David de Leon
ALLIANT ENERGYAbout David de Leon
Senior Vice President and President of Wisconsin Power & Light (WPL); named executive officer at Alliant Energy. Credited service of 21.2 years in the Cash Balance Pension Plan and 37.6 years in the Excess Retirement Plan, with total pension present value of $428,000 as of 12/31/2024; not eligible for the legacy DB SRP . Beneficial ownership totals 35,891 shares plus 7,097 unvested RSUs; no pledging by any executive officers or directors, and hedging/pledging is prohibited by policy . Company performance metrics that drive his pay include Adjusted EPS and operational goals via EXSTIP, and 3-year TSR, net income growth, and workforce composition via performance shares; 2024 Company goals paid at 82% of target, Alliant TSR index value for a $100 investment was $126.64 (peer index $127.32), net income $690M, and Adjusted EPS $3.04 .
Past Roles
No past roles disclosed for Mr. de Leon in the proxy. Skip.
External Roles
No external directorships or outside roles disclosed for Mr. de Leon. Skip.
Fixed Compensation
Base salary levels and change:
| Named Executive Officer | 2024 Base Salary | 2023 Base Salary | % Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| David A. de Leon | $465,000 | $440,000 | 5.7% |
Multi-year compensation summary:
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($) | Change in Pension Value & NQDC Earnings ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 460,212 | 545,784 | 266,910 | 6,000 | 96,170 | 1,375,076 |
| 2023 | 438,846 | 470,068 | 260,260 | 24,000 | 84,305 | 1,277,479 |
| 2022 | 426,923 | 424,148 | 301,473 | 0 | 74,287 | 1,226,831 |
Perquisites detail (2024): $0 perqs; Company contributions to defined contribution and deferred plans $38,841; life insurance premiums $5,028; dividends on unvested awards $52,301 .
Performance Compensation
EXSTIP target and payout:
| Item | 2024 Value |
|---|---|
| EXSTIP Target as % of Base Salary | 70% |
| Target $ | $325,500 (70% × $465,000) |
| Company Performance Pool Payout | 82% |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $266,910 (consistent with 82% of target) |
2024 Company EXSTIP metrics (drive all executives’ payouts):
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | 70% | Threshold $2.99 / Target $3.06 / Max $3.14 | $3.04 | 52% |
| Customer Interaction Survey | 5% | 8.61 | 8.51 | 4% |
| SAIDI (reliability duration) | 5% | 84.2 | 85.3 | 5% |
| SAIFI (reliability frequency) | 5% | 0.81 | 0.93 | —% |
| Environmental progress | 5% | 31% | 39% | 10% |
| Inclusive succession (Dir+ pipeline) | 2.5% | 75% | 77% | 4% |
| Inclusive candidate slates | 2.5% | 75% | 74% | 2% |
| Safety – TRIR | 1.7% | 2.54 | 2.17 | 3% |
| Safety – LTIR | 1.7% | 0.48 | 0.53 | —% |
| Safety – timely reporting | 1.6% | 95% | 95% | 2% |
| Total Pool Payout | 100% | 82% |
Long-term incentives (structure and vesting):
- 2024 LTI target = 130% of base salary; mix: 75% performance shares (TSR 35%, net income 35%, workforce composition 5%), 25% time-based RSUs; performance shares/RSUs are three-year awards (2024–2026), settle in stock, double-trigger acceleration on change-in-control, with cap at 200% of target; no stock options outstanding or issued .
- 2022–2024 TSR performance shares paid 0% (below 40th percentile), while 2022–2024 net income PRSUs paid 94% and workforce composition PRSUs paid 118% of target (company-wide) .
Vesting realized in 2024:
| Award Type | Shares Vested (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (TSR) | 0 | $0 |
| Performance RSUs (Net Income & Workforce) | 3,256 | $200,635 |
| RSUs (Service-based) | 2,098 | $124,076 |
2024 grant details (selected):
| Grant Type | Grant Dates | Target/Max Shares (selected) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares – TSR | 2/15/2024; 5/07/2024 | 1,671 target (Feb); 325 target (May) | $153,820 (TSR Feb); $29,926 (TSR May) |
| Performance Shares – Net Income | 2/15/2024; 5/07/2024 | 1,671 target (Feb); 325 target (May) | $161,704 (NI Feb); $33,235 (NI May) |
| Performance Shares – Workforce | 2/15/2024; 5/07/2024 | 119 target (Feb); 23 target (May) | $23,087 (WF Feb); $4,755 (WF May) |
| RSUs (Service-based) | 2/15/2024; 5/07/2024 | 2,386 total in 2024 | $115,482 (Feb RSUs); $23,775 (May RSUs) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and RSUs:
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | Restricted Stock Units (Unvested) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| David A. de Leon | 35,891 | 7,097 | 42,988 |
- None of the shares held by executives/directors are pledged; hedging/pledging is prohibited for insiders .
- Executive stock ownership requirement for Senior Vice President: 3× base salary; executives have five years to comply, and those <5 years are on track; those ≥5 years are in compliance .
