Michael Snider
About Michael Snider
Michael Snider (age 53) is LGI Homes’ President since 2009 and Chief Operating Officer since July 2013, overseeing sales, construction, and product development . LGI’s pay design ties incentives to pre-tax net income and home closings; in 2024, the annual bonus payout rate was 80% with pre-tax net income of $258.9M and 6,131 homes closed, both below targets, underscoring pay-for-performance mechanics . Over the last five-year window presented, LGI’s cumulative TSR was $126.54 versus the peer group’s $228.94, and compensation actually paid tracked TSR and pre-tax net income trends, reflecting alignment between realized pay and performance .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| LGI Homes | President | 2009–present | Led sales, construction, product development; central to operating execution |
| LGI Homes | Chief Operating Officer | 2013–present (since July 2013) | Enterprise-wide operational leadership and product execution |
| LGI Homes | Executive Vice President of Homebuilding | 2005–2009 | Scaled homebuilding operations and divisional performance |
| LGI Homes | Homebuilding Manager | 2004 | Early operational leadership in homebuilding |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tadian Homes (Troy, MI) | Project Manager | 2004 (prior to joining LGI) | Project management at a homebuilder; foundation for LGI operating role |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $625,000 | $625,000 | $650,000 |
| Annual Bonus ($) | $302,671 | $727,646 | $519,762 |
| Stock Awards ($, grant-date fair value) | $1,312,621 | $1,312,640 | $1,865,158 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $33,397 | $36,226 | $35,703 |
| Total ($) | $2,273,689 | $2,701,512 | $3,070,623 |
| Named Executive Officer | 2023 Base Salary | 2024 Base Salary | % Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Michael Snider | $625,000 | $650,000 | 4% |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (STI)
| STI Parameter | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-tax net income ($000s) | 75% | $154,055 | $290,250 | $437,614 | $258,913 | 80% |
| Homes closed (units) | 25% | 6,000 | 7,500 | 9,000 | 6,131 | 80% |
| Executive | Target Bonus % of Base Salary |
|---|---|
| Michael Snider | 100% |
2024 Total Target Compensation (Element Mix)
| Name | Base Salary | STI | LTI – PSUs | LTI – RSUs | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Michael Snider | $650,000 | $650,000 | $1,092,000 | $273,000 | $2,665,000 |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Program Design
| Attribute | PSUs | RSUs |
|---|---|---|
| Weight in LTI | 80% of target | 20% of target |
| Performance metric | 3-year cumulative Basic EPS vs pre-set targets; payout 0–200% | Time-based retention |
| Risk guardrails | Absolute TSR negative caps PSU payout at 100% of target | Fixed, three-year cliff vest |
| Vesting | Cliff at end of 3-year performance period | Three-year cliff from grant date |
| 2024 LTI multiple of base salary | 2.1x for Snider | Included within 2.1x LTI |
2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (Michael Snider)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Units (Threshold/Target/Max or #) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 03/08/2024 | STI | $325,000 / $650,000 / $1,300,000 | — |
| 03/08/2024 | PSUs | 4,878 / 9,756 / 19,512 | $1,092,087 |
| 03/08/2024 | RSUs | 2,439 | $273,022 |
| 12/15/2024 | RSUs (discretionary) | 5,008 | $500,049 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of Feb 28, 2025)
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | % of Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| Michael Snider | 196,716 | <1% of 23,397,074 shares |
Outstanding Unvested Equity (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Units Unvested | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 12/15/2024 | 5,008 | $447,715 |
| RSUs | 03/08/2024 | 2,439 | $218,047 |
| RSUs | 03/08/2023 | 2,516 | $224,930 |
| RSUs | 03/15/2022 | 2,210 | $197,574 |
| PSUs (Target) | 03/08/2024 | 9,756 | $872,186 |
| PSUs (Max) | 03/08/2024 | 19,512 | $1,744,373 |
| PSUs (Target) | 03/08/2023 | 10,062 | $899,543 |
| PSUs (Max) | 03/08/2023 | 20,124 | $1,799,086 |
| PSUs (Target) | 03/15/2022 | 8,839 | $790,207 |
| PSUs (Max) | 03/15/2022 | 17,678 | $1,580,413 |
Note: Market values use $89.40 closing price on Dec 31, 2024 .
