Daniel Siegel
About Daniel Siegel
Daniel Siegel, age 55, is President of Lifetime Brands and has served in various roles since joining the company in 1992; he has been President since 2013 after prior roles spanning Sales and Corporate Invention Strategies . Education is not disclosed in company filings. Company performance during his recent tenure includes 2024 net sales of $683.0M, Adjusted EBITDA of $55.4M, and a net loss of $(15.2)M . Pay-versus-performance disclosure indicates the year-end value of $100 invested on December 31, 2021 equaled $40 at year-end 2024 (vs. $44 in 2023 and $48 in 2022), signaling TSR pressure over the period .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lifetime Brands | Executive Vice President of Sales | 2006–2008 | Led sales organization |
| Lifetime Brands | Executive Vice President, Corporate Invention Strategies | 2008–2010 | Drove product innovation strategy |
| Lifetime Brands | Executive Vice President | 2010–2013 | Executive leadership across functions |
| Lifetime Brands | President | 2013–Present | Overall commercial leadership |
External Roles
Not disclosed in company filings.
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | 2023 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $725,000 | $725,000 | Set by employment agreement, auto-renewing annually |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 112.5% | 112.5% | “D. Siegel Target Bonus” defined as 112.5% of base salary |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid | $725,500 | $598,317 | Mix of Adjusted EBITDA and individual goals |
| Perquisites | $18,000 (auto allowance) | $18,000 (auto allowance) | $1,500/month vehicle allowance |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Structure and 2024 Outcomes
| Component | Weighting of Target | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 67% | $48.972M | $58.300M | $67.628M (D. Siegel) | $55.371M | 83% of Adjusted EBITDA Target Bonus |
| Individual Goals | 33% | ≥50% achievement to earn ≥50% | 100% achievement to earn 100% | N/A | 100% achieved | 100% of Individual Goal Target Bonus |
Resulting 2024 annual bonus for Daniel Siegel: $725,500 (Adjusted EBITDA component $453,625; Individual Goals component $271,875), or ~89% of total target .
Equity Awards (Structure and 2024 Grants)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target Shares | Vesting | Performance Metric | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restricted Stock (RS) | Mar 8, 2024 | 20,000 | Time-based; 25% per year over 4 years starting 1st anniversary | Retention | $195,200 |
| Performance Shares (PSU) | Mar 8, 2024 | 20,000 (Threshold 15,000; Max 30,000) | Earned at end of 3-year period (2024–2026) | Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA | $195,200 |
Performance share rigor: The 2022 PSU cycle (covering 2022–2024) paid 0% due to falling below threshold (actual cumulative Adjusted EBITDA $170.9M vs. $242.8M threshold) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail | Shares | % of Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership (Daniel Siegel) | 432,227 | 1.9% |
| Direct Ownership | 413,693 | — |
| Spouse Ownership | 8,400 | — |
| UTMA Custodian for children | 10,134 | — |
Stock Ownership Guidelines: Executives must hold stock equal to 1x base salary within 5 years; the company states all executives have satisfied or are on track to satisfy the guidelines . Anti-hedging policy prohibits hedging by executives . Pledging of shares is not disclosed. Options: none reported for Daniel Siegel; equity holdings are RS and PSUs .
