Anatol Feygin
Cheniere EnergyAbout Anatol Feygin
Anatol Feygin (age 56) is Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer of Cheniere Energy (LNG), serving in this role since September 2016 after joining Cheniere in March 2014 as SVP, Strategy & Corporate Development; he holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Rutgers University and an MBA in Finance from NYU Stern . In 2024, Cheniere delivered revenue of ~$15.7 billion and net income of ~$3.3 billion with Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA of ~$6.2 billion, underpinned by record LNG production and robust capital allocation (repurchased ~13.8M shares, increased dividend, funded Stage 3 capex) . Executive incentives emphasize absolute financial performance (cumulative DCF per share) and stock-price growth (ATSR), with 2024 PSU awards (granted in 2022) paying above target and annual cash bonuses driven by a scorecard that achieved 166% of target for 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Loews Corporation | VP, Energy Strategist & Senior Portfolio Manager | 2007–2014 | Led energy strategy and portfolio management for a diversified holding company . |
| Bank of America | Head of Global Commodity Strategy | 3 years (prior to Loews) | Ran global commodity strategy; deep market and trading insight . |
| J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. | Senior Analyst, Natural Gas Pipelines & Distributors | Not disclosed | Sell-side analytical foundation in natural gas midstream and distribution . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc. | Director | 2019–2021 | Offshore drilling governance exposure; sector insights . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $660,000 | $692,308 | $740,385 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $22,860 | $20,772 | $22,165 |
| Total ($) | $6,097,165 | $5,454,966 | $6,022,637 |
| Annual Base Salary Setting | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| EVP & CCO Annual Base ($) | $750,000 | $787,500 |
| All Other Compensation (2024) | Perquisites & Other Personal Benefits ($) | Insurance Premiums ($) | Company Contributions to Retirement/401(k) ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feygin | $649 (tax gross-up on service award) | $816 | $20,700 | $22,165 |
Performance Compensation
| Component | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | $3,909,505 | $3,572,886 | $3,765,087 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | $1,504,800 | $1,169,000 | $1,494,000 |
| 2024 Annual Incentive Payout | Target % of Base | Target ($) | Scorecard (166% of Target) | Earned ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feygin | 100% | $750,000 | $1,245,000 | $1,494,000 |
| 2024 Annual Scorecard Metrics | Weight | Threshold | Target | Stretch | 2024 Actual | % Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scorecard EBITDA (excl. commodity margin) ($mm) | 25% | $3,950 | $4,200 | $4,400 | $4,352 | 176% |
| Commodity Margin ($mm) | 5% | $1,250 | $1,500 | $1,600 | $1,825 | 200% |
| Adjusted SG&A Expense ($mm) | 5% | $256 | $233 | $222 | $216 | 200% |
| Asset Production (TBtu) | 10% | 2,257 | 2,322 | 2,348 | 2,327 | 118% |
| Adjusted O&M Expense ($mm) | 10% | $1,728 | $1,584 | $1,505 | $1,542 | 153% |
| ESG—Emissions Strategy & Development | 10% | QMRV program | FEED on CCS | Methane target + OGMP Gold | Achieved | 200% |
| ESG—Safety (TRIR) | 10% | 0.74 | 0.32 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 184% |
| ESG—DEI Initiatives | 5% | Discretion | Discretion | Discretion | Discretionary outcome | 125% |
| ESG—Regulatory/Compliance | 5% | Discretion | Discretion | Discretion | Discretionary outcome | 125% |
| Strategic—Stage 3 Total Project Progress | 5% | 71% | 75% | 81% | 77.2% | 168% |
| Strategic—Expansion & Growth | 10% | Progress development | FERC filings | On track to FID in 2025 | Achieved | 150% |
| Weighted Average | — | — | — | — | — | 166% |
| 2024 LTI Awards (granted 02/08/2024) | Target Dollar Value | RSUs (shares) | Target PSUs (shares) | PSU Threshold | PSU Maximum | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feygin | $3,750,000 | 11,179 | 11,179 | 2,794 | 33,537 | RSUs: 3-year ratable vesting; PSUs: 3-year cliff vesting; metrics: cumulative DCF/share + ATSR; clawback applies . |
| 2025 LTI Awards (approved Feb 2025) | Target Value (% of Base) | Target Dollar Value | RSUs (shares) | Target PSUs (shares) | ATSR Modifier (PSUs) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feygin | 500% | $3,937,500 | 8,819 | 8,819 | Modifier acts on earned DCF PSUs: 1.50x at ≥12% ATSR; 1.25x at 8.5%; 1.0x at 5% to -5%; 0.75x at -8.5%; 0.50x at ≤-12% . |
| Stock Vested in 2024 | Shares Acquired on Vesting (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Feygin | 83,543 | $13,965,876 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Beneficial Ownership (LNG common) | Shares Beneficially Owned | % of Shares Outstanding | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anatol Feygin | 189,003 | ≈0.085% (189,003 / 222,814,436) | Less than 1% per proxy . |
