Maas Hinz
Cheniere EnergyAbout Maas Hinz
Senior Vice President, Operations at Cheniere Energy (since Jan 2023), age 52; joined Cheniere in Nov 2016 after operations/technical leadership roles at Woodside Energy and Shell across Europe, Russia, Australia, the Middle East and the U.S. He holds a Mechanical Engineering degree with Honors from Central Queensland University and is a Chartered Mechanical Engineer (IMechE, UK) . During his tenure on the executive team, Cheniere delivered 2024 revenue of ~$15.7B, net income of ~$3.3B, Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA of ~$6.2B, and record operations (646 cargoes; 2,327 TBtu; TRIR 0.15), while 2022–2024 PSUs paid out at/above target driven by cumulative DCF/share and strong absolute TSR (27.56% annualized for the 2022–2024 period) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cheniere Energy | SVP, Operations | Jan 2023–present | Executive oversight of operations across Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi facilities |
| Cheniere Energy | VP & GM, Sabine Pass Liquefaction Facility | Nov 2019–Jan 2023 | Led operations at one of the world’s largest LNG production sites |
| Cheniere Energy | Interim GM, Corpus Christi Liquefaction Facility | Apr 2024–Jul 2024 | Interim leadership during project execution and ramp |
| Cheniere Energy | Senior Manager, Operations | Nov 2016–Nov 2019 | Operations leadership during expansion and reliability build-out |
| Woodside Energy Group Ltd.; Shell plc | Various Operations/Technical Leadership | Prior to Nov 2016 (years not specified) | 24 years of LNG/energy operations experience across multiple geographies |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Annual Base Salary ($) | $575,000 | $700,000 |
| Salary Earned in 2024 ($) | $560,577 | — |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $75,913 (includes $54,397 perqs—home leave + tax gross-up/transport; $816 insurance; $20,700 401(k) match) | — |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (AIP) – 2024
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Target bonus (% of base) | 100% |
| Target bonus ($) | $575,000 |
| Company scorecard result | 166% of target (weighted average) |
| Earned bonus ($) | $1,145,400 |
Scorecard structure and highlights:
- Weighting: 55% financial/budget/operational; 45% strategic/ESG (incl. safety) .
- Selected outcomes (target → actual → payout): Scorecard EBITDA excl. commodity margin $4.2B → $4.352B → 176%; Commodity margin $1.5B → $1.825B → 200%; Adjusted SG&A $233mm → $216mm → 200%; Asset production 2,322 TBtu → 2,327 TBtu → 118%; Adjusted O&M $1,584mm → $1,542mm → 153%; Safety TRIR target 0.32 → actual 0.15 → 184%; ESG and compliance items at or above target; Stage 3 progress 75% target → 77.2% → 168% .
Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – Structure and Awards
- Design: 50% PSUs (3-year cliff; 0–300% payout) and 50% RSUs (3-year ratable); 12-month minimum vesting; clawback applies .
- Metrics: PSUs use cumulative Distributable Cash Flow (DCF) per share and Absolute TSR (ATSR) for executive officers; for Hinz, 2024 PSU did not include ATSR as he was not an NEO at grant .
| LTI Awards | Target Value | Instrument | Grant Date | Shares/Target | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 LTI (regular) | $1,725,000 (300% of base) | RSUs | 2/8/2024 | 5,143 | 1/3 on 2/8/2025, 2/8/2026, 2/8/2027 |
| 2024 LTI (regular) | — | PSUs (DCF-only for Hinz) | 2/8/2024 | 5,143 target; 10,286 max | 3-year performance (2024–2026), cliff vest based on certified results |
| 2024 Special Retention | $ — | RSUs | 2/8/2024 | 4,770 | 1/3 annually from grant date (2/8/2024) |
| 2025 LTI | $2,800,000 (400% of base) | RSUs | 2/2025 | 6,271 | Standard RSU schedule (3-year ratable) |
| 2025 LTI | — | PSUs (DCF + ATSR with 2025 modifier) | 2/2025 | 6,271 target | 3-year performance (2025–2027), ATSR modifier tightened in 2025 |
PSU performance (prior cycle): For the 2022 awards, the company achieved cumulative DCF of $80.15/share (200% payout on DCF metric) and an ATSR modifier of 1.50x for NEO PSUs; Hinz’s 2022 PSU was DCF-only and paid at 200% in Feb 2025 .
