Nathan Brunner
About Nathan Brunner
Nathan Brunner, 42, is Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer & Treasurer of LXP Industrial Trust, appointed effective March 1, 2025 after joining LXP in September 2024 as EVP of Capital Markets . He spent ~15 years at J.P. Morgan as a Managing Director in Real Estate Investment Banking and began his career at Macquarie Group (Infrastructure Funds and Investment Banking) from 2005–2010; he holds a Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Commerce from the University of Queensland and a Graduate Diploma of Chartered Accounting from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia . Company performance metrics tied to executive pay in 2024 included 5.0% same‑store NOI growth, net income of $37.9M ($0.13/diluted share), Adjusted Company FFO of $189.4M ($0.64/diluted share), and LXP increased its dividend; LXP’s 2024 TSR measured at $86.82 vs $108.75 for its MSCI US REIT peer index in the pay-versus-performance table .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| J.P. Morgan | Managing Director, Real Estate Investment Banking | ~15 years | Led M&A, strategy, and capital markets coverage for REITs/real estate companies . |
| Macquarie Group | Infrastructure Funds & Investment Banking | 2005–2010 | Investment and banking experience in infrastructure and corporate finance . |
| LXP Industrial Trust | EVP, Capital Markets (then CFO) | Sep 2024–present | Joined to lead capital markets; elevated to CFO Mar 1, 2025 . |
External Roles
- No public company directorships or Item 404(a) related party transactions disclosed; no family relationships with trustees/executives .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (%) | Target Bonus ($) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 485,000 | 100% | 485,000 | 504,804 |
| 2025 | 500,000 | 100% | 500,000 | N/A (to be determined per 2025 plan) |
- 2024 included a $250,000 initial cash payment (sign-on), subject to repayment if terminated for cause or voluntary resignation without good reason before Dec 31, 2025 .
- 2024 minimum annual cash incentive guaranteed at $485,000 to facilitate CFO transition; actual award was $504,804 (paid $402,954 in Jan 2025 and $101,850 expected Mar 2025) .
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Committee Determination/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash Incentive – Objective (2024) | Investments (stabilized development sq ft/# buildings/pre‑promote yield) | 35% | 1.5M sq ft; 4 buildings; 6.5% yield | 0.25M sq ft; 1 building; >7% yield | 23.33% |
| Portfolio Management (percent leased; same‑store NOI; leasing spreads) | 30% | 97%; 4%; 25% | 94%; 5%; >30% | 40.00% | |
| Balance Sheet (ratings; Net Debt/Adj EBITDA) | 20% | Maintain ratings; 6.0x | Maintained; 5.9x | 20.00% | |
| Corporate Responsibility (ISS, GRESB, tenant & employee surveys) | 15% | ISS avg 2; GRESB 102% of peer; tenant 102%; employee neutral | ISS avg 1; GRESB 105%; tenant 103% with 24% participation; employee positive with 97% participation | 22.50% | |
| Annual Cash Incentive – Objective aggregate | 70% of total | 105.83% of objective target; down from 123.5% in 2023 | |||
| Annual Cash Incentive – Subjective (2024) | CFO was guaranteed target per transition; see Fixed Compensation | 30% | Paid per plan; total bonus 104% of target overall | ||
| Long-Term Incentive (2025 plan design) | Performance Shares – relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index | 30% | 50th percentile target; 33rd threshold; 75th max; 3-year cliff vest | Accrue dividends; paid only if vest | Target design; grants Jan 2025 with $8.01/share ref price |
| Performance Shares – relative TSR vs competitor peer group | 30% | 50th percentile target; 33rd threshold; 75th max; 3-year cliff vest | Accrue dividends; paid only if vest | As above | |
| Time-Based Shares (service-based) | 40% | Pro‑rata vest over 3 years | Dividends currently paid | As above |
2025 target LTI mix for Brunner: Performance-based $510,000 (target) and service-based $340,000 for a total target $850,000; performance thresholds/maximums as shown above .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 319,791 common shares beneficially owned, consisting of shares subject to time/performance-based vesting; represents less than 1% of outstanding shares . |
| Vested vs unvested | 150,000 time-based non‑vested shares awarded at hire (see vesting schedule below); dividends paid currently on these . |
| Options | No stock options outstanding; no option exercises; company does not use stock options currently . |
| Ownership guidelines | Executive officers must meet minimum ownership multiples: CFOs among top executives required to hold shares equal to 3× base salary within 3 years of appointment; maintain ownership of at least 50% of shares acquired via equity awards after taxes until retirement/termination; executives and trustees were compliant subject to phase‑in . |
