Stuart Lasher
About Stuart Lasher
Stuart Lasher (age 65) has served on Life Time Group Holdings’ Board since 2015 and is Chair of the Compensation Committee and a member of the Capital Allocation Committee. He is the Founder, Chairman and CEO of Quantum Capital Partners (since 1998) and brings deep accounting/finance and operating experience, including prior roles as CEO, CFO, and CPA; the Board cites his accounting and finance expertise as core qualifications . He is not deemed independent by the Board under NYSE rules; the Board determined that all directors except Bahram Akradi, David Landau, and Stuart Lasher are independent . In 2024, each Board member (including Lasher) attended at least 75% of Board and committee meetings; executive sessions are led by Independent Lead Director John Danhakl .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quantum Capital Partners | Founder, Chairman & CEO | 1998–present | Private investment leadership; board and deal experience |
| Lifestyle Family Fitness | Chairman & CEO | 2010–2012 | Operated 55-location fitness chain |
| Paychex (PEO Division) | CEO | 1996–1997 | Led PEO division following acquisition of NBS |
| National Business Solutions (PEO) | Co‑founder, Chairman & CEO | 1990–1996 | Built and exited to Paychex |
| Silk Greenhouse, Inc. | Chief Financial Officer | 1986–1989 | Corporate finance leadership |
| KPMG Peat Marwick | Certified Public Accountant | 1981–1986 | Audit/accounting foundation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. (NYSE: NOG) | Director | 2020–present | Lasher and LTH CEO/Chair Bahram Akradi both sit on NOG’s board (interlock) |
Board Governance
| Committee | Role | 2024 Meetings | Scope/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compensation Committee | Chair | 4 | Oversees exec and director pay, equity plans, clawback policy, stock ownership guidelines, succession; committee includes non-independent directors; a non-employee director subcommittee exists for Rule 16b-3 approvals . |
| Capital Allocation Committee | Member | 6 | Reviews property development plans, sale-leasebacks, capex, related real-estate/capital activities . |
Additional governance context:
- Controlled company: Principal stockholders hold >50% of voting power; LTH uses some NYSE “controlled company” exemptions—its compensation and nominating committees are not fully independent .
- Attendance: All directors met 75%+ attendance in 2024; executive sessions chaired by Independent Lead Director John Danhakl .
Fixed Compensation
2024 actual director compensation (pro‑rated from Oct 1, 2024 when Lasher became eligible due to nomination by Mr. Akradi):
| Metric (FY2024) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Cash fees earned | $27,500 |
| Stock awards (RSUs grant-date fair value) | $87,887 |
| Total | $115,387 |
Director compensation program rates (for eligible non‑employee directors):
| Position | Annual Cash Retainer |
|---|---|
| Board Member | $75,000 |
| Audit Chair | $40,000 |
| Compensation Chair | $35,000 |
| Nominating & Corp Gov Chair | $25,000 |
| Audit Committee Member | $15,000 |
| Compensation Committee Member | $10,000 |
| Nominating & Corp Gov Member | $10,000 |
| Lead Independent Director | $55,000 |
Notes:
- Effective Oct 1, 2024, Lasher became eligible for director pay as the nominee of Mr. Akradi; most other sponsor‑nominated directors are unpaid except club memberships under $10,000 value .
Performance Compensation
Director equity awards (time‑based; no performance metrics):
| Grant Date | Instrument | Shares | Grant-date Price/Value | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 1, 2024 | RSUs | 3,665 | $23.98; $87,887 fair value | Vest in full on earlier of day prior to 2025 annual meeting or 1st anniversary; accelerate on change in control . |
Note: Director equity for non‑employee directors is an annual RSU (~$155,000 grant‑date value) granted at the annual meeting; mid‑year appointees receive pro‑rated RSUs; awards are service‑based (no performance metrics) .
Other Directorships & Interlocks
| Company | Type | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Northern Oil & Gas (NOG) | External public company | Lasher director since 2020; LTH CEO/Chair Bahram Akradi is also a NOG director (2017–present), creating a board interlock, though across unrelated industries . |
Expertise & Qualifications
- Extensive accounting and finance experience; former CPA at KPMG, CFO (Silk Greenhouse), CEO roles, private equity/investing background; Board cites these as reasons for selection .
- Chair, Compensation Committee—oversaw CD&A review and recommendation to include in proxy .
Equity Ownership
| Item | Amount/Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 542,553 shares; <1% of outstanding . |
| Direct/Indirect holdings | 250,000 shares via SG1 Investment Limited Partnership (indirectly controlled by Lasher); 138,888 shares via QCP Stock Holdings Limited Partnership (indirectly controlled) . |
| Stock options (exercisable) | 150,000 options vested and exercisable . |
| Unvested RSUs | 3,665 RSUs vesting April 24, 2025 (earliest) . |
| Anti‑hedging/pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging by directors, officers, employees . |
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 96%+ support, which the committee viewed as endorsement of the program .
- 2025 say‑on‑pay vote: For 189,949,911; Against 4,258,335; Abstain 24,182; indicates continued strong support .
Related‑Party Transactions (Conflict Exposure)
Life Time disclosed multiple real estate transactions involving entities in which Lasher holds interests (often alongside CEO/Chair Bahram Akradi):
- 2019 sale‑leaseback: lease with an LLC jointly owned by Akradi and Lasher; rent paid in 2024: $2.3 million .
- 2020 sale‑leaseback: lease with a subsidiary of LTRE, a company jointly owned by Akradi, a former executive officer, and Lasher among others; 2024 rent: $2.6 million .
- 2024 sale‑leaseback: lease with a third party in which Akradi and Lasher own a minority interest; 2024 rent: $0.8 million .
- Woodbury, MN lease: LTRE (jointly owned by Akradi, former executive, and Lasher among others) as landlord; 2024 rent: $1.2 million .
Policy/process: Related‑party transactions require review/approval by disinterested Audit Committee members or the full Board; the Audit Committee oversees related‑party transactions under its charter .
Governance Assessment
Strengths
- Deep financial and operating expertise; brings CPA/CFO/CEO experience; identified by the Board as a key qualification .
- Active committee leadership: Chairs Compensation Committee; participates in capital oversight (CAC) with clear scopes and meeting cadence (Comp: 4; CAC: 6) .
- Robust attendance: Board reports all directors met 75%+ attendance; executive sessions led by independent lead director .
- Strong investor support for compensation: 96%+ 2024 say‑on‑pay; 2025 votes also strongly in favor .
- Anti‑hedging/pledging and clawback policies in place; director equity is service‑based RSUs aligning with shareholder value .
Risk indicators and RED FLAGS
- Not independent: Board determined Lasher is not independent; Compensation Committee includes non‑independent directors (and Akradi), which can raise pay‑governance concerns, though a non‑employee director subcommittee addresses Rule 16b‑3 issues .
- Controlled company: LTH uses controlled‑company exemptions; nominating and compensation committees are not fully independent, reducing minority shareholder protections .
- Related‑party real estate: Multiple sale‑leaseback/lease arrangements with entities where Lasher has interests (some jointly with the CEO), totaling several million dollars of rent in 2024—ongoing potential conflict requiring continued Audit Committee oversight .
- Board interlock: Lasher and Akradi both serve on the NOG board; while cross‑industry, interlocks merit monitoring for potential information flow or influence dynamics .
Overall implication
- Lasher brings material compensation, finance, and operating expertise and is engaged as a committee chair with solid attendance and strong shareholder support trends. However, his non‑independent status and recurring related‑party real estate ties (with material rent flows) represent governance risk areas; sustained transparency and disinterested committee oversight of related‑party dealings remain critical for investor confidence .