Jamie Schnur
LCI INDUSTRIESAbout Jamie Schnur
Jamie M. Schnur is Group President – Aftermarket at LCI Industries (Lippert), serving as an executive officer since his promotion from Chief Administrative Officer; he was promoted effective October 1, 2019 and is described in later filings as becoming Group President – Aftermarket in May 2020, and has over 28 years with the company, having started in 1996 . Age 53 as of FY2024, Schnur’s background is in technology and operations; he spearheaded Lippert’s early ERP/MRP/EDI/CRM platforms and built teams across technology, engineering, and customer service that supported scale-up from a private to multi‑billion public manufacturer . Company performance during 2024 featured a 123% increase in Net Income and 35% increase in EBITDA, with Aftermarket resiliency including 7% growth in automotive aftermarket sales and continued RV content expansion; Company TSR (value of an initial $100 investment) was $113 in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| LCI Industries (Lippert) | Chief Administrative Officer | 2013–2019 | Led major technology programs (ERP, MRP, EDI, CRM, call center), enabling scale and operational efficiency |
| LCI Industries (Lippert) | Senior technology/operations leadership | 1996–2013 | Implemented advanced engineering and business systems; built cross-functional teams that supported growth |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | None disclosed in company filings | — | — |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $620,000 | $730,000 | $755,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $105,074 | $123,448 | $120,267 |
| Total Cash (Salary + All Other) ($) | $725,074 | $853,448 | $875,267 |
| 2025 Base Salary Decision | Amount |
|---|---|
| Base Salary (Unchanged) | $755,000 |
| 2024 AIP Target Structure for Schnur | Value/Percent |
|---|---|
| Target EBIT Share (% of Adjusted EBIT) | 0.56% |
| Target Incentive ($) | $1,362,000 |
| Maximum Incentive Cap ($) | $9,000,000 (plan cap) |
Notes:
- In 2024, LCI shifted NEO pay mix toward cash (other than CEO), targeting ~50% cash / 50% long‑term equity for non‑CEO NEOs .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Mechanics | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBIT | Primary (qualifies CFO add-on ≥90%) | $244mm | $218mm | Pays % of Target via assigned EBIT share | 89.56% of Target paid |
| Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) | Add-on (only if ≥90% EBIT target achieved) | $357mm | $370.3mm | 3% of CFO over target, allocated by fixed percentages | No payout (EBIT result below 90% threshold) |
| Jamie Schnur – 2024 AIP Outcomes | Amount |
|---|---|
| Cash Payout under EBIT Share ($) | $1,219,842 |
| CFO Add-on Payout ($) | $0 |
| Total AIP Payout ($) | $1,219,842 |
| Actual vs Target (%) | 89.56% |
Design notes:
- Committee lowered 2024 EBIT target vs 2023 (−19.8%) to reflect market softness and increased responsibilities; CFO add-on requires ≥90% of EBIT target .
Long-Term Incentive – PSUs and RSUs
| Instrument | Metric(s) | Weight | Target(s) | Opportunity | Measurement/Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024 grant) | ROIC; Avg FCF as % of Operating Profit | 50% / 50% | ROIC target 18.5%; FCF target 70% | 0–200% of target units based on performance; linear interpolation; threshold 0.40x at ROIC 14.5% & FCF 45% | Measure FY2024–2026; vest Mar 1, 2027 |
| RSUs (2024 grant) | Service/time | — | — | — | Vest 1/3 annually on grant anniversary over 3 years |
| Jamie Schnur – 2024 Equity Grants (March 1, 2024; 15‑day avg price $114.70) | Units | Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| PSUs (Target Number) | 10,515 | $1,270,200 |
| RSUs | 7,010 | $846,800 |
| Total Target Equity Value | — | $2,117,000 |
Historical performance vesting:
- 2022 ROIC PSUs (3‑yr period 2022–2024) forfeited at 0% for not meeting threshold .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 15, 2025) | Shares |
|---|---|
| Jamie M. Schnur – Beneficially Owned | 39,420 (less than 1%) |
| RSUs not issuable within 60 days | 15,094 |
| PSUs not issuable within 60 days | 38,572 |
| Unvested Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024) | Units | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs – 2024 grant (incl. dividends) | 7,282 | $752,886 (at $103.39/share) |
| RSUs – 2023 grant (incl. dividends) | 4,553 | $470,735 |
| RSUs – 2022 grant (incl. dividends) | 1,873 | $193,649 |
| PSUs – 2023 grant (ROIC 2023–2025) | 15,707 | $1,623,947 |
| PSUs – 2024 grant (ROIC & FCF 2024–2026) | 10,924 | $1,129,432 |
Ownership policies:
- Stock ownership guidelines: 4× base salary for non‑CEO NEOs; compliance required within 3 years; all NEOs compliant or within period as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- Hedging prohibited for directors, officers, and employees; no disclosure of pledging practice in filings reviewed .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Schnur Terms |
|---|---|
| Agreement Term | Initial 3 years; auto 1‑year renewals |
| Severance – Without Cause / Good Reason | 2× base salary; 2× average bonus (avg capped at current base); current AIP amounts; accelerated vesting of time‑based equity; 12 months COBRA; ≥6 months outplacement; weekly payroll over 24 months |
| Non‑Compete / Non‑Solicit | 24 months post‑termination; confidentiality covenants |
| Change‑in‑Control Equity Treatment | Double trigger required for acceleration; specific RSU/PSU treatment depends on assumption/continuation by acquirer and timing vs performance period |
| Clawback | NYSE‑compliant recovery of incentive‑based comp for restatements over prior 3 fiscal years; recovery via reasonable lawful methods |
| Excise Tax Gross‑Ups | None |
Potential payments (hypothetical as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Scenario | Total ($) | Key Components |
|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination – Without Cause / Good Reason | $7,191,793 | Base $1,510,000; Annual bonus $1,510,000; Current AIP $1,219,842; Benefits $75,572; Equity accel $2,876,379 |
| Disability | $4,780,345 | Base $755,000; Current AIP $1,219,842; Benefits $20,280; Equity accel $2,785,223 |
| Death | $4,760,065 | Base $755,000; Current AIP $1,219,842; Equity accel $2,785,223 |
| CIC (Awards not assumed or term within 24 months) | $2,785,223 | Equity acceleration |
Deferred compensation:
- Aggregate balance $4,824,879; 2024 aggregate loss $(585,449); cumulative contributions $2,919,950; cumulative earnings $2,188,263; cumulative withdrawals $283,334 .