Equity Vesting and Realizations (2024)
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Shares acquired on vesting (Hinz) | 18,190 |
| Value realized on vesting ($) | $2,901,002 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 31, 2025 Record Date)
| Holder | Common Shares Beneficially Owned | % of Class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maas Hinz | 18,375 | <1% | Excludes 16,528 unvested RSUs |
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Grant | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) at $214.87 | Unearned PSUs at Max (#) | Market/Payout Value at Max ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 LTI (02/10/2022) | 861 | $185,003 | 2,214 | $475,722 |
| 2022 LTI (02/10/2022) | 1,859 | $399,443 | — | — |
| 2023 LTI (01/01/2023) | 4,000 | $859,480 | — | — |
| 2023 LTI (02/09/2023) | 3,295 | $707,997 | 9,884 | $2,123,775 |
| 2024 LTI (02/08/2024) | 5,143 | $1,105,076 | 10,286 | $2,210,153 |
| 2024 Retention (02/08/2024) | 4,770 | $1,024,930 | — | — |
Notes:
- RSUs vest ratably over three years; PSUs cliff-vest after the 3-year performance period based on certified results .
- The values reflect the 12/31/2024 closing price ($214.87) and PSU maximum share counts as required by SEC presentation .
Alignment Policies
- Executive stock ownership guideline for Senior Vice Presidents: 3x base salary; all executive officers are in compliance .
- No hedging or short sales; no pledging of Company stock or use in margin accounts (reduces misalignment/forced-selling risks) .
Employment Terms
Severance & Change-in-Control (CIC) Framework (Key Executive Severance Pay Plan)
- CIC equity (single-trigger for time-based awards): upon a CIC, time-based awards vest in full; performance awards vest at greater of target or actual (shortened period), except TSR-based awards vest on actual TSR as of CIC .
- CIC termination (double-trigger cash + equity): if terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 3 months before or 24 months after CIC, cash severance equals 2x (non-CEO executives) salary + target bonus; pro‑rated target bonus; unpaid prior-year bonus; plus equity acceleration per plan (TSR on actual; non-TSR at greater of target/actual on shortened period) .
- Non‑CIC termination (without cause/for good reason): cash severance equals 1.5x (non-CEO executives) salary + target bonus; pro‑rated target bonus; unpaid prior-year bonus; time-based equity for SVP, Operations (and CEO) vests if granted >6 months before termination; PSUs vest pro‑rata based on actual performance at period end (CEO subject to >6 month grant condition) .
- Conditions include non‑competition, non‑solicit, confidentiality, non‑disparagement, and release agreements .
Potential Payments for Maas Hinz (Hypothetical, as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario | Total ($) |
|---|---|
| Termination by Company without cause / resignation for good reason (non‑CIC) | $9,270,830 |
| Death/Disability | $6,686,754 |
| Immediately upon Change‑in‑Control | $9,091,579 |
| CIC + Termination without cause / resignation for good reason | $2,935,611 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix is highly at-risk: AIP target 100% of base, with Company scorecard payout at 166% in 2024 on strong financial, operational, safety, and strategic execution .
- LTI shifted fully to RSUs/PSUs (no stock options), reducing binary risk and emphasizing sustained DCF per share and ATSR; minimum 12‑month vesting and clawback apply .
- For 2024, PSU DCF targets were reduced vs prior year due to lower anticipated Henry Hub/Gulf Coast netback curves; Committee stated goals remained at least as challenging .
- Company allowed cash settlement election for officers’ Feb 2025 RSU vesting and offered cash settlement election for 2022 PSU payouts (liquidity for executives; limits dilution aligned with buyback program) .
Say‑on‑Pay, Governance, and Peer Benchmarking
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: over 90% support; ongoing shareholder engagement with >50% of shares represented .
- Peer benchmarking spans large-cap energy (no fixed percentile targeting), reviewed with independent consultant Meridian; no consultant conflicts identified .
- Strong governance practices: anti‑hedging/pledging, rigorous ownership guidelines, clawback policy effective and NYSE/SEC compliant; no defined benefit pension or nonqualified deferred compensation plan .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High equity mix (RSUs/PSUs), 3x salary ownership guideline, and clawback provisions support pay-for-performance and long-term alignment; anti-hedging/pledging reduces forced-sale risks .
- Execution and retention: Above‑target AIP and PSU payouts reflect operational outperformance (record cargoes, TRIR top quintile, EBITDA/DCFs above guidance). 2024 retention RSUs (4,770) and larger 2025 LTI (400% of base) bolster retention but create scheduled vesting events (Feb 2026/2027) to monitor for potential liquidity/selling needs .
- CIC economics: Mixed single‑trigger equity vesting at CIC and double‑trigger cash severance are standard but meaningful; non‑CIC severance for SVP Ops includes special treatment of time‑based awards (>6‑month lookback), supporting retention yet limiting windfalls on very recent grants .
- Risk flags: None material disclosed (no pledging, no options repricing, no related‑party transactions; modest tax gross-up tied to pre‑NEO home leave benefit). Overall 2024 say‑on‑pay was strong, suggesting low compensation governance risk .