Stock Ownership Guidelines and Compliance
| Role | Requirement | Compliance Status |
|---|---|---|
| Chief Operating Officer | 3x base salary | In compliance as of Dec 31, 2024 |
Executives must retain at least 50% of shares acquired from vesting until guidelines met; unvested RSUs count toward compliance, PSUs do not .
ESPP Participation (since inception through Feb 28, 2025)
| Name | Shares Purchased under Existing ESPP |
|---|---|
| Michael Snider | 2,695 |
Hedging/Pledging
- Anti-hedging and insider trading policy in place; no hedging of Company securities permitted . No explicit pledging disclosure found in the proxy .
Employment Terms
Contracts and Severance
- NEOs (other than the CEO) do not have employment or severance agreements; severance/change-in-control economics are governed by the 2013 Incentive Plan .
Equity Acceleration and Change-in-Control
| Termination Scenario | Bonus | Acceleration from Unvested PSUs ($) | Acceleration from Unvested RSUs ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement | — | — | — | — |
| Death | $1,300,000 | $2,561,936 | $1,088,266 | $4,950,202 |
| Disability | — | $2,561,936 | $1,088,266 | $3,650,202 |
| Resignation | — | — | — | — |
| Termination | — | — | — | — |
| Change in Control | — | $2,561,936 | $1,088,266 | $3,650,202 |
RSUs and PSUs are fully vested upon disability, death, or immediately prior to a change in control (single-trigger acceleration for equity awards) .
Clawback
- 2023 clawback policy requires recovery of incentive-based compensation from current/former executive officers for three fiscal years preceding an accounting restatement; recovery equals excess over restated amount .
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
RSU Vesting Calendar (Three-Year Cliff Vest)
| Grant Date | Units | Vesting Terms | Expected Vest Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 03/15/2022 | 2,210 | Three-year cliff vest | 03/15/2025 (third anniversary) |
| 03/08/2023 | 2,516 | Three-year cliff vest | 03/08/2026 (third anniversary) |
| 03/08/2024 | 2,439 | Three-year cliff vest | 03/08/2027 (third anniversary) |
| 12/15/2024 | 5,008 | Three-year cliff vest | 12/15/2027 (third anniversary) |
PSU Performance Periods and Vesting
| Grant Date | Target Units | Performance Period | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| 03/15/2022 | 8,839 | 3-year cumulative Basic EPS; TSR cap if absolute TSR negative | Cliff vest at end of period |
| 03/08/2023 | 10,062 | Same as above | Cliff vest at end of period |
| 03/08/2024 | 9,756 | Same as above | Cliff vest at end of period |
Note: Company uses $111.94 grant-date price and third-party valuation for PSUs; payouts 0–200% of target with TSR cap .
Governance and Shareholder Feedback
- Say-on-Pay support exceeded 95% at the 2023 annual meeting; program structure remained unchanged in response .
- Compensation Committee comprised entirely of independent directors; Meridian Compensation Partners LLC serves as independent consultant for benchmarking and design .
- The company does not use stock options for NEOs; no options were granted in 2024, reducing repricing risks .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: STI is formulaic (75% pre-tax net income; 25% closings) and paid below target when performance misses; 2024 payout at 80% of target evidences enforcement of pay-for-performance .
- LTI rigor: PSUs comprise 80% of LTI and hinge on 3-year EPS with an absolute TSR cap at 100% when TSR is negative—an investor-friendly guardrail that limits windfall payouts during drawdowns .
- Retention vs. selling pressure: Three-year cliff RSUs and PSU cliff vesting create concentrated vest events (e.g., March 2025, March 2026, March/December 2027) that can increase insider selling pressure around vest dates; total unvested RSUs of 12,173 and PSU targets of 28,657 indicate meaningful equity overhang .
- Change-in-control economics: Equity accelerates on a single-trigger basis at CoC with ~$3.65M of equity value eligible for acceleration at 2024 year-end prices—shareholder-friendly clawback exists, but single-trigger acceleration increases transactional optionality for the executive .
- Ownership alignment: Snider beneficially owns 196,716 shares and is subject to a 3x salary ownership guideline (in compliance), with an anti-hedging policy in place; lack of pledging disclosure removes a key red flag, but continued monitoring is warranted .
- Performance track: Five-year TSR underperformance vs. peer group ($126.54 vs. $228.94) highlights execution risk; however, pay actually paid has generally tracked TSR and income trends, reducing potential for misaligned pay outcomes .