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Christopher R. Cage

Chief Financial Officer at Leidos HoldingsLeidos Holdings
Executive

About Christopher R. Cage

Christopher R. Cage is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Leidos, appointed effective July 5, 2021; he previously served as SVP/Chief Accounting Officer, SVP Operations Finance, and divisional CFO (Health & Engineering) after joining Leidos in 1999. He holds a B.S. in accounting and an MBA from San Diego State University, is a CPA (inactive) in California, and is a graduate of Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program; he was 49 at appointment as CFO in 2021 . Under his leadership, Leidos emphasized investor outreach and capital deployment (dividend +$0.02/share, $850M share repurchases, $150M capex), reduced leverage and achieved an S&P ratings upgrade to BBB, with peer-group-leading TSR of 43% in 2024; company results used in pay-versus-performance show FY2024 revenue of $16,662M and net income of $1,251M .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
LeidosSVP, Chief Accounting Officer & Corporate Controller2019–2021Led accounting, reporting, treasury; prepared transition to CFO
LeidosSVP, Operations FinancePriorSupported business operations, M&A, accounting, treasury, IR across segments
LeidosSVP/CFO, Health & Engineering divisionPriorSegment finance leadership and portfolio support
LeidosDirector, FP&APriorCorporate planning and analysis foundation

External Roles

No external directorships or committee roles disclosed for Cage in the latest proxy. Skip if not disclosed.

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)590,385 697,500 807,003
Bonus ($)5,000
All Other Compensation ($)30,250 35,127 43,562

Salary setting and 2024 adjustments:

  • 2024 annual base salary set at $785,000 (effective March), +3% vs 2023’s $760,000, aligned toward peer median per FW Cook analysis .
Base Salary Progression2023 Salary ($)2024 Salary ($)% Increase$ Increase
Cage760,000 785,000 3% 25,000

Performance Compensation

Short-term (Annual Cash Incentive) – Program Design:

  • Metrics and weights: Adjusted EBITDA Margin % (40%), Operating Cash Flow (30%), Revenue (30); payout subject to a +/-20% “Modifier” based on personal goals and leadership behaviors .
  • FY2024 actual payout for Cage: $1,465,595 .
Annual Cash IncentiveThreshold ($)Target ($)Maximum ($)Metric WeightsFY2024 Actual ($)
FY2025 opportunity (set Feb 6, 2025)392,500 785,000 1,570,000 EBITDA Margin 40%; OCF 30%; Revenue 30; +/-20% Modifier 1,465,595 (FY2024)

Long-term incentives (LTI) – Structure and Metrics (2024 program):

  • Mix: PSUs 50% (3-year performance), PRSUs 30% (3-year ratable vesting with first-year EPS hurdle), Stock Options 20% (3-year ratable vesting, 7-year term) .
  • LTI performance metrics (2024 grants): Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA ($) 50%, Relative TSR 50% .
  • PRSU performance hurdle met for 2024 (Adjusted EPS ≥ $3.81), enabling vesting schedule .
2024 LTI Structure (Cage)Metric/FeatureDetail
PSUs (50% of LTI)3-year performanceRelative TSR 50%; Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA ($) 50%
PRSUs (30% of LTI)EPS hurdle and vesting2024 adjusted EPS hurdle $3.81 achieved; vests ratably over 3 years
Stock Options (20% of LTI)Vesting/termRatable 3-year vest; 7-year option term

Grants of plan-based/equity awards (FY2024 awards):

AwardGrant DateUnits/OptionsStrike Price ($)Grant Date Fair Value ($)
Options3/8/202411,250 129.79 392,513
PRSU3/8/20244,537 target units 588,857
PSU3/8/20247,561 target shares (15,122 max) 1,192,191

Performance shares vesting outcome (prior cycle):

  • 2022–2024 PSU payout score approved at 121.36% based on rTSR and revenue performance (company TSR 70.7% vs peer median 30.5%; adjusted revenue $46.2B over period) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership (as of Feb 28, 2025):

HolderCommon StockStock Units (Deferred)Option Shares & RSUs (vestable within 60 days)Total Beneficially Owned
Christopher R. Cage24,999 24,433 16,236 65,668
Shares Outstanding128,213,171
Pledging StatusNo shares pledged

Stock ownership guidelines and compliance:

  • Requirement: CEO 6x salary; Other NEOs (incl. CFO) 5x salary; counts as ownership include shares owned outright, deferred shares, 401(k) equivalents, and unvested PRSUs once performance hurdle met; unvested PSUs and unexercised options do not count. No executive exceptions granted in 2024 .
  • Hedging/pledging/margin: Executives are prohibited from hedging, short sales, derivatives, holding stock in margin accounts, or pledging as collateral; preclearance required for all transactions .

Outstanding equity awards (selected positions at FY2024 year-end):

AwardGrant DateExercisable (#)Unexercisable (#)Exercise Price ($)Expiration
Stock Options3/8/202411,250 129.79 3/7/2031
Stock Options3/3/20234,377 8,495 96.95 3/2/2030
Equity Award TypeGrant DateNot Vested (#)Market/Payout Value ($)Notes
RSU8/4/202310,163 1,495,485 Time-based
PRSU3/8/20244,537 (target) 667,620 3-year ratable vest post EPS hurdle
PSU3/8/20247,561 (target) 1,112,601 3-year performance (rTSR, Cum Adj EBITDA $)
PRSU3/3/20233,498 514,731 Ratable vest
PRSU3/4/20221,928 283,705 Ratable vest
PSU3/3/20238,832 (target) 1,299,629 Performance vest

Vesting schedules (disclosed cadence):

  • Options & PRSUs: 34% on first anniversary, 33% on second and third anniversaries of grant date (e.g., 3/8/2025, 3/8/2026, 3/8/2027 for 2024 grants) .
  • PSUs: Three-year performance period ending FY2026 for 2024 grants; payout based on rTSR and cumulative adjusted EBITDA ($) .

