Brendan P. Mullinix
About Brendan P. Mullinix
Brendan P. Mullinix is Executive Vice President & Chief Investment Officer (CIO) at LXP Industrial Trust; age 50; joined LXP in 1996 after graduating from Columbia College, Columbia University, and previously served as Senior Vice President and Vice President . In 2024, LXP delivered Net Income attributable to common shareholders of $37.9 million ($0.13/diluted share), Adjusted Company FFO of $189.4 million ($0.64/diluted share), same-store NOI growth of 5.0%, and robust leasing spreads (>30%), which underpin performance-linked pay structures for executives . Long-term incentives for Mullinix are tied solely to relative TSR versus the MSCI US REIT Index and a competitor peer group; 2022 PSU tranche paid 0%, 2023 tracking below threshold, and the 2024 grant is tracking slightly above target versus the peer group (index leg below threshold), reflecting high alignment of pay with shareholder returns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| LXP Industrial Trust | Executive Vice President & Chief Investment Officer | Appointed May 26, 2020–present | Leads investment strategy and capital recycling; executed sale of legacy office and non-functional assets and redeployed into Sunbelt industrial properties; led Phoenix ground lease monetization with significant ROI; supports investor outreach . |
| LXP Industrial Trust | Executive Vice President | 1996–present (joined 1996) | Progression from VP/SVP; core investment leadership spanning portfolio transition to industrial-focused REIT . |
External Roles
- No external public company directorships or external roles disclosed for Mullinix in the proxy’s Executive Officers section .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $440,000 | $460,000 | $475,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $15,250 | $16,500 | $17,250 (401(k) company contributions) |
| 2024 Target Bonus (% of Salary) | — | — | 100% ($475,000 target), Threshold 50% ($237,500), Max 200% ($950,000) |
| 2024 Actual Annual Cash Incentive ($) | — | — | $565,646; 119% of target |
| 2025 Base Salary ($) | — | — | $490,000 |
| 2025 Target Bonus (% of Salary) | — | — | 100% ($490,000 target), Threshold 50% ($245,000), Max 200% ($980,000) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Structure (2024)
- 70% objective operational metrics; 30% subjective individual performance .
- Objective portion determination for NEOs: 105.83% of target for 2024 (down from 123.5% in 2023) .
| Metric (Objective) | Weighting | Target | Actual at 12/31/2024 | Committee Determination |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Investments: Stabilized Development SQFT | 35% | 1.5 million | 0.25 million | 23.33% for Investments category |
| Investments: Stabilized Development # of Buildings | 35% | 4 | 1 | 23.33% category result |
| Investments: Pre-Promote Yield | 35% | 6.5% | >7% | 23.33% category result |
| Portfolio Mgmt: Industrial % Leased | 30% | 97% | 94% | 40.00% category result |
| Portfolio Mgmt: Same-Store NOI Growth | 30% | 4% | 5% | 40.00% category result |
| Portfolio Mgmt: Warehouse/Distribution Leasing Spreads | 30% | 25% | >30% | 40.00% category result |
| Balance Sheet: Credit Rating | 20% | Maintain current ratings | Maintained | 20.00% category result |
| Balance Sheet: Net Debt / Adjusted EBITDA | 20% | 6.0x | 5.9x | 20.00% category result |
| Corporate Responsibility: ISS Governance Score | 15% | 2 (lower better) | 1 | 22.50% category result |
| Corporate Responsibility: GRESB vs Peer Average | 15% | 102% | 105% | 22.50% category result |
| Corporate Responsibility: Tenant Survey | 15% | 102% | 103% / 24% participation | 22.50% category result |
| Corporate Responsibility: Employee Survey | 15% | Neutral | Positive / 97% participation | 22.50% category result |
| Metric (Subjective – Mullinix) | Rationale | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|
| Individual Performance (30% of ACI) | Led capital recycling (sold Cleveland legacy asset, three Chicago assets; acquired Savannah, Houston, two Atlanta assets with no dilution); oversaw 2022 Phoenix ground lease monetized in 2024 with significant ROI; supported investor outreach | 150% of subjective portion |
Long-Term Incentives (Equity)
| Program Feature | 2024 LTIP Design | 2025 LTIP Design |
|---|---|---|
| Award Mix | 60% performance-based non-vested shares; 40% time-based non-vested shares | Same mix |
| Performance Metric | Relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT (50%) and competitor peer group (50%); 3-year cliff (Jan 1 start) | Relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT (50%) and competitor peer group (50%); 3-year cliff (Jan 1 start) |
| Performance Levels | Threshold 33rd pct; Target 50th; Max 75th; straight-line interpolation; dividends accrue and pay only upon vest | Same |
| Service Shares Vesting | Pro-rata annually over 3 years; dividends currently paid | Pro-rata annually over 3 years; dividends currently paid |
| Mullinix Target Opportunity | $1,050,000 total target (PB $630,000; TB $420,000) | $1,100,000 total target (PB $660,000; TB $440,000); +5% vs 2024 |
| 2024 Grant Share Counts (Mullinix) | Service-based shares: 43,710 (#) at $420,053 GDFV ; Performance shares target: 65,557 (#) (threshold 32,779; max 131,114) at $766,034 GDFV | 2025 grants were based on $8.01 share price (Jan 2, 2025) for share count determination |
