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Jeffrey Coyne

General Counsel and Secretary at MediaAlpha
Executive

About Jeffrey Coyne

Jeffrey B. Coyne, 58, is General Counsel and Secretary of MediaAlpha (MAX) since May 2021; he holds a B.A. in Economics from Duke University and a J.D. from the University of Southern California Law Center . His incentive compensation is tied to company-level performance metrics—Transaction Value and Adjusted EBITDA—with payouts determined post-audit, aligning pay with profitable growth priorities . In 2024 he received a 150% of target cash bonus ($300,000 vs. $200,000 target), indicating above-target achievement against those metrics for the year . Coyne beneficially owns 152,224 Class A shares (<1%), with executive stock ownership guidelines requiring “other executive officers” to hold stock equal to at least 2× base salary and retain 75% of shares until compliant .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Veritone, Inc. (AI technology provider)EVP, General Counsel & Secretary2016–2021Legal leadership at an AI solutions company
Newport Corporation (acquired by MKS Instruments)VP, then SVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary2001–2016Legal leadership at a global advanced technology supplier
Stradling Yocca Carlson & RauthPartner, Corporate & SecuritiesTechnology-focused law firm partner

External Roles

No current public company board seats or external directorships disclosed for Coyne in the 2025 proxy .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year compensation summary for Coyne:

YearSalary ($)Bonus ($)Stock Awards ($)Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($)All Other Compensation ($)Total ($)
2022383,333 1,488,834 12,783 1,884,950
2023397,500 1,647,063 13,200 2,057,763
2024400,000 2,049,431 300,000 13,800 2,763,231
  • Base salary remained $400,000 in 2024 (no change vs. 2023) .
  • “All Other Compensation” in 2024 includes a $13,800 401(k) employer match .

Performance Compensation

Annual incentive plan design and 2024 outcome:

MetricWeightingTarget (Cash $)Actual Payout (Cash $)Payout PercentagePayout Timing
Transaction Value50% 100,000 (50% of $200,000 target) Part of $300,000 total payout 150% plan max Determined Q1 following fiscal year
Adjusted EBITDA50% 100,000 (50% of $200,000 target) Part of $300,000 total payout 150% plan max Determined Q1 following fiscal year
  • 2024 target incentive: 50% of base salary ($200,000) .
  • Actual 2024 cash bonus paid: $300,000 (150% of target) .

2024 equity grant (time-based):

  • RSUs: 103,350 shares granted on March 15, 2024 under the 2020 Omnibus Incentive Plan; grant-date fair value $2,049,431 .
  • Vesting: 16 equal quarterly installments from May 15, 2024 through February 15, 2028, subject to continued service .

Company equity award policy:

  • 2024 long-term incentives granted as time-based RSUs (no performance RSUs for Coyne), due to share price volatility and difficulty setting credible long-term goals; the company does not grant stock options .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

HolderClass A SharesOwnership %Class B SharesVoting Power %
Jeffrey Coyne152,224 <1% <1%
  • Stock ownership guidelines: “other executive officers” must own stock valued at least 2× base salary; retention requirement to hold 75% of shares until compliant .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited without prior approval; none of the directors or executives have engaged in hedging or pledging transactions .
  • Approximate value vs. guideline: Using 12/31/2024 closing price of $11.29 and 152,224 shares, indicative value ≈ $1.72 million, exceeding the 2× salary guideline ($800,000); formal compliance status not stated in the proxy .

Employment Terms

Severance agreement:

  • Coyne is party to a severance compensation agreement (June 2022) that conditions benefits on a release and compliance with noncompetition, nonsolicitation and other restrictive covenants .

Key definitions:

  • “Cause” includes felony-related events, fraud/embezzlement, willful failure to comply after notice, chronic non-medical absence, illegal drug use affecting performance, gross negligence/willful misconduct causing substantial injury, or breaches of non-compete/solicitation/confidentiality/proprietary information agreements (with cure periods where applicable) .
  • “Good reason” includes reductions in base salary or target bonus (outside an equal across-the-board reduction), material changes in title/reporting/responsibilities, relocation >25 miles, or material breach of employer obligations (with cure periods and timing requirements) .

Estimated severance—other qualifying terminations (as of 12/31/2024, no change of control):

ComponentAmount ($)
Salary-based severance (12 months)400,000
Incentive-based severance300,000
Continuation of benefits35,200
Total estimated payments735,200

Change-of-control (double-trigger) economics:

  • If terminated without cause or for good reason within 3 months prior to or 12 months after a change of control: 18 months’ base salary, up to 18 months of employer-paid COBRA, prorated portion of target annual bonus (≥6-month minimum), and full vesting of time-based equity awards; base salary and prorated bonus paid in lump sum in that window .
  • Estimated CoC payouts (as of 12/31/2024): | Component | Amount ($) | |---|---:| | Salary-based severance (18 months, lump sum) | 600,000 | | Incentive-based severance (100% of target, lump sum) | 200,000 | | Equity vesting (aggregate market value at $11.29/share) | 2,119,686 | | Continuation of benefits (18 months) | 52,800 | | Total estimated payments | 2,972,486 |

Clawback and recovery:

  • Incentive-Based Compensation Recovery Policy (adopted August 2023) requires reimbursement of erroneously awarded incentive pay following an accounting restatement; applies to compensation received on/after October 2, 2023 and within the three fiscal years prior to the restatement determination .

Investment Implications

  • Strong pay-for-performance linkage: 2024 bonus tied 50/50 to Transaction Value and Adjusted EBITDA with a 150% payout at plan maximum, reinforcing alignment with profitable growth results .
  • Retention: Significant unvested time-based RSUs vest quarterly through February 2028, providing multi-year retention incentives and alignment with shareholder value; options are not used, reducing leverage risk .
  • Governance risk mitigants: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging (none engaged) and a robust clawback policy reduce misalignment and financial restatement risk exposure .
  • Change-of-control terms: Double-trigger severance and full vesting of time-based RSUs in a CoC termination scenario create clear economics, with total estimated CoC payments of ~$3.0 million as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership (~152k shares) combined with stringent stock ownership guidelines and retention requirements suggests adequate alignment, even as ownership is modest relative to founders and large holders .