Nabil Andrawis
About Nabil Andrawis
Executive Vice President & Director of Taxation at LXP Industrial Trust; age 54 (2025). He joined LXP in 2002 after roles at Vornado Realty Trust and Deloitte & Touche and previously co-chaired NAREIT’s State and Local Tax Subcommittee; he holds a degree from Baruch College and is a Certified Public Accountant . Company performance context during his tenure includes robust leasing and NOI growth: in 2024 LXP leased 4.5M sq ft, delivered 5.0% same-store NOI growth, net income of $37.9M ($0.13 diluted EPS) and Adjusted Company FFO of $189.4M ($0.64/share) ; 2023 delivered 6.8M sq ft leased and 4.1% same-store NOI growth . Pay-versus-performance TSR shows $100 investment at $86.82 (2024) vs MSCI US REIT Index $108.75; $104.33 (2023) vs index $113.74 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vornado Realty Trust | Tax/Finance (prior role) | Not disclosed | Large-cap REIT tax experience supporting complex transactions |
| Deloitte & Touche LLP | Tax (prior role) | Not disclosed | Public accounting foundation; REIT taxation expertise |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NAREIT (National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts) | State & Local Tax Subcommittee Co‑Chair (previously) | Not disclosed | Industry tax policy leadership; information flow across REIT peers |
Company Performance Context (for compensation alignment)
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Square Feet Leased (industrial) | 6.8M | 4.5M |
| Base Rent Increase (excl. fixed renewals) | ~52.3% | 46.5% |
| Cash Base Rent Increase (excl. fixed renewals) | ~37.3% | 39.7% |
| Same-Store NOI Growth | 4.1% | 5.0% |
| Net Income ($M) | $35.9 | $37.9 |
| Adjusted Company FFO ($M) | $206.2 | $189.4 |
| TSR – $100 Investment | $104.33 | $86.82 |
| MSCI US REIT Index – $100 Investment | $113.74 | $108.75 |
Fixed Compensation
- Executive salary and annual cash incentive structure: LXP’s program uses base salary plus annual cash incentive, with 70% based on predefined objective metrics and 30% on subjective measures; this framework applied to named executive officers (NEOs) and reflects pay-for-performance design .
- Nabil’s individual base salary and annual incentive amounts are not disclosed (he is not listed as an NEO); however, the incentive architecture and corporate performance metrics (portfolio management, investments, balance sheet, corporate responsibility/ESG) set the performance context for executive incentives .
- Share ownership guidelines apply to executive officers: CEO at 6x salary; next three most highly compensated at 3x; fifth most highly compensated at 2x; executives must retain at least 50% of shares acquired through equity awards until retirement; executive officers were in compliance (subject to phase-in periods) .
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric | Weighting | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | 2024 Payout vs Target | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash Incentive (Objective) | Investments – stabilized development sq ft (# buildings; pre-promote yield) | 35% | 1.5M sq ft; 4 buildings; >6.5% yield | 0.25M sq ft; 1 building; >7% yield | 23.33% of objective segment | Cash; earned annually |
| Annual Cash Incentive (Objective) | Portfolio Management – % leased; same-store NOI; leasing spreads | 30% | 97% leased; 4% SS NOI; 25%+ spreads | 94% leased; 5% SS NOI; >30% spreads | 40.00% of objective segment | Cash; earned annually |
| Annual Cash Incentive (Objective) | Balance Sheet – maintain ratings; Net Debt/Adj EBITDA | 20% | Maintain ratings; 6.0x | Ratings maintained; 5.9x | 20.00% of objective segment | |
| Annual Cash Incentive (Objective) | Corporate Responsibility (ISS governance, GRESB vs peer, tenant/employee surveys) | 15% | ISS score 2; GRESB 102% of peer; tenant 102% with participation; employee neutral | ISS 1; GRESB 105%; tenant 103%/24% participation; employee positive/97% participation | 22.50% of objective segment | |
| Annual Cash Incentive (Objective – aggregate) | Sum of objective components | 70% of total bonus | — | — | 105.83% of objective portion for NEOs | — |
| Long-Term Incentive (Performance Shares) | Relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index | 30% of LTI target | 50th percentile target; 33rd threshold; 75th max | Tracking below threshold (2024 grant to 12/31/2024) | 0% (tracking) | 3-year cliff; dividends accrue, paid upon vesting |
| Long-Term Incentive (Performance Shares) | Relative TSR vs competitor peer group | 30% of LTI target | 50th percentile target; 33rd threshold; 75th max | Tracking slightly above target (2024 grant to 12/31/2024) | 114% (tracking) | 3-year cliff; dividends accrue, paid upon vesting |