| Pledging/hedging | Company prohibits pledging and hedging of LXP securities; anti‑pledging/hedging policies in place . |
Vesting Schedule (time-based shares from initial grant)
| 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
|---|---|---|
| 50,000 shares on Sep 3, 2025 | 50,000 shares on Jan 1, 2026 | 50,000 shares on Jan 1, 2027 |
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Start dates | Joined LXP Sep 1, 2024 (EVP Capital Markets); appointed CFO Mar 1, 2025 . |
| Contract | At‑will employment; confidentiality obligations; standard benefits package . |
| 2024 sign-on/transition | $250,000 initial cash payment (repayable if terminated for cause or voluntary resignation without good reason prior to Dec 31, 2025); guaranteed minimum 2024 annual cash incentive at target; initial 150,000 time‑based non‑vested common shares . |
| 2025 compensation plan | Base $500,000; annual cash incentive threshold $250,000, target $500,000, maximum $1,000,000; LTI target $850,000 (60% performance, 40% time-based) . |
| Severance (policy) | Under Executive Severance Plan: for termination without cause or with good reason (including within change in control), multiple equals 2× base salary + average of last two annual cash incentive awards; continuation of certain benefits for 2 years; pro‑rata bonus; death/disability equals 1× base salary + pro‑rata bonus + benefits continuation; no excise tax gross‑ups . |
| Change‑in‑control and vesting | All change‑in‑control severance arrangements are double‑trigger; equity plan provides for assumption/substitution of awards or potential acceleration if not assumed; involuntary termination within 12 months post change‑in‑control accelerates vesting; committee may accelerate or cash out awards if not assumed . |
| Potential payments (illustrative at 12/31/2024) | Without cause/with good reason: $3,776,915 total; Death or disability: $2,282,306 total (includes accelerated equity, salary multiple, bonus component, benefits); single‑trigger CoC payments not provided . |
| Clawback | NYSE‑compliant clawback policy; recoup incentive compensation upon GAAP restatement in excess of what would have been paid ; plan provides clawback/Dodd‑Frank recoupment provisions . |
Compensation Structure vs Performance Metrics
- Annual cash incentives are 70% objective metrics and 30% subjective; 2024 objective metrics emphasized Investments, Portfolio Management, Balance Sheet, and Corporate Responsibility; the objective portion paid at 105.83% of target .
- Long‑term incentives emphasize pay‑for‑performance via relative TSR vs MSCI US REIT Index and a competitor peer group over 3 years; 60% of LTI is performance‑based and 40% time‑based to balance retention and performance alignment; dividends on performance awards accrue and are paid only if vesting occurs .
- Compensation governance highlights include independent consultant (Ferguson Partners), strong shareholder support (96% “say‑on‑pay” in 2024; five‑year average ~97%), transparent disclosure, and no tax gross‑ups .
Equity Plan Parameters and Dilution
- 2022 Equity‑Based Award Plan amended (subject to shareholder approval) to add 5,000,000 shares; overhang would rise from ~1.56% to ~3.25%; three‑year average burn rate ~0.28% .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
- Competitor peer group (industrial and net‑lease REITs) includes BNL, EGP, EPRT, FR, GTY, NNN, REXR, STAG, TRNO, WPC, among others .
- Size peer group spans 20 REITs with total capitalization between ~$2.95B–$5.6B; LXP at 36th percentile ($4.0B) at Oct 31, 2023 .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval ~96%; five‑year average ~97% .
- Robust shareholder engagement: meetings representing 61% of outstanding shares as of Dec 31, 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Brunner’s compensation is tightly linked to operational execution (leasing spreads, same‑store NOI, leverage) and multi‑year TSR, with significant equity and clear ownership/retention policies; anti‑pledging/hedging and clawbacks reduce governance risk .
- Retention risk: Initial $250k sign‑on subject to repayment and staggered vesting of 150k time‑based shares through 2027 create near‑term retention hooks; severance is standard at 2× with double‑trigger for CoC, limiting windfall risk yet offering protection .
- Performance focus: 2025 plan maintains emphasis on relative TSR and continued operational metrics—investors should monitor leasing mark‑to‑market execution, vacancy resolution, and leverage trajectory (Net Debt/Adj EBITDA) as key payout drivers .
- Trading signals: Upcoming vesting dates (Sep 3, 2025; Jan 1, 2026; Jan 1, 2027) may modestly increase supply from tax‑withholding settlements; no options outstanding reduces overhang from in‑the‑money exercises . Strong say‑on‑pay and governance practices suggest low compensation‑related controversy risk .