positive alignment factor .
  • Related party transactions: None in FY2024–FY2025—reduces conflict risk .
  • Auditor transition: Change from Deloitte to RSM in Oct 2024; prior material weakness (FX translation controls) remediated by Jan 31, 2024—monitor process rigor continuity .

Investment Implications

  • Near-term selling pressure: Multiple time-based RSU cliffs (e.g., 10/31/2025; 01/31/2026; 12/04/2026; 04/04/2027) and options fully exercisable by 02/01/2026 could create episodic supply; however, ownership guidelines and disposal limits mitigate forced selling until compliance thresholds are met .
  • Pay-for-performance alignment: Incentives tethered to revenue growth, Adjusted EBITDA margin, and FCF margin should support disciplined execution, but FY25 net loss highlights execution risk; continued PSU linking to margin/FCF is a positive for capital discipline .
  • Governance quality signals: Robust clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, and double-trigger CoC severance (1.5× salary+target bonus) suggest shareholder-sensitive design; severance terms are standard for CFOs and unlikely to drive perverse incentives .