Raja Sundararajan
ALLIANT ENERGYAbout Raja Sundararajan
Raja Sundararajan is Executive Vice President at Alliant Energy (LNT), serving since June 2023; he was 49 as of the company’s 2024 and 2025 10‑K filings . Prior roles include senior regulatory and customer leadership and external affairs at American Electric Power (AEP), and President & COO of AEP Ohio (2019–2021) . During his tenure, Alliant delivered adjusted EPS of $3.04 in 2024 (vs. $2.82 in 2023), net income of $690M in 2024 (vs. $703M in 2023), and total shareholder return (TSR) value of $126.64 in 2024 versus $106.09 in 2023; the defined peer group TSR was $127.32 in 2024 . 2024 annual incentives funded at 82% driven by adjusted EPS of $3.04 vs. a $3.06 target and mixed operational outcomes, indicating disciplined pay-for-performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alliant Energy | Executive Vice President | Jun 2023–present | Enterprise leadership across strategy, operations and stakeholder engagement |
| AEP | EVP – External Affairs | Jul 2022–Jun 2023 | Oversight of external relations supporting regulatory and customer strategy |
| AEP | SVP – Regulatory & Customer Solutions | Jul 2021–Jul 2022 | Led regulatory/customer initiatives; rate, policy, service quality |
| AEP Ohio | President & COO | Jan 2019–Jul 2021 | P&L responsibility, grid reliability, customer service execution |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| American Electric Power (AEP) | EVP – External Affairs; SVP – Regulatory & Customer Solutions; President & COO (AEP Ohio) | 2019–2023 | Progression through regulatory, customer, and operating leadership spanning Ohio utility operations |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $604,616 | $334,616 |
| Target Bonus (% of base) | 75% | 75% |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid ($) | $369,000 | $409,500 |
| Perquisites & Other Personal Benefits ($) | $15,458 (physical exam, financial planning, LTD insurance) | $0 perquisites; $25,750 relocation/tax reimbursement |
| Registrant Contributions to Defined Contribution/Deferred Plans ($) | $50,862 | $22,154 |
| Dividends on Unvested Awards ($) | $68,589 (paid only upon vesting) | $17,407 (paid only upon vesting) |
| Total Compensation ($) | $2,113,940 | $1,846,058 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (EXSTIP) – Company Metrics and Outcomes (2024)
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout toward Pool |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS | 70% | Threshold $2.99; Target $3.06; Max $3.14 | $3.04 | 52% |
| Customer Interaction Survey | 5% | 8.61 | 8.51 | 4% |
| SAIDI | 5% | 84.2 | 85.3 | 5% |
| SAIFI | 5% | 0.81 | 0.93 | 0% |
| Environmental (GHG progress) | 5% | 31% | 39% | 10% |
| Workforce – Succession | 2.5% | 75% | 77% | 4% |
| Workforce – Inclusive Slates | 2.5% | 75% | 74% | 2% |
| Safety – TRIR | 1.7% | 2.54 | 2.17 | 3% |
| Safety – LTIR | 1.7% | 0.48 | 0.53 | 0% |
| Safety – Timely Reporting | 1.6% | 95% | 95% | 2% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | 82% |
- Sundararajan’s 2024 EXSTIP payout: Target 75% of $600,000 base; Company performance 82% → $369,000, matching reported non‑equity incentive .
Long-Term Incentives – Structure, Weighting, Targets, and Payouts
| Award Type | Weight of LTI | Grant Date (2024) | Target Units | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Performance/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares – TSR vs EEI Index | 35% | Feb 15, 2024 | 7,376 | $339,591 | Prior cycle (2022–2024) paid 0% (below 40th percentile) | 3-year period ending Dec 31, 2026 |
| Performance Shares – Net Income Growth | 35% | Feb 15, 2024 | 7,376 | $356,998 | 2022–2024 PRSU paid 94% (5.3% CAGR; cumulative $2,175.7M vs target) | 3-year period ending Dec 31, 2026 |
| Performance Shares – Workforce Composition | 5% | Feb 15, 2024 | 1,054 | $51,014 | 2022–2024 PRSU paid 118% (women 24.8%, people of color 7.8%) | 3-year period ending Dec 31, 2026 |
| Service-based RSUs | 25% | Feb 15, 2024 | 5,269 | $255,020 | Time-based; dividends accrual paid only on vest | Single installment after 3 years; vests Dec 31, 2026 |
- 2024 awards settle in stock; all performance share payouts capped at 200% of target .
