Andrew LaBenne
LendingClubAbout Andrew LaBenne
Andrew “Drew” LaBenne is Chief Financial Officer of LendingClub (since September 1, 2022) with 25+ years in financial services across Capital One, JPMorgan Chase, Amalgamated Financial, and Bakkt. He holds a BSE in Industrial & Operations Engineering (University of Michigan) and an MBA (University of Virginia – Darden) . In 2024, LendingClub delivered 85% stock appreciation, net income growth of 32% to $51.3M, deposits up from $7.3B to $9.1B, and CET1 of 17.3%—providing favorable backdrop for incentive alignment during his tenure . Company pay-versus-performance shows 2024 GAAP Net Income of $51.3M and PPNR of $243.3M, reinforcing the link between equity-heavy pay and shareholder returns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bakkt Holdings, Inc. | EVP & Chief Financial Officer | 2021–2022 | Led finance, IR, and enterprise risk; supported public listing . |
| Amalgamated Financial Corp. | Chief Financial Officer | 2015–2021 | Transformed business lines; led bank through its IPO (as summarized across disclosures) . |
| JPMorgan Chase & Co. | CFO, Business Banking | 2013–2015 | Managed divisional finance for business banking . |
| Capital One Financial | Multiple rising CFO/finance roles incl. CFO Retail & Commercial Banking | ~1996–2013 | Broad divisional CFO responsibilities; scaled retail/commercial banking finance . |
External Roles
| Organization | Position | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external public company directorships disclosed in LC’s executive bio . |
Fixed Compensation
- 2024 base salary: $425,000; target annual bonus: 85% of salary; bonus paid at 135% of target = $487,688 .
Multi-year compensation (Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 182,396 | 425,000 | 425,000 |
| Bonus ($) | 183,200 (sign-on) | — | 140,625 (vested cash LTI portion) |
| Stock Awards ($) | 3,137,519 | 1,518,284 | 1,765,578 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Comp ($) | 193,796 | 299,838 | 487,688 |
| All Other Comp ($) | — | 5,005 | 5,000 |
| Total ($) | 3,696,911 | 2,248,127 | 2,823,891 |
2024 annual bonus design and outcome:
- Metrics and structure: PPNR (H1/H2) with 50–125% payout per half, plus an all-or-nothing 10% if H2 Total Revenue ≥ target; automatic reduction if any quarter GAAP NI negative .
- Results: H1 PPNR $103.5M (62.5%), H2 PPNR $139.8M (62.5%), H2 Total Revenue $419.0M (10.0%), Net Income modifier not triggered; total program funding 135% .
- Individual NEO bonuses paid at corporate funding (no discretion applied): LaBenne $487,688 .
2024 bonus funding achievement:
| Period/Metric | Target | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| H1 2024 PPNR ($M) | 75.75 | 103.5 | 62.5% |
| H2 2024 PPNR ($M) | 100.00 | 139.8 | 62.5% |
| H2 2024 Total Revenue ($M) | 400.0 | 419.0 | 10.0% |
| Full-Year Funding | — | — | 135% |
Performance Compensation
Long-term incentive architecture (2024 refresh):
- Mix for NEOs: 25% 3-year Cash Award + 75% equity (RSUs 30% / PBRSUs 70% for non-CEO NEOs) .
- RSUs: 3-year vesting, 1/12th quarterly starting May 25, 2024 .
- PBRSUs: 3-year performance; 50% cumulative Adjusted Net Income; 50% relative TSR vs basket; absolute TSR modifier; cap 125% (and TSR portion cap 100% if absolute TSR negative and relative TSR < 75th percentile) .
2024 grants to Andrew LaBenne (grant date March 21, 2024):
| Award Type | Units / $ | Grant Date FV ($) | Vesting / Performance |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 147,289 units | 1,259,321 | 1/12th quarterly over 3 years starting 5/25/2024 |
| PBRSUs (Target) | 58,903 units | 506,257 | 3-year; 50% cum. Adjusted NI; 50% relative TSR with absolute TSR modifier |
| Cash Award | $562,500 | — | 1/12th quarterly over 3 years starting 5/25/2024 |
Program design alignment highlights:
- Shift from options to RSUs/PBRSUs; elimination of option grants; equity dilution management via increased cash LTI (25%) .
- 2021 and 2022 relative TSR PBRSUs paid 0% (reinforces downside alignment) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership (as of April 7, 2025):
- Total: 232,157 shares (includes 171,522 directly held; 10,000 in two UTMA accounts; 50,635 RSUs vesting within 60 days). Ownership <1% of shares outstanding .
- Ownership guidelines: CFO must hold equity equal to 3x base salary; 5 years to comply; prior to meeting requirement, cannot sell >50% of after-tax shares on any vest; company states executives are in compliance or have time to meet the levels .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited; no pledging or margin accounts allowed .
- Holding period: 1-year holding required for shares acquired from vesting of awards granted on/after Jan 1, 2024 (tax withholdings excluded) .
