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Jason McDonell

Chief Executive Officer at Leslie'sLeslie's
CEO
Executive
Board

About Jason McDonell

Jason McDonell, age 51, was appointed Chief Executive Officer and Director of Leslie’s effective September 9, 2024, bringing nearly 30 years of retail and consumer products experience, including senior roles at Advance Auto Parts, PepsiCo, and Procter & Gamble; he holds a BBA from Wilfrid Laurier University and completed executive leadership programs at Harvard Business School . Company performance context during his onboarding: FY2024 Adjusted EBITDA was $108.7M versus a $180.0M target (no annual bonuses paid), and FY2024 net income was a loss of $23.4M; the Pay vs. Performance table shows the company’s IPO-to-FY2024 TSR value per $100 invested at $13.18 versus peer group $71.20 . The company’s PSU programs are tied to cumulative Adjusted Net Income and revenue, with 2023–2024 actuals missing thresholds materially (Adjusted Net Income $50.0M; Revenue $2,781.3M), resulting in forfeiture of certain PSU tranches .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Advance Auto PartsEVP, Merchandising, Marketing & e-CommerceMar 2021–Dec 2023Drove omnichannel growth across $11B portfolio; managed 200+ suppliers and $4B inventory; led global teams
Advance Auto PartsEVP & Chief Marketing OfficerJul 2019–Feb 2021Re-launched DieHard brand; advanced omnichannel capabilities (Advance Same Day)
PepsiCo Foods CanadaPresident & GM2015–2019Full P&L responsibility for $2.5B division (Frito-Lay and Quaker) across U.S. and Canada operations
Procter & GambleBrand Management (early career)Not disclosedFoundational brand management experience

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsCommittees
None disclosed (public company boards)Director nominees summary indicates 0 other public boards for McDonell

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2024FY 2025
Base Salary ($)$850,000 (per appointment terms) $850,000 (no change disclosed)
Target Bonus (% of Salary)Not eligible FY2024 100%
Sign-on Bonus ($)$350,000 (paid on first payroll after start; 12-month repayment if resign/for-cause)
Relocation Benefit (cap) ($)Up to $30,000

Performance Compensation

Incentive TypeMetricWeightingTarget/StructureActual/PayoutVesting
Annual Cash Bonus (FY2024 program design; CEO not eligible FY2024)Adjusted EBITDA100%Threshold $160.0M → 25%; Target $180.0M → 100%; Max $200.0M → 200% Actual $108.7M → 0% payout (no bonuses earned) Annual plan (not applicable to McDonell in FY2024)
Annual Cash Bonus (FY2025)Adjusted EBITDA (program metric)Not disclosedCEO bonus target set at 100% of salary Not yet disclosedAnnual plan
Long-term Equity – RSUs (Sep 2024 grant)Time-basedGrant date fair value $1,150,000; 396,552 RSUs N/AVests 25% annually over 4 years
Long-term Equity – PSUs (Dec 2024 grant)Adjusted Net Income (cumulative)75%2-year performance period covering FY2024–FY2025; 0–200% of target; payouts 50% in Q1 FY2026 and 50% in Q1 FY2027 Tracking below target across NEOs (program context) 50% payout in Q1 FY2026; 50% in Q1 FY2027 if earned; continued employment required
Long-term Equity – PSUs (Revenue component)Revenue (cumulative)25%Same as above Same as above Same as above

RSU Vesting Schedule (McDonell Sep 9, 2024 grant)

Vest DateShares Vesting
Sep 9, 202592,388
Sep 9, 202692,388
Sep 9, 202792,388
Sep 9, 202892,388

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemValue
Beneficial Ownership (Dec 31, 2024)0 shares; “—” indicated in table (under 60-day vesting test)
Shares Outstanding (Dec 31, 2024)185,208,018
Ownership %0.0% (based on table presentation)
Unvested RSUs (FY2024 YE)396,552; market value $1,134,139 (at $2.86/share on Sep 27, 2024)
Options – Exercisable/UnexercisableNone disclosed for McDonell
PSUs – UnvestedDecember 2024 grant (count not disclosed in outstanding awards table)
Stock Ownership GuidelinesCEO: 6x base salary; 50% net share retention until guideline met
Compliance StatusAll NEOs serving on record date complied by holdings or retention ratio
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for executive officers and directors; no margin accounts or pledging allowed

Employment Terms

TermDetails
Appointment Effective DateSeptember 9, 2024
Severance Plan ParticipationExecutive Severance Plan; individualized enhancement for CEO
Cash Severance – Involuntary Termination (No Cause)18 months of monthly payments equal to 1/12 of (annual base pay + annual target bonus); for McDonell, $2,125,000 cash severance illustrative at FY2024 YE
COBRA Reimbursement$39,246 (illustrative at FY2024 YE)
Change of Control TreatmentUpon qualifying termination following CoC: cash severance as above, plus accelerated RSUs ($1,134,139), PSUs not accelerated; total $3,298,385 (valued at $2.86/share)
Non-Compete/Restrictive CovenantsBound by covenants in Section 5 of the Severance Plan; agreement signed Aug 20, 2024
Related Party TransactionsNone for McDonell (Item 404(a) disclosure)
Clawback PoliciesNasdaq-compliant clawback; Plan includes restatement-related clawback covering time- and performance-based awards for 3 prior fiscal years
Pension/Deferred CompNo defined benefit pension or non-qualified deferred compensation plans

