Matteo Anversa
About Matteo Anversa
Matteo Anversa is Chief Financial Officer of Logitech International S.A., appointed effective September 1, 2024, and is a Section 302/906 certifying officer on the Company’s SEC filings . Logitech’s incentive design under his tenure ties pay to revenue in constant currency and non-GAAP operating income, with a 10% ESG scorecard; FY25 bonus funding reached 190% of target and the ESG score was 100% of target . Logitech’s longer-term PSUs emphasize weighted average revenue growth (constant currency), a non-GAAP operating income “gate,” and TSR vs. the Russell 3000, aligning incentives with value creation over multi-year periods .
Fixed Compensation
| Item (USD) | FY25 |
|---|---|
| Annual Base Salary | $700,000 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 95% |
| Target Bonus $ (Annual) | $665,000 |
| Prorated Target Bonus $ (FY25 service period) | $385,481 |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $732,413 (190% of prorated target) |
| Replacement Cash Payment (sign‑on for forfeited comp at prior employer) | $1,076,166 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan Structure and FY25 Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Target Definition | Actual/Funding | Payout Mechanics | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (constant currency) | Not disclosed | Corporate target set by Compensation Committee | Contributed to 190% funding outcome | Bonus paid as % of target; CFO prorated target $385,481 | Cash paid after fiscal year |
| Non‑GAAP Operating Income | Not disclosed | Corporate target set by Compensation Committee | Contributed to 190% funding outcome | Bonus paid as % of target; CFO actual $732,413 | Cash paid after fiscal year |
| ESG Scorecard (carbon metrics, labeling) | 10% of bonus | Composite of net carbon reduction, renewables, carbon labeling rollout | Achieved 100% of target in FY25 | Included in corporate funding outcome | Cash paid after fiscal year |
Equity Awards (FY25 grants)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares (Target) | Shares (Max) | Grant‑Date Fair Value (USD) | Vesting Schedule | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 10/15/2024 | 33,393 | 66,786 | $3,000,027 | Earn over a 3‑year performance period; 0–200% payout | Weighted average revenue growth (CC); TSR vs Russell 3000 (modifier); non‑GAAP op income “gate” |
| RSU (Replacement Award) | 10/15/2024 | 10,833 | n/a | $929,679 | Vests in full on March 15, 2026 | Service‑based (replacement for forfeited equity) |
Notes:
- Logitech does not grant stock options to NEOs; PSUs are the focal annual equity for NEOs, with RSUs reserved for new‑hire replacement awards .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of June 30, 2025)
| Holder | Shares Owned | Shares Acquirable Within 60 Days | Total Beneficial Ownership | % of Shares Outstanding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matteo Anversa | — | — | — | * (<1%) |
Outstanding Equity at FY25 Year‑End (March 31, 2025)
| Award Type | Units Unvested (#) | Market Value (USD) | Performance Awards Target (#) | Market/Payout Value (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 10,833 | $914,414 | — | — |
| PSUs | — | — | 33,393 | $2,818,703 |
Alignment policies:
- Stock ownership guidelines require the CFO to hold Logitech shares equal to 3× base salary, with a five‑year compliance window; executives must hold at least 50% of after‑tax shares from equity awards until in compliance .
- Hedging, pledging, short sales, and derivatives in Logitech stock are prohibited for directors and executive officers .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements exist for NEOs; compensation is at the discretion of the Compensation Committee/Board (Anversa’s FY25 replacement cash/RSU reflect forfeited prior‑employer compensation) .
- No severance or change‑in‑control cash arrangements; equity follows “double‑trigger” acceleration (change‑in‑control plus qualifying termination) .
- RSUs: fully accelerate upon qualifying post‑CIC termination .
- PSUs: convert to time‑based RSUs at CIC based on actual performance; pro‑rata vesting upon qualifying separation during the performance period .
- Clawback: Dodd‑Frank compliant compensation recovery policy effective October 1, 2023 for Section 16 officers .
- Notice/non‑compete: NEO agreements include either a 12‑ or nine‑month notice period or non‑competition provisions under certain terminations (program‑level disclosure) .
- No tax gross‑ups; no stock option repricings; no stock option awards to NEOs .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Emphasis on performance‑based pay: annual cash bonus tied to revenue (CC), non‑GAAP operating income, and ESG (10%); FY25 corporate funding outcome was 190% of target, with CFO paid 190% on a prorated base .
- Long‑term incentives are 100% PSUs for focal grants; RSUs are used solely for replacement in new hires (CFO received RSU replacement vesting March 15, 2026) .
- No severance/change‑in‑control cash; equity is double‑trigger only, reducing windfall risk and tightening pay‑for‑performance alignment .
- Independent governance: Compensation Committee (independent directors) uses independent advisors and conducts annual peer review and risk assessment .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑Pay support: 84.38% approval at 2023 AGM; binding Swiss votes also conducted on aggregate compensation amounts . In 2022, 83% supported Say‑on‑Pay and aggregate compensation for the Group Management Team/Board .
Investment Implications
- Retention and selling pressure: A single‑date RSU vest on March 15, 2026 creates a concentrated vesting event; monitor potential insider sale timing around this date, though Logitech prohibits hedging/pledging and requires retention until ownership guidelines are met .
- Alignment: CFO currently reports less than 1% beneficial ownership, but is subject to a 3× salary ownership guideline with a five‑year compliance window; PSUs tied to revenue growth (CC), non‑GAAP profitability, and relative TSR provide strong multi‑year alignment .
- Pay‑for‑performance signal: FY25 bonuses funded at 190% indicate strong corporate performance versus plan; ongoing use of PSUs and double‑trigger equity treatment reduces misalignment risk and change‑in‑control windfalls .
- Contract economics: No severance/change‑in‑control cash, clawback policy in place, and prohibition on hedging/pledging suggest lower governance risk and fewer shareholder‑unfriendly practices .