
Mark Ordan
About Mark Ordan
Mark S. Ordan is Chair of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Pediatrix Medical Group, Inc. (ticker: MD). He re-assumed the CEO role on January 12, 2025 (previously CEO 2020–2022) and has served as a Director since July 2020; he became Chair and CEO concurrently in January 2025 and is not independent under NYSE rules . He is 66 years old, holds a BA from Vassar College and an MBA from Harvard Business School . Company-level performance context: 2024 Adjusted EBITDA was $224.0M and 2024 total shareholder return (TSR) translated to a $47.21 value for a $100 investment, reflecting sector headwinds; pay-for-performance remains focused on Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted Income from Operations (AIFO) rather than relative TSR .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pediatrix (MD) | CEO; Chair; Director | CEO Jul 2020–Dec 2022; Executive Chair Jan–Jun 2023; Chair Jul 2023–Oct 2024; Executive Chair Oct 2024–Jan 2025; Chair & CEO since Jan 2025; Director since Jul 2020 | Led portfolio restructuring and leadership transitions; returned as CEO and Chair in 2025 to drive operational execution . |
| Quality Care Properties (QCP) | CEO; Director | Prior | Senior healthcare REIT leadership experience . |
| Washington Prime Group (WPG) | CEO; Director | Prior | Turnaround and public-company governance experience . |
| Sunrise Senior Living | CEO; Director | Prior | Large-scale healthcare operations leadership . |
| The Mills Corporation | CEO; Director | Prior | Public company CEO and board roles . |
| Fresh Fields Markets | Founder & CEO | Prior | Entrepreneurial founding and operational leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Carlyle Group (CG) | Director; Lead Independent Director | Since Apr 1, 2022 | Lead independent governance role at a global alternatives firm . |
| Federal Realty (FRT) | Trustee | Feb 2019–Sep 2022; also 1996–2006 (Chair 2001–2006) | Deep public REIT governance experience . |
| VEREIT (VER); Harris Teeter (HTSI) | Director | Prior | Public board experience . |
| U.S. Chamber of Commerce | Chairman | Current | National policy leadership . |
| Holton-Arms School | President of the Board | Current | Non-profit governance . |
| Vassar College | Trustee | 20 years | Higher-education governance . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | 2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | N/A as CEO | $1,000,000 | Per CEO employment agreement effective Jan 12, 2025 . |
| Executive Chair Cash Fee | $85,000/month (Mar 2024–Jan 11, 2025) | N/A | Incremental monthly fee while Executive Chair . |
| One-time Cash Retention | N/A | $2,000,000 | Paid within 30 days of Jan 12, 2025; subject to pro‑rata repayment if voluntary resignation (other than Good Reason) or termination for Cause within 3 years . |
Performance Compensation
- Annual Bonus (Cash)
- Target: 150% of base salary (metrics and range set annually by the Compensation & Talent Committee) .
- Long-Term Equity
- Equity Transformation Award: Performance Share Units (PSUs) for 640,000 shares; 3-year cliff vesting; shares earned in thirds if stock price hits 125%, 150%, and 175% of the 20‑trading‑day average closing price before Jan 12, 2025, for at least 20 consecutive trading days before the third anniversary; maximum determined by hurdles; subject to service through 3 years .
- Ongoing Annual Equity: Target grant-date fair value not less than $5.5M per year during the employment period .
| Incentive | Metric | Weighting | Targets | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO Annual Bonus (2025) | Committee-set metrics | N/A | To be set annually | N/A | N/A |
| CEO Equity Transformation Award | Stock price hurdles vs 20-day avg pre-effective date | N/A | 125%, 150%, 175% hurdles; 20 consecutive trading days | Earned by hurdle; overall vests at 3-year anniversary | 3-year cliff vest (to Jan 12, 2028) |
| Company Bonus Framework (2024, context) | AIFO (80%); Non-financial goals (20%) | 80%/20% | AIFO target $157M; scale 0–200% | AIFO achieved $183.681M → 200%; non-financial 100%; overall 180% of target | Annual cash |
The company emphasizes Adjusted EBITDA/AIFO and structured non-financial goals; shareholders approved say‑on‑pay with ~96% support in 2024 and ~97% in 2023, reflecting buy‑in to the pay design .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | As of Mar 10, 2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Common Shares Beneficially Owned | 138,683 shares | Includes 120,323 directly owned and 18,360 unvested director restricted shares with voting power . |
| Ownership % of Shares Outstanding | ~0.16% | 138,683 / 85,816,882 shares outstanding (issued and outstanding at Mar 10, 2025) . |
| Vested vs Unvested | Unvested director RS: 18,360 | Director RS typically vest on first anniversary of grant; as CEO, he no longer receives board pay, but outstanding director RS continue per award terms . |
| 2025 CEO PSU Grant | 640,000 performance share units | 3-year cliff; price‑hurdle based earning; potential meaningful upside alignment with TSR . |
| Anti‑hedging/Anti‑pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited unless able to repay without pledged shares | Applies to Directors and insiders . |
| Ownership Guidelines | NEO stock ownership multiples and 50% net‑after‑tax retention until achieved | Policy requires NEOs to meet multiples; 50% retention of net shares until in compliance . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Effective Date | January 12, 2025 | CEO appointment . |
| Initial Term & Renewal | 5-year term; automatic annual renewals thereafter | Employment Agreement . |
| Severance (Non‑CIC) | 2x base salary + 2x greater of average or target bonus + pro‑rata actual-year bonus; equity accelerated (performance awards subject to goal achievement) | Termination without Cause or for Good Reason . |
| Severance (CIC Window) | 3x base salary + 3x greater of average or target bonus + pro‑rata actual-year bonus; equity accelerated (performance awards at greater of target or actual through CIC date) | If terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within 6 months prior to or 12 months post‑CIC . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Customary non‑compete, non‑solicit, non‑disparagement, confidentiality | Employment Agreement . |
| Clawback | NYSE-compliant clawback policy in effect | Company policy updated Nov 2023 . |
| Insider Trading | Policy filed as Exhibit 19.1 to 2024 10‑K; compliance required | Prohibits hedging and controls trading windows . |
Board Governance
- Role: Chair of the Board and CEO since January 2025; not independent under NYSE rules; Board maintains a Lead Independent Director (Guy P. Sansone) to counterbalance combined roles and lead executive sessions .
