John Danhakl
About John Danhakl
John Danhakl (age 69) is an independent Class I director of Mister Car Wash (MCW), serving on the board since August 2014. He is Managing Partner of Leonard Green & Partners (LGP), which he joined in 1995, and previously held senior corporate finance roles at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and Drexel Burnham Lambert. He holds a B.A. from UC Berkeley (1980) and an MBA from Harvard Business School (1985). The board cites his extensive private equity investing and financial analysis experience as core credentials for MCW’s board .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leonard Green & Partners, L.P. | Managing Partner | Joined 1995–present | Leads private equity investments; board views experience investing in high‑growth, market‑leading companies as additive to MCW governance |
| Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette | Managing Director | Prior to 1995 (not individually dated) | Corporate finance leadership |
| Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. | Vice President, Corporate Finance | Prior to DLJ (not individually dated) | Corporate finance experience |
External Roles
| Company | Role | Since | Committees/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| IQVIA Holdings, Inc. | Director | February 2010 | Committee assignments not disclosed in MCW proxy |
| Life Time Group Holdings, Inc. | Director | June 2015 | Committee assignments not disclosed in MCW proxy |
Board Governance
- Committee assignments and chair roles: Not currently assigned to Audit, Compensation, or Nominating & Corporate Governance; not a committee chair .
- Class/tenure/term: Class I nominee at the 2025 annual meeting; if elected, term runs to the 2028 annual meeting .
- Independence: Board determined he is independent under NASDAQ rules (9 of 10 directors independent) .
- Attendance and engagement: Board met 4x in 2024; all directors attended at least 75% of their meetings; all directors attended the 2024 annual meeting; independent directors hold regular executive sessions with a rotating presiding director .
- Controlled company context: MCW qualifies as a “controlled company” because LGP controls >50% of voting power; while MCW currently follows non‑controlled governance standards, it may avail itself of exemptions in the future . Mr. Danhakl is an LGP designee under the Stockholders Agreement .
Fixed Compensation (Director)
| Year | Annual Cash Retainer ($) | Committee Member Fees ($) | Committee Chair Fees ($) | Equity Awards (Grant-Date Value, $) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Non‑employee directors affiliated with LGP are not compensated under MCW’s director compensation policy . |
MCW’s policy: eligible non‑employee directors receive a $75,000 cash retainer; committee chairs +$25,000; committee members +$10,000; and $100,000 in RSUs upon election and annually, vesting by the next annual meeting. LGP‑affiliated directors (including Mr. Danhakl) do not receive director compensation .
Performance Compensation (Director)
| Component | Structure | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|
| Director incentive/PSU awards | None disclosed for directors; annual RSUs for eligible, non‑LGP directors vest time‑based | No performance metrics tied to director pay disclosed; LGP‑affiliated directors receive no director pay |
Other Directorships & Interlocks
| Type | Entity | Role/Connection | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public board | IQVIA Holdings, Inc. | Director | Since Feb 2010 |
| Public board | Life Time Group Holdings, Inc. | Director | Since Jun 2015 |
| Shareholder designee | MCW | LGP Designee | Designation rights under Stockholders Agreement; LGP controls 66.1% voting power |
| Internal interlocks (influence context) | MCW Compensation Committee | Members: Rogers (Chair), Seiffer (LGP), Galashan (LGP) | LGP designees sit on Comp and Nom/Gov committees; Seiffer chairs Nom/Gov |
Expertise & Qualifications
- Private equity and financial analysis expertise from senior roles at LGP, DLJ, and Drexel Burnham Lambert .
- Education: UC Berkeley (B.A., 1980) and Harvard Business School (MBA, 1985) .
- Board views his experience supporting high‑growth, market‑leading companies as a qualification for service .
Equity Ownership
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Personal beneficial ownership | Not individually listed as a beneficial owner; table shows “—” and “*” (<1%) for Mr. Danhakl . |
| Controlling shareholder context | LGP and affiliates beneficially own 219,213,079 shares (66.1%) with designation rights; Mr. Danhakl is Managing Partner and an LGP designee (but not shown as personal beneficial owner) . |
| Ownership guidelines | Directors must hold 5x annual cash retainer, except those affiliated with LGP or an affiliate; LGP‑affiliated directors are excluded from the requirement . |
| Hedging/pledging | Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policy applies to directors . |
Governance Assessment
-
Positives:
- Board has determined Mr. Danhakl is independent; he is not seated on key committees, which can mitigate direct committee‑level conflicts .
- Attendance: all directors met ≥75% attendance in 2024; full board attended the 2024 annual meeting; regular independent‑director executive sessions support oversight .
- LGP‑affiliated directors are not paid director fees or equity, reducing direct pay‑related conflicts; anti‑hedging/pledging policy applies .
- Related‑party transactions require approval by independent directors; Audit Committee reviews related‑person transactions .
- Compensation Committee uses an independent consultant (Exequity), with the committee determining no conflicts of interest .
-
Risk indicators and red flags:
- Controlled company: LGP owns 66.1% and has board designation rights; MCW may rely on controlled‑company exemptions in the future, concentrating governance power with the sponsor .
- Influence/interlocks: multiple LGP designees on Compensation and Nominating & Corporate Governance committees (Seiffer chairs Nom/Gov), which can amplify sponsor influence on pay and board composition .
- Ownership alignment: Mr. Danhakl shows no personal beneficial ownership in MCW; while he represents LGP’s controlling stake, minority shareholder alignment relies on board processes rather than personal shareholding .
- Say‑on‑pay context: Prior say‑on‑pay support was strong (95.2%), but continued oversight is warranted given sponsor influence .
Note: MCW currently complies with NASDAQ standards applicable to non‑controlled companies, but explicitly reserves the right to utilize controlled‑company exemptions while LGP remains a controlling shareholder .