Joseph Schachinger
About Joseph Schachinger
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Treasurer of MBIA Inc. since April 30, 2024; also appointed Chairman and CFO of MBIA Insurance Corp. on the same date. Age 56. Previously MBIA’s Controller (2017–2024) and Deputy Controller (2009–2017); joined MBIA in 2000 after serving as Controller, Chief Trading Risk Officer, and Financial & Operations Principal at DNB US in New York. MBIA’s pay-for-performance program ties compensation primarily to Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and Adjusted Book Value (ABV); 2024 annual incentive paid at 79% of target amid PREPA-related losses and an ABV per share decline to $13.79 from $17.66 in 2023 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MBIA Inc. | EVP, CFO & Treasurer | 2024–present | Financial leadership during runoff; focus on liquidity, ABV, expense management and PREPA remediation |
| MBIA Insurance Corp. | Chairman & CFO | 2024–present | Oversees portfolio management and remediation at MBIA Insurance |
| MBIA Inc. | Controller | 2017–2024 | Led accounting in transition/runoff; equity & incentive plan administration |
| MBIA Inc. | Deputy Controller | 2009–2017 | Financial reporting integrity; supported risk & liquidity oversight |
| MBIA Inc. | Vice President, Controller’s Group | 2000–2009 | Joined MBIA; controller group leadership |
| DNB US, New York | Controller; Chief Trading Risk Officer; Financial & Operations Principal | Pre-2000 | Trading risk oversight; regulatory principal duties |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MBIA Insurance Corp. | Chairman & CFO | 2024–present | Governance and finance oversight for insurance subsidiary |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 (set) |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $345,833 | $375,000 (7% increase) |
| Target bonus (%) of base | 100% | Not disclosed |
| Target bonus ($) | $350,000 | Not disclosed |
| Actual bonus paid ($) | $276,500 (79% of target) | |
| Stock awards grant-date FV ($) | $150,000 | |
| All other compensation ($) | $108,377 (includes $44,250 pension/401k; $64,127 non-qualified plan contribution) | |
| Total compensation ($) | $880,710 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout impact | Vesting / mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual incentive (Company scorecard) | Composite: National 31%; MBIA Insurance 15%; Corporate Liquidity 8%; Enterprise (ABV 15%, Expense 8%, People 23%) | 100% of target | Overall formulaic outcome 79% of target; CFO bonus paid $276,500 (79% of $350,000) | Cash payout at 79% of target | Paid in cash; CFO award reflects company scorecard and role-based target |
| Long-term incentive (2024 grant) | N/A | $150,000 grant-date FV | 23,184 time-based restricted shares granted | Equity value depends on stock at vesting | Time-based shares vest in equal installments on 3rd, 4th, and 5th anniversaries of Mar 4, 2024 grant |
| Performance shares (2024) | N/A | None granted in 2024 | N/A | N/A | Company ceased issuing PSUs in 2024; awards are time-based equity |
| Program performance linkage | Most important measures for CAP: TSR and ABV | TSR/ABV | TSR correlation emphasized; ABV per share fell to $13.79 (from $17.66) | Reduced annual incentive; forfeiture in prior cycles | Prior 2022–2024 performance share cycle forfeited at 0% (threshold not met); CFO did not receive those PSUs as he was not CFO then |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 203,257 common shares as of Mar 12, 2025 (less than 1% outstanding) |
| Stock vested in 2024 | 32,324 shares; value realized $213,872 |
| Unvested time-based shares (12/31/2024) | 14,712 (2020 grant); 13,315 (2021 grant); 11,261 (2022 grant); 12,039 (2023 grant); 23,184 (2024 grant). Market values calculated at $6.46 per share |
| Performance shares outstanding | None listed for Schachinger at 12/31/2024 |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CFO required to hold 3× base salary; 3 of 4 other NEOs exceeded guidelines as of Mar 12, 2025; remaining NEO appointed in 2024 on track (implies CFO progressing) |
| Hedging/pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging; Legal has not approved any such transactions in over 10 years |
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash severance ($) | Equity vesting (time-based) | Equity vesting (performance-based) | Healthcare/retirement benefits | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change in control + qualifying termination | $0 | Immediate vesting; $481,341 value at $6.46/share | Vest to extent “performance score” satisfied | None disclosed | $481,341 |
| Retirement (eligible as of 12/31/2024) | $0 | Remain outstanding; vest per schedule; immediate vesting for certain awards | Earned PS remain outstanding; vest per schedule | Health benefits (COBRA) to age 65 at employee cost; retirement plan balances per policy | $481,341 |
| Involuntary termination (no CIC) | Board discretion (no fixed multiple) | Immediate vesting of 2019–2024 annual awards; 2018 vests per terms | Continue vesting per original terms to extent performance criteria met | None disclosed | $481,341 |
| Death or disability | $0 | Immediate vesting; $481,341 value | Vest to extent “performance score” satisfied | Unvested retirement accounts become fully vested | $481,341 |
Additional governance and retention notes:
- MBIA does not offer employment contracts to NEOs; change-in-control cash severance (KEEP Plan) applies only to CEO, not to CFO .
- Executive compensation clawback policy revised July 2023 to comply with listing standards; applies to current and former executive officers; no clawback actions in 2024 .
- Special one-time cash retention awards approved Feb 11, 2025 for CEO, Bergonzi, Young, Avitabile; CFO not included; awards cliff vest Mar 1, 2028, or earlier upon qualifying termination in a change of control, death/disability .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is intact: 2024 annual incentive paid 79% of target on a quantifiable scorecard (ABV decline, PREPA losses), and performance share cycles have forfeited when TSR thresholds were not met—reinforcing downside sensitivity; CFO’s LTI is entirely time-based, which supports retention but dilutes direct performance linkage compared to PSUs .
- Low severance exposure and strong alignment safeguards: CFO has no cash severance under CIC, equity vests per plan, and anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies reduce misalignment risks; clawback is in place, lowering governance risk .
- Ownership alignment is developing: CFO beneficially owns 203,257 shares, is subject to a 3× salary guideline, and vested 32,324 shares in 2024; as a 2024 appointee, he is on track to meet guidelines—monitor for acceleration or shortfall relative to policy .
- Retention signal: Absence from 2025 special retention awards while other NEOs received long-dated cash incentives could modestly elevate CFO retention risk if market opportunities arise; offset by multi-year vesting of sizable time-based RS awards .
- Performance execution focus: Company priority on PREPA resolution, liquidity, and ABV stabilization ties directly to incentive outcomes; investors should watch TSR/ABV trends and annual scorecard results for read-through to CFO cash bonus and equity realization .