- Committees: Ordan is not listed on standing committees (Audit; Compensation & Talent; Nominating & Corporate Governance; Strategy) .
- Board Activity: 8 Board meetings in 2024; each Director attended at least 75% of meetings; all Directors attended the 2024 annual meeting virtually .
- Director Pay (2024): Non‑employee Directors received cash retainers and $150,000 in RS; while Executive Chair, Ordan received $85,000 per month (Mar 2024–Jan 11, 2025). As CEO, he receives no Board compensation .
Director Compensation (Context, 2024)
| Component | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Board Cash Retainer | $80,000 per year | Non-employee Directors . |
| Chair of Board (non-employee) | $50,000 per year | Additional retainer; separate from Executive Chair fee . |
| Lead Independent Director | $50,000 per year | Additional retainer . |
| Committee Chair Fees | Audit $22,500; Comp $15,000; Nominating $12,500 | Additional retainers . |
| Annual Director Equity | $150,000 RS | Vests on first anniversary . |
| Ordan Executive Chair Fee | $85,000/month (Mar 2024–Jan 11, 2025) | Paid while Executive Chair; also received 2024 Director RS . |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 restructuring: Exited primary/urgent care and most ambulatory practices (≈$200M revenue drag), executed overhead reductions, and transitioned to a hybrid revenue cycle management model to support EBITDA improvement .
- Financial outcomes: Adjusted EBITDA $224.0M in 2024; pay-for-performance centered on Adjusted EBITDA/AIFO, not relative TSR, given payor-mix and regulatory volatility .
- Shareholder support: Say-on-pay approvals ~95.6% (2024 proxy for 2023 program) and ~96% (2025 proxy for 2024 program), reflecting investor endorsement of the updated design (multi‑year ROIC modifier; structured non‑financial goals) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Alignment levers
- High at-risk mix: CEO bonus at 150% target and a large, price-hurdle PSU (640,000 shares) create direct linkage to absolute TSR and operational execution .
- Vesting pressure/insider selling: The PSU is 3‑year cliff (no interim vesting), reducing near-term selling pressure; legacy director RS (18,360 shares) vest on standard schedule; 50% net-share retention supports alignment .
- Risk controls: Robust clawback; anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging; insider trading policy; Lead Independent Director oversight of combined Chair/CEO structure .
- Potential red flags
- One-time $2M retention cash reduces at-risk mix in year 1 (subject to clawback via pro‑rata repayment on certain separations), but strategic PSU sizing and annual equity minimum ($5.5M) mitigate by emphasizing long-term equity exposure .
- Combined Chair/CEO can raise independence concerns; presence of a Lead Independent Director and fully independent key committees partially offsets governance risk .
Employment & Contracts (Severance and CIC Economics)
| Scenario | Cash | Equity | Other |
|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause / Good Reason | 2x base + 2x greater of average or target bonus + pro‑rata actual-year bonus | Acceleration; performance awards subject to goal achievement | Customary restrictive covenants . |
| CIC + Qualifying Termination (−6/+12 months window) | 3x base + 3x greater of average or target bonus + pro‑rata actual-year bonus | Acceleration; performance awards at ≥ of target or actual to CIC | Customary restrictive covenants . |
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback (Context)
| Year | Approval | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 SOP (voted 2024) | ~95.6% | Support for 2023 program (multi‑year ROIC modifier; structured non‑financial goals) . |
| 2024 SOP (voted 2025) | ~96% | Continued support for 2024 program . |
Expertise & Qualifications
- Education: BA (Vassar); MBA (Harvard) .
- Industry: Decades as healthcare operator and public-company CEO (Sunrise, QCP, WPG), plus board leadership across healthcare and real estate .
- Governance: Lead Independent Director at The Carlyle Group; prior Chair at Federal Realty; U.S. Chamber Chairman .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: The 640,000‑share PSU tied to multi‑step stock-price hurdles and 3‑year cliff vesting tightly aligns Ordan’s realized pay with absolute TSR over his first three years; annual equity awards of ≥$5.5M further anchor long-term alignment .
- Selling/overhang dynamics: Minimal near-term vesting aside from legacy director RS; the long cliff structure reduces forced selling in the next 12–24 months, limiting insider supply pressure .
- Retention and succession: Five-year term with auto-renew and robust severance/CIC terms reduce near-term retention risk; clawback and restrictive covenants provide shareholder protections .
- Governance checks: Combined Chair/CEO role heightens independence scrutiny, but the designated Lead Independent Director and fully independent committees provide counterbalances; continued strong say‑on‑pay outcomes suggest investor comfort with the framework .
- Performance focus: Company emphasis on Adjusted EBITDA/AIFO, plus the CEO’s equity design centered on absolute stock performance, should concentrate management on durable profit growth and cash conversion; execution on RCM stabilization and portfolio refocus remains the critical lever for value creation in 2025–2027 .