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Gabriel Tirador

Gabriel Tirador

Chief Executive Officer at MERCURY GENERALMERCURY GENERAL
CEO
Executive
Board

About Gabriel Tirador

Chief Executive Officer of Mercury General Corporation since January 1, 2007; Director since 2003; previously President (2001–2023) and CFO (1998–2001). Age 60 and an inactive CPA with prior audit experience at KPMG; earlier roles include VP/Controller at Automobile Club of Southern California and Assistant Controller at Mercury (joined 1994) . Performance under his tenure shows strong 2024 recovery: net income of $467.95M and underwriting profit of $205.53M with combined ratio 0.96, producing a 2024 TSR value of $168 on a $100 base versus $92 in 2023; pay-versus-performance metrics emphasize underwriting profit, operating income, and combined ratio as key drivers .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Mercury General CorporationChief Executive Officer2007–presentLed turnaround to 2024 underwriting profit and net income recovery; focus on combined ratio discipline
Mercury General CorporationPresident2001–2023Oversaw multi-decade operations and growth; transitioned leadership to separate President/COO in 2024
Mercury General CorporationChief Financial Officer1998–2001Strengthened financial reporting and controls; brought accounting rigor
Mercury General CorporationAssistant Controller1994–1996Built foundational finance processes
Automobile Club of Southern CaliforniaVice President & Controller1997–1998External operational finance experience in insurance-adjacent services
KPMG LLPAuditorPre-1994Audit discipline; informs governance and financial oversight

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Automobile Club of Southern CaliforniaVice President & Controller1997–1998External finance leadership; operational experience leveraged at Mercury
KPMG LLPAuditorPre-1994Audit expertise; supports board and executive oversight quality

Multi-Year Compensation Summary (Gabriel Tirador)

Metric202220232024
Salary$1,174,657 $1,220,767 $1,341,933
Bonus (incl. half‑month bonus, sign‑ons)$50,152 $387,331 $56,767
Stock Awards (PSUs grant-date fair value)$926,540
Non‑equity Incentive Plan (MIP)$1,327,339
All Other Compensation$83,246 $90,250 $26,012
Total$1,308,055 $1,698,348 $3,678,591

Fixed Compensation (2024)

ComponentDetail
Base Salary$1,341,933
Target Bonus %100% of base salary (MIP target opportunity)
Actual Bonus Paid (Half‑month employee bonus)$56,767

Performance Compensation

  • Annual Cash Bonus (MIP) – 2024 | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Timing | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | GAAP underwriting profit margin (1 − combined ratio) | 100% corporate CPM | 4% margin | 4% margin (combined ratio 0.96) | CPM 100%; Individual multiplier 100%; Paid $1,327,339 | Calculated and approved in Q1 post year‑end; paid shortly after approval |

  • LTIP PSUs – Granted February 7, 2024 | Feature | Detail | |---|---| | Instrument | Performance-based phantom stock units (cash-settled) | | Performance Metrics | Average combined ratio and market share growth (equally weighted), plus individual performance; 3-year period | | Grant (Target/Threshold/Max) | Target 23,979; Threshold 11,989; Max 35,968 | | Maximum Payout | 150% of target | | Vesting Date | End of 3-year period (12/31/2026) | | Settlement Basis | Cash amount per unit based on average share price near end of period; requires continued employment through payment | | 12/31/2024 Estimated Payout Value (at target) | $1,594,109 |

Equity Ownership & Alignment

MetricValue
Beneficial ownership (common)51,213 shares; less than 1%
Shares outstanding (reference)55,388,627 (as of 3/17/2025)
Ownership % of outstanding~0.09% (51,213 / 55,388,627)
Unvested PSUs (target)23,979 units; estimated payout value $1,594,109 at 12/31/2024
Stock options – exercised in 202412,500 shares; value realized $438,810
Stock options – outstanding at 12/31/2024None outstanding
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for executives and directors (no hedging, pledging, or margin purchases)
Ownership guidelinesNot disclosed in proxy (executives)

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Employment start date at MercuryAssistant Controller from March 1994; CFO Feb 1998–Oct 2001; President Oct 2001–Dec 2023; CEO since Jan 1, 2007
Agreement/termNo employment agreement with specific term; employment at will
Severance provisionsNo severance agreements covering executive officers
Change-of-controlNo change-of-control (“parachute”) arrangements
Clawback policyMandatory recovery of erroneously awarded incentive comp for 3 years prior to a restatement; effective Oct 2, 2023
Non-compete / Non-solicitNot disclosed
Deferred compensation / SERPNone, aside from qualified 401(k); no SERP
PerquisitesPersonal use of company automobile and parking ($13,937 in 2024)

Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, Independence)

  • Board Service and Roles: Director since 2003; CEO since 2007; not independent under NYSE rules (executive officer) .
  • Committees: Member, Investment Committee (alongside George Joseph, Victor Joseph, Braunegg, Ellis, Cappello; Chair Braunegg as of Feb 7, 2025) .
  • Board Leadership: Roles split between Chairman (George Joseph) and CEO (Tirador); Lead Independent Director (Martha Marcon) coordinates independent director activities and executive sessions—mitigates dual-role concentration risk .
  • Attendance: Board held 4 meetings in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of board/committee meetings; two directors attended the 2024 annual meeting .

