Siobhan Lane
About Siobhan Lane
Executive Vice President and Group Chief Executive, Gaming at Light & Wonder (LNW); named among NEOs since at least 2022, with compensation and incentives disclosed in 2024 and 2025 proxies . Her annual bonus is tied to both consolidated company and Gaming segment LWICP Revenue and AEBITDA metrics; 2024 payout was ~98.1% of target and paid in vested shares, indicating near-target operational performance . Long-term performance equity ties to relative TSR vs S&P 400 and consolidated AEBITDA; the 2022–2024 cycle achieved 71st percentile TSR (100% payout) and 91.3% of AEBITDA target (partial payout), supporting pay-for-performance alignment . She complies with stock ownership guidelines (2x salary) with 39,822 shares/units vs a 15,635-share requirement as of 12/31/2024 .
Past Roles
- Not disclosed in the DEF 14A filings reviewed .
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the DEF 14A filings reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $592,308 | $750,000 | $768,750 (2.5% increase effective Apr 1, 2024) |
| Target Bonus % of Base | — | 75% | 75% → 100% (effective Apr 1, 2024; blended for FY) |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $475,452 | $621,281 | $703,838 (paid in vested shares) |
| Bonus Payout % of Target | — | 110.5% | 98.1% |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Bonus (LWICP) – Metric Targets and Results
| Metric | Weighting | Target (US$ mm) | Actual (US$ mm) | Result (% of Target) | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated LWICP Revenue | 25% | $3,225 | $3,188 | 98.9% | 94.4% |
| Consolidated LWICP AEBITDA | 25% | $1,193 | $1,208 (adjusted down $37m for LWICP) | 101.2% | 102.4% |
| Gaming LWICP Revenue | 25% | $2,092 | $2,068 | 98.8% | 94.2% |
| Gaming LWICP AEBITDA | 25% | $1,005 | $1,010 (adjusted down $17m for LWICP) | 100.5% | 101.1% |
| Weighted Total | 100% | — | — | — | 98.03% (segment weighting) / 98.4% (corporate weighting) |
- Notes: 2024 LWICP bonuses were paid in vested shares in March 2025 .
Performance RSUs – Achievement and Vesting (2022–2024 cycle; vested March 20, 2025)
| Performance Metric | Threshold | Target | Actual | Payout % | Units Vested (Lane) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated AEBITDA (RSU AEBITDA) | $964m | $1,303m | $1,244m | 91.3% | 3,163 |
| Relative TSR vs S&P 400 | 30th percentile | 55th percentile | 71st percentile | 100% | 3,465 |
Equity Grants and Vesting Structure (2024 cycle and special award)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Target Units | Vesting / Performance | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03/20/2024 | Time-vesting RSUs | 7,514 | 3 tranches starting 03/20/2025 | Annual grant |
| 03/20/2024 | TSR RSUs | 3,758 | Cliff vest 03/20/2027; TSR vs S&P 400 through 12/31/2026 | 50–100% payout range |
| 03/20/2024 | AEBITDA RSUs | 3,758 | Cliff vest 03/20/2027; RSU AEBITDA through 12/31/2026 | 50–100% payout range |
| 11/20/2024 | Gaming segment performance RSUs | 21,905 | Cliff vest 03/31/2028; FY25–FY27 Gaming Revenue (50%) and AEBITDA (50%); 25–100% payout | $2.0m grant-date value |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (04/11/2025) | 30,347 shares; “<1%” of outstanding (84,836,055) |
| Beneficial Ownership (04/11/2024) | 21,254 shares; “<1%” of outstanding (90,385,726) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Group Chief Executives must hold ≥2x base salary; Lane required 15,635 shares; owned 39,822 shares/units as of 12/31/2024 (in compliance) |
| Vested vs Unvested (12/31/2024) | Unvested time RSUs: 2,310 (2022), 8,744 (2023), 7,514 (2024) ; Unvested TSR RSUs: 3,465 (2022 achieved; converted to time; vested 03/20/2025) ; 6,557 (2023, to 03/20/2026) ; 3,758 (2024, to 03/20/2027) ; Unvested AEBITDA RSUs: 3,163 (2022 achieved; converted to time; vested 03/20/2025) ; 6,557 (2023, to 03/20/2026) ; 3,758 (2024, to 03/20/2027) ; Performance RSUs: 21,905 (to 03/31/2028) |
| Options | None disclosed for Lane (no options outstanding) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Company prohibits hedging and pledging of LNW securities (policy-level) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Siobhan Lane – Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | In place; specifies duties, compensation commitments, severance, restrictive covenants |
| Severance (Qualifying Termination) | 2x base salary paid over 24 months; pro rata bonus for year of termination; COBRA premiums up to 18 months |
| Non-Compete / Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality and competitive activity restrictions; non-compete duration 24 months post-termination for Lane |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Not a participant in CIC Plan (covers CEO and CLO only) ; under 2003 Plan, unvested equity generally accelerates upon CIC; performance criteria may be deemed met at Committee’s discretion |
| Retirement/Deferred | Eligible for 401(k); historical match up to 3.5% of eligible comp |
| Clawbacks | NASDAQ/Dodd-Frank compliant recoupment plus additional misconduct-based clawback covering cash and equity; may cancel awards, recoup gains from incentive comp |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for employees/officers/directors |
| Tax Gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups; CIC “best net” cutback applies if applicable (plan-level) |
Compensation Program, Governance, and Peer Benchmarking
- Program design: Multiple metrics; LWICP payout curve requires ≥85% of target for any payout; performance equity split between TSR and AEBITDA with capped payout at target .
- Say-on-Pay: Approved by ~98% of votes cast at the 2024 meeting; continued strong shareholder support .
- Compensation Committee: Independent directors; Chair Hamish R. McLennan; uses independent consultant Compensation Advisory Partners (CAP); no conflicts identified .
- Peer group used for benchmarking (FY2023–2024): AppLovin, Aristocrat Leisure, Bally’s, Boyd Gaming, DraftKings, Electronic Arts, Everi, IAC, IGT, Match Group, PENN Entertainment, Playtika, Roblox, Take-Two, Wynn Resorts .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Lane’s 2024 bonus closely tracks consolidated and segment targets, and prior performance RSUs paid out fully on TSR and partially on AEBITDA, indicating alignment to shareholder returns and operating cash metrics .
- Retention and performance focus: A $2.0m special performance RSU grant (Gaming revenue and AEBITDA across FY25–FY27; cliff vest 03/31/2028) increases retention and ties value creation to segment KPIs, reducing execution risk misalignment .
- CIC exposure: Lane is not covered by the double-trigger CIC Plan (CEO/CLO only); equity would generally accelerate under the 2003 Plan upon CIC, but cash severance is governed by her employment agreement, moderating change-of-control cash liabilities while preserving equity alignment .
- Insider selling pressure and vesting cadence: Annual RSU vesting cycles around March 20 and a 2028 cliff create predictable windows to monitor for Form 4 activity; policy-level bans on hedging/pledging reduce alignment red flags .
- Ownership alignment: Exceeds guideline with 39,822 vs 15,635 required shares/units, but overall beneficial ownership remains <1% of outstanding, suggesting alignment is primarily via performance equity rather than absolute ownership concentration .