Board Governance

  • Board Service: Joined Leslie’s Board concurrently with CEO appointment on September 9, 2024 .
  • Committees: None; director nominees summary shows 0 committee memberships for McDonell (typical for management directors) .
  • Independence: As CEO, not an independent director; committee roles reserved for non-employee directors per governance charters .
  • Director Compensation Program (non-employee directors): Annual cash retainers—Chair $150,000; Board Member $75,000; Lead Independent $25,000; Committee Chairs/Members as listed; annual RSU grants of $125,000 on election/re-election, vesting at next annual meeting or 1-year anniversary .
  • Ownership Guidelines (Directors): 5x annual cash retainer; 50% retention until met; all non-employee directors in compliance at record date .

Director Compensation

ComponentAmount/Policy
Non-Executive Chairman Retainer$150,000
Board Member Retainer$75,000
Lead Independent Director$25,000
Audit Committee Chair/Member$25,000 / $10,000
Compensation Committee Chair/Member$15,000 / $10,000
Nominating & Corporate Governance Chair/Member$10,000 / $5,000
Equity CompensationRSUs at $125,000 per election/re-election, pro-rated for initial appointments; 1-year vest

Performance & Track Record

MeasureFY 2024 ResultContext
Adjusted EBITDA$108.7M (below $160.0M threshold) No annual bonuses paid due to underperformance
Net Income (Loss)$(23.4)M Pay vs. Performance disclosure
TSR (IPO-to-FY2024)Company: $13.18; Peer Group: $71.20 (value of $100 invested) Historical stock performance context
PSUs (2023–2024 tranche)0% earned (Adjusted Net Income $50.0M; Revenue $2,781.3M vs thresholds) Second tranche did not vest

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2023 Say-on-Pay approval: 98.2% support (shares voted) .
  • 2025 Board recommendations: “FOR” director nominees, auditor ratification, NEO compensation, Removal Amendment, and officer exculpation amendment .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Equity-heavy incentives with RSU and PSU mix; CEO received off-cycle RSUs at hire and PSUs aligned to two-year performance period starting FY2024—promotes long-term value creation but near-term cash bonus exposure remains at 100% of salary for FY2025 .
  • Rigorous metrics: Adjusted EBITDA for annual bonus; PSUs tied to cumulative Adjusted Net Income (75%) and revenue (25%), with 0–200% payout scales and deferred payout schedule—reduces short-termism and can temper insider selling pressure .
  • Governance safeguards: Strong clawback coverage, prohibition on hedging/pledging, and stringent ownership guidelines (CEO 6x salary; 50% share retention) support alignment and mitigate risk of misaligned pay outcomes .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Hedging/Pledging: Prohibited for executives and directors (mitigates misalignment risk) .
  • Related Party Transactions: None disclosed for McDonell .
  • Change-of-Control Terms: Double-trigger structure implied by “qualifying termination following a change of control,” with RSU acceleration but PSUs not accelerated—limits windfall risk; cash severance equals salary+target bonus over 18 months .
  • Exculpation Amendment: Proposal seeks officer liability limitations (governance context) .

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Committee composition: Seth Estep (Chair), Lorna Nagler, Maile Naylor, Claire Spofford; independent oversight and CD&A inclusion recommended by committee .
  • Consultant: FW Cook engaged for market review, peer analysis, and LTI design; pay program emphasizes at-risk compensation and market alignment .

Equity Ownership & Vesting Pressure Indicators

FactorObservation
Near-term vestingFirst RSU tranche vests Sep 9, 2025 (92,388 shares), then annually through 2028—creates predictable calendar-based vest opportunities
50% net retention ruleRequired until CEO meets 6x salary guideline—reduces sell pressure at vest
PSUs payout timingDeferred to FY2026 and FY2027, contingent on 2-year goals—limits short-term monetization

Board Governance (Dual-role implications)

  • McDonell serves as CEO and Director, but holds no committee seats; compensation, audit, and nominating committees operate under charters with non-employee directors, preserving independence of oversight .
  • Dual-role implication: As a management director, he is not independent; however, independent committees and chair roles mitigate concentration of power and reduce CEO-Chairman conflicts (Chair role held by John Strain during transition) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong ownership guidelines and anti-hedging/pledging policies, plus a heavy PSU/RSU mix tied to multi-year performance, signal long-term alignment and may temper insider selling pressure around vest dates .
  • Retention risk: Enhanced severance (18-month salary+bonus) and off-cycle RSU/PSU grants provide retention glue through FY2027; covenants under Severance Plan add enforcement leverage .
  • Pay-for-performance: With FY2024 underperformance (zero bonus; PSU tranche forfeiture), FY2025 bonus outcomes will hinge on Adjusted EBITDA; PSU attainment remains the key lever for realizable pay, aligning with earnings and revenue recovery trajectories .
  • Governance: Independent compensation oversight, robust clawbacks, and committee structures reduce governance risk despite CEO-director dual role; proposed officer exculpation amendment merits monitoring for shareholder sentiment impact .