Director Compensation (Employee-Director)

YearDirector Fees
2022$56,000
2023$60,000
2024$0

Pay Versus Performance (Context for PEO, Gabriel Tirador)

Metric20202021202220232024
PEO Summary Comp Total$2,892,692 $1,707,323 $1,347,555 $1,698,348 $4,346,160
Company TSR (Value of $100)$113.69 $120.71 $81.33 $92.34 $168.31
Net Income (Loss)$374,606,536 $247,937,243 $(512,672,098) $96,335,874 $467,953,442
Underwriting Profit (Loss)$246,672,928 $65,010,451 $(344,067,476) $(231,655,187) $205,527,611

Company-selected performance measures: Underwriting Profit, Operating Income, Combined Ratio .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix shift toward performance-linked cash: Introduction of cash-settled PSUs under the 2024 LTIP, targeting 75% of salary for CEO, with payout up to 150% based on combined ratio and market share growth—reduces equity overhang and aligns to underwriting outcomes .
  • Annual incentive fully tied to corporate performance: 2024 MIP 100% weighted to underwriting profit margin via CPM; target 4% achieved; CPM 100% yielded $1.33M payout for the CEO, with individual multiplier at 100% .
  • Benchmarking and consultant use: Compensation Committee did not use external peer benchmarking for 2024; relied on committee experience and longstanding resolution delegations, indicating a bespoke approach tied to Mercury’s operating model .
  • Governance safeguards: NYSE-compliant clawback adopted in 2023; strict hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment risks .

Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure

  • PSUs vest after the three-year period ending December 31, 2026; payout in cash based on average share price near period end; maximum 150% of target; requires continued employment through payment .
  • Options activity: CEO realized $438,810 on exercise of 12,500 options in 2024; no options outstanding at year-end, reducing forward selling pressure from option overhang .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited, mitigating forced selling or collateral-driven disposals .

Equity Ownership & Alignment Notes

  • Beneficial ownership of 51,213 shares (<1%), with substantial unearned PSU exposure (23,979 units, $1.59M est. payout value at 12/31/2024) providing forward alignment to performance metrics; no pledging permitted .
  • Ownership guidelines for executives are not disclosed; ESOP allocations may be included in reported beneficial ownership .

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Committee composition: Independent directors Little, Braunegg, Cappello; Chair Cappello; three meetings held in 2024 .
  • Scope: Designs/administers executive comp including MIP and 2024 LTIP; considers say‑on‑pay outcomes (96% approval in 2024) in policy decisions .
  • Interlocks: No compensation interlocks; members are non‑employees .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: >96%; no changes made for 2025 based on results .
  • CEO Pay Ratio: 43:1 for 2024 (median employee $85,899; CEO $3,678,591) .

Board Service Considerations (Dual-role implications)

  • CEO serves as a director; Chairman role separated (George Joseph); Lead Independent Director established and independent-majority board mitigates independence concerns; CEO not independent under NYSE rules .
  • Investment Committee membership provides direct oversight over investment strategies and managers—aligns operating execution with capital deployment .

Related Party Transactions (Context)

  • Family affiliations centered on Joseph family; policy requires Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee oversight for transactions involving directors/CEO/5% holders; disclosed 2024 agency commissions and compensation to family members, reinforcing governance process .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: MIP exclusively tied to underwriting profit margin and LTIP PSUs tied to combined ratio and market share growth, with clawbacks and anti‑hedging/pledging policies—supports disciplined underwriting and sustainable ROE .
  • Retention risk moderate: No severance or change‑of‑control protections and cash-settled PSUs that require continued employment through payout—combines retention hooks with shareholder‑friendly exit economics .
  • Governance balance: Split Chair/CEO and Lead Independent Director structure offsets dual‑role concerns; majority independent board and committee independence; however, concentrated insider ownership and related‑party ties warrant ongoing monitoring for minority shareholder protections .
  • Trading signals: 2024 option exercise removed legacy option overhang; future cash PSU payouts linked to operational outcomes—watch combined ratio trajectory and market share gains through 2026 to gauge incentive realizability and potential payout‑driven liquidity events .