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Adam H. Schechter

Adam H. Schechter

President and Chief Executive Officer at LABCORP HOLDINGSLABCORP HOLDINGS
CEO
Executive
Board

About Adam H. Schechter

Adam H. Schechter is Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of Labcorp (Labcorp Holdings Inc.), serving as CEO since November 2019, Chair since May 2020, and a director since April 2013; age 60; B.S. in biology from La Salle University (honorary Doctor of Humane Letters in 2021) . Under his leadership, Labcorp’s 2024 results included revenue of $13.0B, operating cash flow of $1.6B, free cash flow of $1.1B, diluted EPS of $8.84, and adjusted EPS of $14.57, with incentives paying near target (LBP at 99.5% of target; 2022–2024 performance shares earned at 114.2% with a 47th percentile relative TSR modifier) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Merck & Co., Inc.President, Global Human Health; Executive Vice President; member of Merck’s executive committee2010–2018Led global sales/marketing/managed markets; deep pharma/healthcare expertise and stakeholder collaboration .
Merck & Co., Inc.Special advisor to the CEOJan 2019–Jul 2019Senior advisory role to CEO prior to Labcorp CEO appointment .
Merck & Co., Inc.President, Global Pharmaceutical Business2007–2010Leadership across product/business development globally .
LabcorpDirectorApr 2013–presentBoard oversight prior to and during CEO tenure .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
DaVita Inc.Director (public company)CurrentPublic board service .
American Clinical Laboratory AssociationVice Chair, Board of DirectorsCurrentIndustry leadership .
Water.orgBoard MemberCurrentNon-profit governance .
National Alliance for Hispanic HealthCorporate Advisory CouncilCurrentAdvisory role .

Fixed Compensation

Component2024 DetailSource
Base SalaryIncreased from $1,394,000 (Jan 1, 2024) to $1,435,000 effective June 16, 2024
Target Annual Bonus (LBP)150% of salary
2024 Actual Bonus Paid (LBP)$2,113,816 (enterprise Business Performance Factor 99.5%, ESG Modifier 100%, Individual Modifier 100%)

Performance Compensation

  • Program design: 2024 LTI mix targeted at 60% performance shares (PSUs), 20% non-qualified stock options, 20% RSUs; overlapping three-year PSU cycles; annual LBP with enterprise and segment metrics plus ESG and individual modifiers .

2024 Annual Incentive (LBP) – Outcome

ExecutiveProrated SalaryTarget Bonus %Business Performance Factor TypeBusiness Performance Factor Payout %ESG ModifierIndividual ModifierBonus Payout
Adam H. Schechter$1,416,292150%Enterprise99.5%100.0%100.0%$2,113,816
  • 2024 LBP metrics included consolidated revenues, consolidated adjusted operating income, and segment-specific metrics; payouts for CEO and other NEOs tied to enterprise result at 99.5% .

2024–2026 PSU Design (granted Feb 6, 2024)

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetSuperiorTSR Modifier
Three-year cumulative EPS70%$44.25$48.25$52.25±25% based on relative TSR vs peer group (bottom 25th percentile: −25%; 26th–75th: 0%; top 25th: +25%; overall cap 200%) .
Three-year cumulative Revenue30%$38.4B$40.1B$41.8BSee TSR modifier .

2022–2024 PSU Cycle – Earned

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetSuperiorResultPayout
Three-year cumulative EPS70%$43.44$48.93$54.53$48.69Contributed to 114.2% total payout .
Three-year cumulative Revenue30%$39.5B$40.7B$41.9B$41.3BSee above .
Relative TSR ModifierN/A−25%No adjustment+25%47th percentileNo adjustment .

2024 Equity Grants (CEO)

Award TypeGrant DateQuantity/TargetExercise PriceGrant Date Fair Value
RSUs2/6/202413,380 units$2,974,106
PSUs2/6/2024Target 40,130 (Thr 20,065; Max 80,260)$9,188,165
Stock Options2/6/202441,400 options$222.28$3,015,965
LBP opportunity3/31/2024Threshold $1,065,129; Target $2,130,259; Max $4,260,518

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetailSource
Total beneficial ownership367,646 shares as of Mar 20, 2025
% of shares outstandingLess than 1% of 83,668,573 shares outstanding
Options exercisable within 60 days (included in ownership)248,995 for Mr. Schechter
Executive stock ownership guidelinesCEO: 6x base salary; EVPs: 3x; all other executive officers: 1x
Compliance statusEach NEO in compliance as of Dec 31, 2024 (meets level or holding requirement)
Anti-pledging/hedging policyProhibits pledging, margin, short sales, options, and hedging (e.g., collars, swaps)

Outstanding CEO Equity (selected as of 12/31/24)