| Unvested/Outstanding Equity at 12/31/2024 | Count (shares) | Market/Payout Value Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs (total) | 20,080 | Footnote states unvested RSUs excluded from beneficial ownership . |
| 2022 PSU (max unearned) | 46,005 | Max shares subject to performance; 3-year period 2022–2024 . |
| 2023 PSU (max unearned) | 34,269 | 3-year period 2023–2025 . |
| 2024 PSU (max unearned) | 33,537 | 3-year period 2024–2026 . |
| Ownership Policy & Alignment | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive Officer Stock Ownership Guidelines | EVP requirement: 4x base salary; compliance within 5 years; all executive officers are in compliance . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited (no hedging, short sales, or pledging/margin accounts) . |
| Option Awards | Company currently does not grant stock options . |
Employment Terms
| Role Tenure | Start at Cheniere | Current Role Since | Years in Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| EVP & CCO | March 2014 (SVP Strategy & Corp Dev) | September 2016 (EVP & CCO) | ~9 years as of 2025 . |
| Severance Plan—Non‑CIC Termination | Cash Multiple | Pro-Rata Target Bonus | Health/Welfare | Equity Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EVP (Feygin) | 1.5x (salary + target bonus) = $2,250,000 | $750,000 | $58,703 | Time-based awards vest; PSUs vest pro‑rated based on actual performance (subject to grant timing rules for CEO/SVP Ops) . |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) — Double Trigger | Cash Multiple | Pro-Rata Target Bonus | Health/Welfare | Equity Acceleration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EVP (Feygin) | 2x (salary + target bonus) = $3,000,000 | $750,000 | $58,703 | Time‑based awards vest in full; PSUs vest at greater of target or actual (shortened period); TSR PSUs vest at actual TSR as of CIC date . |
| Plan Mechanics & Protections | Detail |
|---|---|
| Conditions | Non‑competition, non‑solicitation, non‑disclosure, non‑disparagement, and release required to receive benefits . |
| 280G/4999 | Cutback to avoid excise tax if net benefit is higher; no tax gross‑ups disclosed . |
| Clawback | Mandatory clawback of erroneously paid performance-based incentive comp upon financial restatement per SEC/NYSE rules . |
Compensation Structure Notes
- Pay mix: LTI program for executives is 50% PSUs and 50% RSUs; RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; PSUs cliff-vest at year 3 subject to performance certification; clawback applies .
- PSU metrics: cumulative Distributable Cash Flow per share (absolute financial performance) and Absolute Total Shareholder Return (ATSR) (stock price growth), with 2025 ATSR modifier updated for company scale; 2022 PSU awards paid above target on these metrics .
- Annual bonus governance: Scorecard spans financial (55%) and strategic/ESG including safety (45%), delivering 166% of target in 2024; individual performance adjustments of 120% were applied for NEOs (except departing NEO) .
Governance, Peer Benchmarking, and Shareholder Feedback
- Peer group used for benchmarking includes large-cap energy firms (e.g., ConocoPhillips, Marathon Petroleum, Occidental, Williams, Kinder Morgan, Phillips 66), with Cheniere’s consolidated EV between the 75th–100th percentile of peers; no change to peer group after 2024 review .
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay received over 90% support; ongoing shareholder outreach covered >50% of outstanding shares .
- Compensation risk review concluded plans are not reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect; mix of annual/longer-term incentives, no excessive leverage, no options, and ownership/retention requirements support prudent risk-taking .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Heavy use of PSUs tied to absolute DCF/share and ATSR, plus rigorous anti‑hedging/pledging policies and 4x salary ownership guideline for EVPs, signal strong pay‑for‑performance alignment and reduced misalignment risk .
- Retention & CIC economics: Severance multiples for EVPs (1.5x non‑CIC; 2x CIC) are conventional, with equity accelerating under CIC and pro‑rata performance treatment otherwise—adequate retention without egregious parachutes; non‑compete conditions apply .
- Selling pressure monitor: Significant 2024 vesting (Feygin: 83,543 shares) can create periodic liquidity events; monitor Form 4 filings around vesting dates and trading windows for potential near‑term supply .
- Performance linkage: 2024 scorecard at 166% was driven by exceptional safety (TRIR 0.15), EBITDA outperformance, and strategic project execution—expect continued emphasis on absolute cash generation and safe operations in incentive outcomes .
- Governance stability: High say‑on‑pay support (>90%), clawback enforcement posture, and prohibition on hedging/pledging reduce red‑flag risk and support durable investor alignment .
Note: All quantitative values are sourced from Cheniere’s 2025 DEF 14A and related filings, with citations in each table cell or statement above.