Unvested and Unearned Equity at 12/31/2024
| Grant Cohort | Instrument | Unvested/Unearned Shares |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 9, 2021 | RS | 3,750 |
| Mar 8, 2022 | RS | 8,250 |
| Mar 8, 2023 | RS | 13,125 |
| Mar 8, 2024 | RS | 20,000 |
| Mar 8, 2022 | PSUs | 16,500 (target; earned 0%) |
| Mar 8, 2023 | PSUs | 17,500 (target) |
| Mar 8, 2024 | PSUs | 20,000 (target) |
Vesting schedule for RS grants is 25% annually starting one year from grant date (e.g., 2024 grant: 5,000 shares vest on Mar 8, 2025/2026/2027/2028) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Provision |
|---|---|
| Agreement | Employment agreement dated Nov 8, 2017; effective Jan 1, 2018; amended Jan 1, 2019; Jan 1, 2021; Jan 1, 2023; Nov 2023 |
| Base Salary | $725,000 |
| Target Bonus | 112.5% of base salary (“D. Siegel Target Bonus”) |
| Perquisites | $1,500/month vehicle allowance |
| Term | Through Dec 31, 2020 with auto-renewal for 1-year periods unless non-renewal notice |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/Nasdaq-compliant policy effective Oct 2, 2023 |
| Anti-hedging | Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy |
Severance and Change-of-Control (CoC) Economics
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Bonus Severance | Equity Treatment | Health Benefits | Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause or Resignation for Good Reason (non-CoC) | 2.0x base salary | 2.0x Target Bonus (112.5% of salary) + pro-rated performance bonus | Immediate vesting of options; RS restrictions terminate (subject to LTIP) | 12 months | Salary paid over 24 months; bonus in 60 days |
| Non-renewal (non-CoC) | 1.0x base salary | Annual Adjusted EBITDA bonus for year of termination | Immediate vesting/acceleration similar to above | 12 months | Over 12 months |
| CoC + Termination without Cause or Good Reason within 2 years (double-trigger) | 2.0x base salary (greater of CoC date vs termination date salary) | 2.0x Target Bonus (greater of CoC date vs termination date salary) + pro-rated performance bonus | Immediate vesting of options; RS restrictions terminate; PSUs vest at target for open periods within 24 months post-CoC | 12 months | Lump sum within 60 days |
Illustrative CoC termination value (12/31/2024 assumptions): Total $4.441M for Daniel Siegel inclusive of cash severance, awarded but unpaid bonus, equity, benefits, salary/vacation accruals .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Annual bonus is heavily tied to Adjusted EBITDA (67% weighting) plus individualized operational goals (33%), with capped payouts (150% max for Siegel) and sliding-scale mechanics, aligning cash pay to controllable financial outcomes .
- Long-term equity split 50/50 between time-based RS and 3-year PSUs tied to cumulative Adjusted EBITDA, with PSUs demonstrating rigor as the 2022 cycle earned 0% .
- No options currently granted to executive officers, reducing repricing risk; equity grants are RS/PSU forms .
- Ownership guidelines (1x salary) and anti-hedging policy support alignment and limit speculative behavior; compliance noted as satisfied or on-track for executives .
Say-on-Pay & Governance Inputs
- Say-on-Pay: ~90% approval at 2024 Annual Meeting, supporting compensation approach .
- Compensation Committee: Independent directors (Nanninga—Chair, Jarosh, Pollack) overseeing pay, clawback, risk management; six meetings in 2024 .
- Compensation Consultant: Pearl Meyer engaged; peer group includes Helen of Troy, YETI, iRobot, Hamilton Beach, Johnson Outdoors, Movado, Lands’ End, and others; independence assessed with no conflicts .
- Related Party Context: Daniel Siegel is the son of the Chairman (Jeffrey Siegel); other relatives employed, though no Item 404 transactions beyond employment relationships were disclosed .
- Section 16 Compliance: One late Form 4 filing for Daniel Siegel (transaction on Oct 4, 2024 reported Nov 15, 2024) .
LCUT Performance Context During Siegel’s Tenure
| Metric | FY 2013 | FY 2014 | FY 2015 | FY 2016 | FY 2017 | FY 2018 | FY 2019 | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 502,721,000 | 586,010,000 | 587,670,000 | 592,619,000 | 579,476,000 | 704,542,000 | 734,902,000 | 769,169,000 | 862,924,000 | 727,662,000 | 686,683,000 | 682,952,000* |
| EBITDA ($) | 38,968,000* | 34,890,000* | 39,521,000* | 43,645,000* | 31,093,000* | 44,663,000* | 54,645,000* | 69,945,000* | 88,122,000 | 50,359,000* | 53,621,000* | 51,451,000* |
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance linkage is robust: bonus weighting to Adjusted EBITDA and 3-year PSUs tied to cumulative Adjusted EBITDA. The zero payout on the 2022 PSU cycle indicates high performance thresholds and reduces windfall risk .
- Retention risk appears managed via sizable unvested RS tranches (45,125 shares) and ongoing PSU cycles (54,000 target shares), plus double-trigger CoC protections and standard severance economics (2x base + 2x target bonus) .
- Insider selling pressure: hard data on recent Form 4 transactions could not be independently retrieved here; however, anti-hedging and stock ownership guidelines suggest disciplined holding behavior, while scheduled RS vesting (e.g., 5,000 shares/year from 2024 grant) may create periodic liquidity events, subject to company policies .
- Governance flags: familial relationships (Chairman is father) warrant monitoring, though no related-party transactions beyond disclosed employment relationships were reported; say-on-pay support (~90%) and independent comp oversight mitigate concerns .
- Execution risk: Company-level TSR under pressure in recent years and 2024 net loss despite stable net sales and Adjusted EBITDA; continued focus on EBITDA improvement is essential for PSU realization and broader investor alignment .