InstrumentGrant DateExercisableUnexercisableExercise PriceExpirationSource
Stock Options11/1/201927,661$149.3110/31/2029
Stock Options11/1/201972,612$171.7010/31/2029
Stock Options2/4/202050,862$163.632/3/2030
Stock Options2/2/202132,346$209.252/1/2031
Stock Options2/11/202220,89310,449$247.682/10/2032
Stock Options2/7/202310,18620,375$221.672/6/2033
Stock Options2/6/202441,400$222.282/5/2034
RSUs unvested (market value)2/11/2022; 2/7/2023; 2/6/20242,963; 6,499; 13,380
PSUs unearned (target cycles)2022; 2023; 202430,469; 58,470; 80,260

Implications: Substantial scheduled vesting (RSUs/PSUs) and option tranches may create periodic liquidity windows; pledging/hedging prohibitions and robust ownership guidelines mitigate alignment risk .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey termsSource
Employment agreementCommenced Nov 1, 2019; maintained through 2024 holding company reorganization with no term changes
Base salary and bonusInitial base $1,250,000; annual target bonus 150% of base (LBP)
2019 sign-on equityOne-time RSUs ($1M), NQOs ($1M), premium-priced NQOs ($2M at 115% of FMV); vesting over 3 years
Severance (no cause / good reason)2x (base + average last three bonuses) paid in two tranches; 3x if within 36 months post-Change in Control (double trigger); up to 18 months COBRA reimbursement; vesting of unvested portion of Sign-On Grants
Change-in-control vestingCompany provides only double-trigger CIC accelerated vesting provisions
ClawbackRobust Incentive Compensation Recoupment Policy applies to cash- and equity-based incentive comp
Tax gross-upsNone, including on severance/CIC
Severance policy capCash severance capped at 2.99x salary + target bonus under Company policy (CEO agreement includes defined 3x CIC term)

Board Governance (CEO + Chair dual role)

  • Dual role: Board determined combined Chair/CEO provides unified leadership given business complexity; structure balanced by a strong, elected Lead Independent Director (Dr. Garheng Kong) with clearly defined authorities over agendas, schedules, information flow, and executive sessions .
  • Independence: 9 of 10 director nominees are independent; all Board committees are 100% independent .
  • Executive sessions: Independent directors met five times in 2024; Lead Independent Director chaired .
  • Board/committee attendance: 5 Board meetings in 2024; each director attended 100% of Board meetings and ≥88% of assigned committee meetings .

Company Performance Context (FY2024)

MetricFY2024Source
Revenue$13.0 billion
Diluted EPS (cont.)$8.84
Adjusted EPS (cont.)$14.57
Free Cash Flow$1.10 billion

Say-on-Pay Support

YearApproval %Source
2024 Annual Meeting~92%

Compensation Structure Analysis (signals)

  • Mix/at-risk tilt: ~76% of CEO 2024 target comp performance-based; LTI at 60% PSUs, 20% options, 20% RSUs encourages multi-year alignment and price appreciation .
  • Metric rigor and stability: PSU metrics remain three-year cumulative EPS and revenue with a relative TSR modifier; 2024–2026 targets disclosed and capped at 200% payout, demonstrating structured goal-setting and external alignment via TSR .
  • LBP governance: Enterprise-wide metrics with ESG and individual modifiers; payout capped at 200%; 2024 CEO payout at 99.5% suggests calibration near plan performance .
  • Policy safeguards: No pledging/hedging; no tax gross-ups; double-trigger CIC; clawback in place; severance capped by policy (2.99x), with CEO’s CIC multiple explicitly disclosed (3x) .
  • Peer benchmarking: Committee targets total pay generally around market median (within ~±15%), using FW Cook, indicating restraint against upward ratcheting; 2024 CEO LTI increased 18% for performance/competitiveness and separately recognized spin-off efforts (one-time) .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Related-party transactions: None since Jan 1, 2024, per policy and Audit Committee review .
  • Option repricing: Plan prohibits repricing; options priced at or above FMV, with minimum vesting; no liberal recycling .
  • Pledging/hedging: Prohibited, reducing misalignment risks .
  • Say-on-pay: Strong support (~92% in 2024), lowering governance friction risk .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High at-risk pay, transparent PSU design (EPS/revenue with TSR modifier), robust ownership guidelines, and anti-pledging/hedging support strong pay-for-performance alignment .
  • Retention/selling pressure: Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs and multi-tranche, long-dated options (including 2024 grant expiring 2034) create retention hooks but also future liquidity events around vesting; monitoring Form 4s around vest dates is prudent .
  • Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger CIC and disclosed 3x CEO multiple (vs policy cap at 2.99x) are within market norms but material; quantify potential payout sensitivity to bonus history in downside scenarios .
  • Execution track record: Near-target LBP payout for 2024 and 114.2% PSU payout for 2022–2024 (TSR at 47th percentile) indicate goals were reasonably calibrated and performance delivered amid portfolio actions and specialty testing expansion .