Outstanding unvested equity awards (as of 12/31/2024; market values at $59.14):
| Award Type | Performance Period | Units (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares – TSR (granted 2023) | Ends 12/31/2025 | 6,491 | $383,878 |
| Performance Shares – TSR (granted 2024) | Ends 12/31/2026 | 8,175 | $483,470 |
| Performance RSUs – Net Income (granted 2023) | Ends 12/31/2025 | 6,491 | $383,878 |
| Performance Shares – Net Income (granted 2024) | Ends 12/31/2026 | 8,175 | $483,470 |
| Performance RSUs – Workforce (granted 2023) | Ends 12/31/2025 | 925 | $54,705 |
| Performance Shares – Workforce (granted 2024) | Ends 12/31/2026 | 1,168 | $69,076 |
| RSUs (Service-based, granted 2023) | Vests 12/31/2025 | 2,318 | $137,087 |
| RSUs (Service-based, granted 2024) | Vests 12/31/2026 | 2,920 | $172,689 |
Employment Terms
Severance and change-of-control economics:
- Executive Severance Plan (non-CIC): one year base salary; up to 18 months medical/dental/COBRA (six months paid); up to $10,000 outplacement/tuition; requires severance agreement .
- KEESA (double-trigger CIC): provides 2× (base salary + target annual incentive) cash termination payment; life/medical/dental continuation up to two years; outplacement up to 10% of base; equity per plan terms; no 280G tax gross-ups (cutback vs full-pay best-after-tax); non-compete 1 year and confidentiality 5 years .
Potential payments for David A. de Leon (as of 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Cash Termination Payment | Insurance Continuation | RSUs (Unearned) | Performance RSUs (Unearned) | Performance Shares (Unearned) | Outplacement | Legal/Accounting | Total Pre-Tax Benefit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death | $0 | $0 | $309,776 | $219,292 | $709,947 | $0 | $0 | $1,239,015 |
| Disability | $0 | $0 | $309,776 | $219,292 | $709,947 | $0 | $0 | $1,239,015 |
| Involuntary Termination (no CIC) | $465,000 | $8,351 | $81,097 | $146,194 | $300,668 | $10,000 | $0 | $1,011,310 |
| Retirement | $0 | $0 | $309,776 | $219,292 | $709,947 | $0 | $0 | $1,239,015 |
| CIC + Termination (double-trigger) | $1,581,000 | $28,703 | $81,097 | $146,194 | $300,668 | $46,500 | $10,000 | $2,194,162 |
| CIC without Termination | $0 | $0 | $81,097 | $146,194 | $300,668 | $0 | $0 | $527,959 |
Award agreement termination/vesting rules:
- Pro-rata or full vesting for death/disability/retirement based on performance year elapsed; pro-rata vesting for involuntary termination without cause; RSUs vest pro-rata/full depending on anniversary elapsed; CIC awards valued at target with payment at period end subject to continued employment or qualifying termination .
- Retirement definition: age ≥55 and age + service years ≥65 .
Policies and governance:
- Clawback covering erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation for restatements; legacy clawback also covers misconduct-linked restatements for cash/equity; hedging/pledging prohibited; no CIC tax gross-ups; maximum CIC cash multiplier ≤2.99 .
- Compensation peer group (utility peers) used for market benchmarking; total compensation targeted to ~50th percentile; Mr. de Leon’s role is utility-specific position benchmarked to utility data .
- Say-on-pay support >95% in 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Pension Details
Pension benefits (present values as of 12/31/2024):
| Plan | Credited Service (Years) | Present Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Cash Balance Pension Plan | 21.2 | $382,000 |
| Excess Retirement Plan | 37.6 | $46,000 |
| DB SRP | N/A (not eligible) | N/A |
| Total | $428,000 |
WPL prior plan monthly benefit formula (for service until 8/2/2008): A − B × C, where A = 55% of average monthly compensation (up to 30 years), B = 0.50% of average monthly compensation in excess of Social Security covered compensation, and C = credited service (up to 360 months)/30; final average comp based on 3 highest calendar years .
Deferred compensation: Mr. de Leon had no AEDCP balance or contributions in 2024 (zeros across all fields), unlike other NEOs .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift in LTI design (2024): PRSUs were replaced with performance shares; mix remains 75% performance-based equity and 25% RSUs; no stock options outstanding or anticipated—reduces option exercise-driven selling pressure .
- Year-over-year pay mix: Salary up 5.7% in 2024; stock awards up to $545,784 from $470,068; cash incentive modestly up to $266,910, consistent with below-target Company performance (82% pool payout) .
- Ownership alignment: Executives subject to ownership multiples (SVP = 3× salary), with 5-year compliance window and 100% post-tax retention requirement until compliant .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is solid: annual cash tied to Adjusted EPS and operational reliability/safety metrics; LTI ties to 3-year relative TSR and net income growth, with 0% payout on TSR for the 2022–2024 cycle, signaling rigorous design and downside sensitivity .
- Retention risk appears moderate: double-trigger CIC cash multiple is 2× for non-CEO roles, with meaningful equity continuation rules and severance protection; absence of options and use of RSUs/PSUs focuses on tenure and performance rather than exercise timing .
- Insider selling pressure low: no options outstanding; equity vesting schedule extends through 2025–2026, implying measured stock supply; hedging/pledging prohibited reduces misalignment risk .
- Governance risk low: clawback compliant with SEC and exchange standards; no tax gross-ups; strong say-on-pay (>95%) and defined peer benchmarking at ~50th percentile mitigate pay inflation and governance concerns .
- Ownership small vs. float: Mr. de Leon’s direct holdings are well under 1% of shares outstanding; combined with stock ownership guidelines and ongoing unvested awards, alignment is supported, but absolute “skin-in-the-game” remains modest typical for regulated utilities .