Outstanding equity (12/31/2024):
| Category | Units | Market Value at 12/31/2024 ($16.19) |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs | 110,467 | 1,788,461 |
| Unearned 2024 PBRSU – TSR portion (max) | 36,621 | 592,894 |
| Unearned 2024 PBRSU – Adjusted NI portion (max) | 37,008 | 599,160 |
Vesting and sales context:
- 2024 vested stock: 160,233 shares; realized value $1,893,717 (reflects gross vesting; tax withholding and 1-year hold policy apply) .
- Rule 10b5-1 plan: Adopted March 6, 2025 (expires Nov 28, 2025) for up to 38,858 shares (max 6.3% of his equity including unvested time-based RSUs and target PBRSUs); would be his first sales since joining in 2022 .
Employment Terms
Key ongoing terms and 2022 hire economics:
- Effective CFO date: September 1, 2022 .
- Base salary: $425,000; target corporate bonus 85% of salary; initial new-hire RSU award $3,500,000 (3-year vesting: 1/3 at year 1, then quarterly); sign-on cash bonus $183,200 (2-year clawback if voluntary departure) .
Severance and change-in-control (CIC) framework:
- Without CIC (NEOs excluding CEO): 0.5× salary; pro-rata bonus; 6 months health benefits; no equity acceleration .
- With CIC (NEOs excluding CEO; double-trigger within 12 months): 1× salary; 1× greater of target or most recent actual bonus; 12 months health benefits; full acceleration of all unvested equity and 2024 Cash Award .
- “Qualified Transition” (for 2024 awards): up to 1 additional year of vesting credit post-termination for 2024 equity; PBRSUs pro-rated based on added credit and actual performance .
- Definitions and restrictive covenants: “Cause,” “Good Reason,” and “CIC” detailed; 6-month post-termination non-solicit; payments conditioned on release of claims .
Illustrative potential payments as of 12/31/2024:
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Bonus ($) | Health ($) | Continued Vesting ($) | Acceleration ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified Transition | — | — | — | 1,589,573 | — | 1,589,573 |
| Involuntary Termination (No CIC) | 212,500 | 487,688 | 13,365 | — | — | 713,553 |
| Involuntary Termination (With CIC) | 425,000 | 361,250 | 26,730 | — | 6,646,542 | 7,459,522 |
Related policies:
- Clawbacks: NYSE/SEC restatement clawback plus supplemental misconduct/reputational harm clawback covering cash bonuses, PBRSUs, RSUs, and Cash Awards .
- No tax gross-ups (except limited relocation imputed income); 1-year minimum vesting for new hires; option repricing requires shareholder approval .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Large at-risk and multi-year components (RSUs/PBRSUs/Cash LTI) tie LaBenne’s economics to sustained profitability (Adjusted Net Income) and shareholder returns (relative TSR). 2024 PBRSU redesign (50% operating metric) reduces dependence on macro-driven TSR alone and raises line-of-sight to operating execution .
- Retention and potential selling pressure: Significant unvested equity (RSUs 110,467; PBRSUs 73,629 max across 2024 tranches) plus 1-year post-vest holding promote retention and alignment; March 2025 10b5-1 plan for up to 38,858 shares suggests managed diversification but limited size (~6.3% of equity including unvested awards), and would be first sales since joining .
- Governance risk mitigants: Strict hedging/pledging prohibitions; ownership requirement at 3× salary; robust clawbacks; double-trigger CIC with full acceleration (standard practice, but note potential equity overhang/flow if CIC occurs) .
- Corporate performance backdrop: 2024 strength (85% stock price appreciation; net income growth; deposit expansion) supports incentive payouts and positive estimate momentum for variable pay constructs like PPNR/Revenue bonuses and multi-year ANi/TSR PBRSUs .
- Shareholder sentiment: Say-on-pay support of ~99% (2024) indicates investor acceptance of the program’s design and changes (including cash LTI to curb dilution) .
Appendix: Additional Company Context (performance references)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GAAP Net Income (Loss) ($M) | (187.5) | 18.6 | 289.7 | 38.9 | 51.3 |
| PPNR ($M) | (184.2) | 157.2 | 420.4 | 298.2 | 243.3 |
| 2024 Strategics | — | — | — | — | 85% stock price appreciation; deposits $7.3B→$9.1B; assets $10.6B; CET1 17.3% |
Note: Company performance is presented to contextualize LaBenne’s incentive alignment and program outcomes. It is not an attribution analysis.
Sources and Policies Referenced
- Executive bio, age, role, education ; CFO appointment and hire terms .
- Compensation program, peer group, bonus results, grants, vesting, and payouts .
- Outstanding awards, beneficial ownership and breakdown .
- Ownership guidelines, hedging/pledging, holding period, clawbacks .
- Severance/CIC framework and potential payout amounts .
- Rule 10b5-1 plan details .
- Company 2024 performance highlights and GAAP/PPNR history .