- Company does not issue stock options and has none outstanding (reduces option-related selling pressure) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (direct/indirect shares) | 500 shares |
| Unvested RSUs (not “beneficially owned”) | 15,858 units |
| Ownership as % of Shares Outstanding | 0.00019% (500 / 256,866,523 shares outstanding) |
| Outstanding Equity Awards (at 12/31/2024) | PS-TSR 2023 grant: 14,139 units; PS-TSR 2024 grant: 15,132 units (values assume max); PRSU-Net Income 2023: 14,139; PS-Net Income 2024: 15,132; PRSU-Workforce 2023: 2,019; PS-Workforce 2024: 2,162; RSUs 2023: 5,049; RSUs 2024: 5,405 |
| Pledging/Hedging | None pledged; hedging and pledging prohibited for insiders |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | EVP required multiple: 3.5× base salary |
| Compliance Status | Executives in role <5 years are on track; full compliance expected within five years |
Note: Unvested RSUs and performance shares count toward guideline once earned/vested per policy; dividends and equivalents accrue but are paid only upon vesting .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| KEESA (Change-in-Control) | Double trigger; for EVPs, cash payment = 2×(base + target annual incentive), insurance continuation up to 2 years, outplacement up to 10% of base, legal/accounting fees up to $10,000; equity vests per plan at target upon CoC; no 280G tax gross-up (cutback vs full payment by after-tax comparison) |
| KEESA – Sundararajan Estimated CoC+Termination (12/31/2024) | Cash: $2,100,000; Insurance: $16,097; SRP lump sum: $2,000; Unearned RSUs: $157,691; Unearned PRSUs: $318,528; Unearned PS: $598,319; Outplacement: $60,000; Legal/Accounting: $10,000; Total pre-tax: $3,262,635 |
| Executive Severance Plan (non-CoC) | One year base salary; up to 18 months COBRA or retiree medical (6 months paid by company); up to $10,000 outplacement/tuition; EAP access; requires release |
| Non-compete/Confidentiality | Non-compete for 1 year post-employment; confidentiality for 5 years (may be waived by CEO and Board) |
| Clawback | Restatement-based clawback for incentive compensation (3-year lookback); broader clawback for misconduct-related restatements |
Deferred Compensation & Retirement
| Program | 2024 Executive Contribution | 2024 Registrant Contribution | Aggregate Earnings 2024 | 12/31/2024 Balance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alliant Energy Deferred Compensation Plan (AEDCP) – Sundararajan | $148,846 | $12,315 | $11,062 | $172,343 |
| Pension Program | Present Value of Accrued Benefit (12/31/2024) |
|---|---|
| Excess Retirement Plan | $13,000 |
| Cash Balance Pension Plan | Not eligible |
| DB Supplemental Retirement Plan (legacy) | Not eligible |
Governance & Peer Benchmarking
- Say‑on‑pay approval exceeded 95% in 2024, indicating broad investor support for pay practices .
- Compensation peer group of 20 utilities (Pay Governance) with target pay generally at market 50th percentile; committee and advisor independence affirmed .
- No related‑person transactions since 2024; robust governance and risk oversight, including compensation risk assessment and sector commission reviews .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is intact: 2024 annual incentives paid at 82% despite adjusted EPS below target; TSR-based performance shares from the 2022–2024 cycle paid 0%, while net income and workforce metrics paid at 94% and 118%, respectively, signaling balanced use of relative (TSR) and absolute (profit/workforce) hurdles that curb windfalls and reward execution .
- Option risk is absent (no options outstanding/issued), reducing forced selling pressure; however, RSUs and performance shares vesting in 2025–2026 could create event‑driven supply as awards settle in stock (watch vesting windows and tax sales) .
- Alignment and retention appear solid: strict ownership guidelines (3.5× salary), prohibitions on hedging/pledging, clawbacks, and double‑trigger CoC design (no tax gross‑ups) point to investor‑friendly structures with moderate entrenchment risk and clear recourse for misconduct .
- Severance economics for CoC (2× base+target bonus; total estimated $3.26M) are within regulated utility norms and unlikely to drive perverse incentives; monitor progress on TSR versus peers into the 2024–2026 cycle to gauge potential long‑term payout leverage .