Insider exercises/vesting (FY2024):

NameOptions Exercised (#)Value on Exercise ($)Shares Vested (#)Value on Vesting ($)
Christopher R. Cage2,774 188,521 8,753 1,083,745

Employment Terms

Executive Severance Plan (effective July 27, 2023) – applicable to Cage:

  • Without Cause (no CIC): Lump sum = 1.0x base salary + pro-rata bonus (actual performance), 12 months COBRA premiums, 12 months outplacement; 12-month non-compete and non-solicit required .
  • CIC (double trigger, within 3 months before to 24 months after): Lump sum = 1.5x (salary + target bonus), pro-rata bonus at target, 18 months COBRA, continued financial planning for year of termination, 12 months outplacement; 18-month non-compete/non-solicit required; equity awards subject to plan terms with accelerated/pro-rata vesting per scenario .

Change-in-control and termination economics (Cage, as of Jan 3, 2025):

ScenarioSeverance + Pro-rata Bonus ($)RSUs ($)Options ($)PSUs ($)Benefits & Perqs ($)Total ($)
Involuntary Termination/Good Reason (no CIC)2,250,595 1,549,548 411,007 3,289,489 38,096 7,538,735
Change in Control3,140,000 3,138,403 1,006,238 5,447,156 50,894 12,782,691
Death1,465,595 3,138,403 1,006,238 3,622,515 9,232,751
Disability1,465,595 3,138,403 1,006,238 3,289,489 8,899,725

Equity award treatment:

  • Death/disability: RSUs and options vest immediately; PSUs pay target (death) or pro-rata based on actual performance at period end (disability) .
  • Retirement and involuntary termination (no cause): Pro-rata vesting for RSUs/options held ≥6 months; PSUs pro-rata based on actual performance at period end .

Clawbacks and governance:

  • Robust compensation recoupment policy for material restatements and misconduct; additional clawback provisions adopted per Exchange Act §10D/NYSE §303A.14 effective October 26, 2023 .
  • No “golden parachutes,” no single-trigger CIC benefits, no excise tax gross-ups; no option repricing without shareholder approval .

Multi-Year Compensation Summary (Cage)

Component ($)202220232024
Salary590,385 697,500 807,003
Bonus5,000
Stock Awards1,158,458 2,454,747 1,781,048
Option Awards270,023 342,524 392,513
Non-Equity Incentive (Cash)610,320 1,012,472 1,465,595
All Other Compensation30,250 35,127 43,562
Total2,659,436 4,542,370 4,494,721

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Increased fixed pay modestly (salary +3% to align with market median) while maintaining at-risk mix dominated by equity and performance-based cash; LTI split PSUs/PRSUs/options at 50%/30%/20% .
  • Strategic metric shift in 2024 from revenue to cumulative adjusted EBITDA ($) in PSUs to reinforce long-duration quality-of-contract focus; rTSR retained at 50% weighting .
  • 2022–2024 PSU payout at 121.36% demonstrates robust multi-year performance alignment with shareholder outcomes .
  • Strong shareholder support: Say-on-Pay approval ~96% (2024 and 3-year average) .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Hedging/pledging prohibited; no shares pledged by Cage (reduces misalignment risk) .
  • Double-trigger CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; no option repricing without shareholder approval (shareholder-friendly) .
  • Comprehensive clawbacks including misconduct-related recovery beyond restatements .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Credentials: CPA (inactive), MBA (San Diego State), HBS AMP; deep internal experience across accounting, FP&A, operations finance, segment CFO .
  • CFO tenure since July 2021; extensive investor engagement and capital allocation initiatives highlighted in 2024 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment – Guidelines

GuidelineRequirementWhat CountsWhat Doesn’t
NEO Ownership5x annual salary Shares owned; deferred shares; 401(k) equivalents; unvested PRSUs post-hurdle Unvested PSUs; unexercised options
Exceptions (2024)None granted

Employment Covenants

  • Non-compete and non-solicit: 12 months post termination (no CIC); 18 months post CIC; confidentiality and non-disparagement obligations apply to severance eligibility .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: STIP tied to EBITDA margin/OCF/revenue with modifier; LTI tied to rTSR and multi-year adjusted EBITDA ($); prior PSU cycle paid above target (121.36%), supporting execution credibility .
  • Retention risk appears moderate: Material unvested PRSUs/PSUs/options with multi-year vesting cadence and double-trigger CIC protections create ongoing holding incentives; hedging/pledging bans reduce near-term selling pressure; however 2024 option exercises and vesting show normal liquidity needs .
  • Ownership alignment is adequate but not concentrated: 65,668 total beneficial shares and no pledging; guideline at 5x salary plus required post-tax hold on equity until compliance supports alignment, though personal stake is well below 1% of outstanding shares (company-wide statement) .
  • Governance lowers headline risk: Robust clawbacks, no golden parachutes/single-trigger, no gross-ups, high say-on-pay support (~96%) and independent comp consultant oversight suggest limited compensation-related controversy risk .