Multi‑Year Compensation (NEO Disclosure)
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $620,000 | $730,000 | $755,000 |
| Stock Awards (Grant‑date fair value) | $1,838,252 | $2,392,737 | $2,218,840 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (AIP) | $1,193,500 | $0 | $1,219,842 |
| All Other Compensation | $105,074 | $123,448 | $120,267 |
| Total | $3,756,826 | $3,246,185 | $4,313,949 |
Compensation Structure & Governance Signals
- Pay mix shifted in 2024 to increase cash component for non‑CEO NEOs (to ~50% cash / 50% equity), aligning with broader market practice while remaining equity‑heavy vs local RV peers .
- 2024 AIP added CFO add‑on metric but required ≥90% EBIT threshold; despite CFO > target, add‑on paid $0 due to EBIT under threshold, evidencing guardrails against windfall payouts .
- No stock options outstanding for NEOs; equity is RSUs/PSUs with three‑year horizons, reducing option‑exercise selling pressure but creating recurring RSU vesting flow .
- Independent consultant (Willis Towers Watson) engaged; committee concluded compensation practices do not create material adverse risk; robust clawback and ownership guidelines in place .
Peer benchmarking and shareholder input:
- 2024 Executive Compensation Peer Group includes AO Smith, American Axle, Brunswick, Carlisle, Dana, Donaldson, Graco, Hubbell, ITT, Lincoln Electric, Modine, Patrick Industries, Terex, Thor, Visteon, Watts Water, Winnebago; used to calibrate competitiveness given Elkhart talent market dynamics .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval 83% .
Performance & Track Record (Aftermarket)
- Aftermarket Q4 2024: net sales $181.6mm (+1% YoY), operating profit $14.3mm (7.9% margin); full‑year automotive aftermarket sales +7%, offsetting RV/marine softness; management commentary highlights growing RV content driving replacement/repair demand and premium market expansion .
- Company highlights: 2024 Net Income +123%, EBITDA +35%, driven by cost savings, operational improvements, and product innovation (Touring Coil Suspension, anti-lock braking, Chill Cube AC, new window series) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details
| Policy | Requirement | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guideline (NEO) | 4× base salary | Compliant or within 3‑year window as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging | Prohibited for directors/officers/employees | Policy in place |
| Pledging | Not disclosed | — |
Employment Terms – Additional Provisions
- Awards governed by 2018 Omnibus Incentive Plan; accelerated vesting rules differ for RSUs vs PSUs based on death/disability, retirement/term w/o cause or for good reason, and change‑in‑control assumption status .
- Insider trading policy governs transactions; filings indicated all Section 16(a) reports were timely for 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong pay‑for‑performance design (PSU ROIC/FCF, AIP EBIT/CFO) with clawback and double‑trigger CIC vesting lowers governance risk and aligns incentives with profitability, returns, and cash generation .
- Retention risk: Executive Employment Agreement with 24‑month non‑compete and meaningful severance reduces near‑term flight risk; 3‑year equity cycles and sizable unvested RSU/PSU balances further anchor retention .
- Selling pressure: Absence of options limits forced exercises; RSU tranches vest annually and PSUs cliff‑vest post‑performance periods, creating periodic settlement supply but contingent on performance for PSUs .
- Performance levers: Aftermarket leadership under Schnur continues to offset OEM cyclicality via automotive aftermarket growth and rising RV content; watch PSU metrics through 2026 (ROIC 18.5% target; FCF/OP 70% target) as indicators of future equity vesting and compensation outcomes .
- Governance: 2024 say‑on‑pay (83%) and independent consultant engagement support continuity; one watchpoint is the committee’s willingness to lower EBIT targets in soft markets—a pragmatic step, but monitor for ongoing calibration to ensure rigor .