| Long-Term Incentive (Time-Based Shares) | Service-based equity | 40% of LTI target | N/A | N/A | N/A | Pro-rata annual vesting over 3 years; dividends currently paid |
Note: Nabil Andrawis’s individual payouts are not disclosed (not an NEO). The table reflects LXP’s plan design and 2024 determinations for NEOs that set the incentive context for executive officers .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Measure | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Group ownership – all trustees & executive officers (persons) | 6,400,750 shares; 14 persons | 7,770,010 shares; 15 persons |
| Group ownership – % of outstanding | 2.17% | 2.6% |
| Inclusion of Nabil Andrawis | Included in group (footnote 10) | Included in group (footnote 10) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO 6x salary; next three execs 3x; fifth exec 2x; 50% retention of shares until retirement | Same |
| Compliance status | Executive officers and trustees in compliance (subject to phase-in) | Executive officers and trustees in compliance (subject to phase-in) |
| Anti‑pledging / anti‑hedging | Prohibited for trustees, officers, employees | Prohibited for trustees, officers, employees |
Form 4 insider trading data could not be retrieved due to an API authorization error, so recent transaction-level selling/buying pressure for Nabil is not available from this source at this time.
Employment Terms
- Severance framework (applicable to “certain executive officers”): On termination without cause or with good reason (including within a change-in-control), executives receive 2x base salary, 2-year average annual cash incentive, benefits for 2 years, and a pro‑rata annual bonus; CEO receives 2.5x and 2.5 years of benefits .
- Change‑in‑control mechanics: No single trigger; awards are assumed or substituted; if not, Committee may accelerate vesting or cash out; double‑trigger acceleration if involuntary termination within 12 months post‑CoC .
- Equity acceleration terms: Time‑based awards and earned performance awards accelerate; unearned performance awards prorate to termination date (full earning in certain CoC events) .
- Clawback: NYSE‑compliant policy requires recovery of incentive compensation upon GAAP restatement .
- Insider trading policy: Centralized policy filed with the 2024 Form 10‑K; trading windows and governance enforced .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited across trustees, officers, employees .
Compensation Benchmarking & Governance Signals
- Peer groups: Competitor and size-based REIT peer sets underpin compensation benchmarking; competitor peers include EGP, FR, REXR, STAG, TRNO, WPC, etc. .
- Say‑on‑pay: 5‑year average ~97% support; 2024 vote ~96% FOR, evidencing investor acceptance of the pay program .
- 2025 program: LTI mix remains 60% performance shares (split MSCI REIT Index and competitor peer group) and 40% time‑based; performance period three years; CEO and other NEO LTI targets modestly increased; grants priced at $8.01 on Jan 2, 2025 .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Strong at‑risk mix and multi‑metric design: 70/30 objective/subjective cash incentives balance operational drivers (leasing, NOI, spreads) with strategic/ESG outcomes; LTI tied to relative TSR across sector peers, aligning with shareholder returns .
- Guardrails and governance: No option repricing, no tax gross‑ups, double‑trigger CoC, minimum vesting and clawbacks mitigate excess risk and pay inflation .
- Ownership alignment: Mandatory retention of 50% of acquired shares and multiples of salary requirements enhance skin‑in‑the‑game; anti‑pledging reduces misalignment risk .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Relative‑TSR LTI and mandatory share retention support long‑term alignment; anti‑hedging/pledging and clawbacks reduce governance risk .
- Retention risk: Three‑year vesting, double‑trigger CoC, and market‑aligned LTI sizing for senior executives are retentive; absence of single‑trigger protection and lack of tax gross‑ups are shareholder‑friendly .
- Trading signals: Without Form 4 data, insider selling pressure for Nabil cannot be assessed; group ownership rose from 2.17% (2024) to 2.6% (2025), suggesting broader insider equity alignment, but not person‑specific activity .
- Performance tie‑in: Cash incentives linked to leasing/NOI/spreads and balance sheet targets dovetail with LXP’s 2023–2024 operational outcomes; TSR underperformance vs index in 2024 limits performance share vesting on the index tranche, tempering realized pay and signaling accountability .