| PSU Tracking/Payouts | 2022 PSU paid 0% (both legs below threshold); 2023 tracking below threshold; 2024 tracking slightly above target vs peer group and below threshold vs index | Will determine after 3-year period |
Scheduled Vesting (Service-Based and Performance-Based)
| Vesting Date | Service-Based Shares (Mullinix) | Performance-Based Shares Outstanding (Mullinix) |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 2025 | 34,406 (#) | 65,844 (#) (subject to performance and service) |
| Jan 2026 | 27,090 (#) | 112,677 (#) (subject to performance and service) |
| Jan 2027 | 14,570 (#) | 131,114 (#) (subject to performance and service) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership (shares) | 807,395 |
| Directly Held | 302,209 |
| Subject to Performance/Time-Based Vesting | 505,186 |
| Percentage of Class | <1.0% (“*” per proxy) |
| Outstanding Equity Awards at FY-End 2024 | Non-vested shares: 76,066 valued at $617,656 (at $8.12/share) ; Unearned PSUs: 110,116 valued at $894,138 (at $8.12/share) |
| Options | None outstanding; no option exercises in 2024 |
| 2024 Shares Vested & Value | 42,755 shares vested; $424,130 value realized |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives must own minimum multiples of salary (CEO 6x; next three highest 3x; fifth 2x) and hold 50% of net shares acquired until retirement; all executives in compliance (subject to phase-in) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited (no hedging or pledging allowed per policy) |
| Clawback | Robust clawback compliant with NYSE/Exchange Act 10D; recapture up to 3 years prior to restatement period; not a “good reason” trigger |
Employment Terms
| Scenario (as of 12/31/2024) | Severance Components (Mullinix) | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| Without Cause or With Good Reason (double-trigger if within Change in Control) | Base salary portion | $950,000 |
| Bonus portion (avg of 2023–2024 ACI incl. pro rata) | $1,631,274 | |
| Group healthcare benefits (assumed lump-sum) | $39,164 | |
| Accelerated equity awards (time-based and earned PSUs; pro-rata for unearned PSUs) | $1,511,794 | |
| Total Payments & Benefits | $4,132,232 | |
| Death or Disability | Base salary portion | $475,000 |
| Bonus portion (pro rata under policy) | $543,758 | |
| Group healthcare benefits | $39,164 | |
| Accelerated equity awards | $1,511,794 | |
| Total Payments & Benefits | $2,569,716 | |
| Change in Control (single-trigger) | No payment absent termination; all NEOs require double-trigger | Policy statement (no single-trigger CIC severance) |
Severance multiples: CEO 2.5x salary+bonus; others (incl. Mullinix) 2.0x salary+bonus; continuation of certain benefits (two years for others) and pro-rata bonus; no 4999 excise tax gross-ups; PSUs accelerate only for earned portion (unearned PSUs pro-rate unless CIC provisions deem earned) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Mullinix’s compensation heavily emphasizes relative TSR via PSUs (60% of LTIP) with three-year cliffs and strict thresholds, plus operational metrics for cash incentives; 2024 PSU cohort tracking slightly above target versus the competitor peer group and below threshold versus the index suggests sensitivity to sector-relative performance and index headwinds .
- Near-term selling pressure: Significant scheduled vesting tranches in January 2025/2026/2027 (service shares: 34,406; 27,090; 14,570; PSUs outstanding subject to performance: 65,844; 112,677; 131,114) may create episodic supply; however, executives must retain at least 50% of net shares, and hedging/pledging are prohibited, tempering disposal risk .
- Retention and change-in-control economics: Double-trigger CIC, two-times severance multiple for Mullinix, and three-year PSU cliffs are retentive; absence of tax gross-ups and capped severance indicates shareholder-friendly design .
- Ownership alignment: Mullinix’s beneficial ownership of 807,395 shares (<1%) and compliance with ownership guidelines reinforce alignment; no options outstanding reduces incentive for timing-driven exercises, focusing alignment on TSR and operational outcomes .
- Performance backdrop: 2024 outcomes (AFFO $189.4m; 5.9x Net Debt/Adj. EBITDA; 5% same-store NOI; >30% leasing spreads) supported above-target cash incentive results, particularly in the portfolio management category; ongoing TSR-linked PSU outcomes will drive realized compensation variability and provide signals on sector-relative execution .
Say-on-Pay & Peer Benchmarking
- 2024 Say-on-Pay approval ~96%; five-year average 97%, reflecting shareholder support for the program .
- Benchmarking uses competitor and size-based REIT peer groups; LTIP comparator groups include MSCI US REIT Index and a competitor peer cohort (e.g., EGP, FR, REXR, STAG, TRNO, WPC, etc.) for relative TSR measurement .
Notes on Track Record and Execution Risk
- Achievements: Led capital recycling and ground lease monetization (Phoenix land) with significant ROI; redeployed into Sunbelt assets with stronger growth profiles; supported investor outreach .
- Risks: 2022 and 2023 PSU cohorts tracking/payout below threshold indicate sensitivity to broader REIT index performance; operational targets (industrial % leased, development stabilization) faced headwinds from supply and tenant demand in 2024, partly offset by strong leasing spreads and same-store NOI growth .