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J. Tyson Hagale

Executive Vice President, President — Bedding Products at LEGGETT & PLATTLEGGETT & PLATT
Executive

About J. Tyson Hagale

J. Tyson Hagale is Executive Vice President, President—Bedding Products at Leggett & Platt (appointed 2023), age 47, with over two decades at the company across corporate development, commercial leadership, and segment P&L roles since joining in 2001 . 2024 Bedding performance under his remit showed FCF outperformance versus target (actual $160.0M vs $140.9M target; 154.4% payout) but EBITDA under target (actual $136.0M vs $176.8M; 0% payout), leading to a 55% weighted KOIP payout and $255,200 bonus . Company PSU outcomes tied to 2022–2024 TSR and EBIT CAGR were below threshold (TSR -69.2% at 2nd percentile; EBIT CAGR -22.3%), evidencing stringent long-term metrics and zero PSU vesting for that cycle .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Leggett & PlattEVP, President—Bedding Products2023–present Segment P&L for Bedding (targets and payouts under KOIP)
Leggett & PlattSVP, President—Bedding Products2021–2023 Led Bedding operations through market softness and restructuring
Leggett & PlattCommercial VP—Domestic Bedding2020 Drove commercial execution in bedding segment
Leggett & PlattPresident—Home Furniture Group2020 Managed Home Furniture business unit
Leggett & PlattPresident—Furniture Hardware Division2018–2020 Led hardware division operations
Leggett & PlattDirector—Market Plan Development2015–2018 Corporate strategy and market planning
Leggett & PlattBusiness Development Director2011–2015 M&A and growth initiatives
Leggett & PlattCorporate Development (various roles)2001–2011 Corporate development, finance, and strategy

External Roles

No external directorships or outside roles were disclosed for Hagale .

Fixed Compensation

Component202220232024
Base Salary ($)$510,577 $551,923 $575,385
KOIP Target (% of Salary)80% 80% 80%
Actual Bonus Paid ($)$267,120 $120,064 $255,200

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (KOIP) – 2024 Details (Profit Center Participant: Bedding)

MetricWeightTargetActualPayout %Notes
EBITDA (Bedding)65% $176.8M $136.0M 0.0% Below threshold
Free Cash Flow (Bedding)35% $140.9M $160.0M 154.4% Exceeded target
Compliance Adjustment+1% Safety/compliance factor
Weighted Payout55.0% Leads to $255,200 bonus

Long-Term Incentives

AwardGrant DateShares/UnitsTermsGrant-Date Fair Value ($)
RSU2/26/2024 22,873 Vests 1/3 on 2/26/25, 2/26/26, 2/26/27 $385,435
PSU (2024–2026)2/26/2024 34,309 target; 20,585 threshold; 68,618 max 50% EBITDA; 50% ROIC; TSR multiplier 0.75–1.25; payout by 3/15/2027 $524,928
PSU (2022–2024)Prior cycleBased on EBIT CAGR and relative TSR; Company achieved below threshold; 0% vesting
PSU 2024–2026 Performance SchedulesThresholdTargetMaximum
EBITDA (cumulative, $M) 1,320.0 → 70%1,485.0 → 100%1,650.0 → 200%
ROIC (%) 7.9 → 50%9.3 → 100%10.7 → 200%
Relative TSR (%ile) 25th → 0.75x50th → 1.00x75th → 1.25x

Notable vesting event: 2024 RSUs vested 8,284 shares with $165,957 value realized; no options exercised; no PSUs vested in 2024 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemValue
Common Stock Owned33,656 shares
Stock Units (ESU/Deferred/RSUs)100,412 units
Options Exercisable (60 days)None
Total Beneficial Ownership134,068 units
Ownership % of Outstanding0.1% (of 134,952,808 shares)
Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024)34,598 units; $332,141 market value
PSU Unearned (12/31/2024)44,087 units; $423,235 market/payout value at target disclosure basis
Stock Ownership GuidelinesEVP requirement: 3× base salary; all NEOs in compliance as of 3/5/2025
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for executives (no hedging; no pledging)
Dividends on Unvested AwardsCredited but not paid until vesting; none on options/SARs
Deferred Compensation Participation2024 deferrals: $79,859 ESU; $57,539 DSU; 2024 ESU/DSU earnings -$308,644; aggregate balance $789,496 at 12/31/2024

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerms
Employment AgreementAt-will; no employment contracts
KOIP ClawbackRecoupment for restatement, misconduct; 2-year repayment window; restrictive covenants: 2-year non-compete/non-solicit post-award payment
PSU Clawback & CovenantsRecovery for restatements/misconduct; non-compete/non-solicit for 1 year post-payout
Change-in-Control (CIC) EquityDouble-trigger vesting; time-based awards vest; performance awards deemed earned at max (unless acquirer terminates awards, then immediate vesting)
CIC Severance CashDouble-trigger; 200% of base salary + target annual incentive paid over 24 months; pro-rata KOIP bonus; continuation of benefits for 24 months; additional retirement credit; no 280G gross-up
Hagale’s Estimated CIC Payments (as of 12/31/2024)Severance: $2,088,000; PSU vesting: $565,251; RSU vesting: $332,141; Retirement benefits: $227,218; Health/Life benefits: $57,866; Total: $3,270,476

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and rigor: Hagale’s package balances cash and equity with high at-risk pay; EBITDA/FCF KOIP and multi-factor PSUs (EBITDA/ROIC with TSR modifier) emphasize profitability and capital efficiency .
  • Target calibration: 2024 KOIP segment targets (Bedding EBITDA/FCF) were set below 2023 actuals amid macro softness and restructuring; PSUs 2024–2026 targets reduced versus prior 3-year performance, but still above cost of capital for ROIC; TSR cap limits upside in negative absolute TSR periods .
  • Equity program safeguards: No option repricing/cash buyouts; minimum one-year vesting for ≥95% shares; independent HRC administration; clawbacks across KOIP and equity .

Say-on-Pay & Peer Benchmarking

  • Say-on-Pay support: 94% approval in 2024; >90% historically since 2011 .
  • Peer group: HRC references a 16-company manufacturing peer set and broad surveys; pay levels aligned near market median; focus on at-risk equity .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and risk: Strong alignment via ownership guidelines, hedging/pledging ban, and multi-year equity with hard EBITDA/ROIC hurdles; PSU negative TSR cap curbs windfalls in down markets .
  • Near-term selling pressure: RSUs vest annually (next tranches around 2/26/2026, 2/26/2027), a potential source of supply; PSUs vest only on performance and carry stricter clawbacks and non-competes .
  • Execution signals: 2024 Bedding FCF outperformance paired with EBITDA under-delivery yielded a moderate KOIP payout; stringent long-term outcomes (0% 2022–2024 PSU vesting) reflect accountability and may temper future equity realizations absent margin recovery .
  • CIC economics: Double-trigger 2× cash severance plus accelerated equity create retention but also a defined cost profile in event-driven scenarios; no tax gross-ups mitigate shareholder concerns .